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Resumo
A tecnologia VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) permite a realização de chamadas
telefónicas baratas através da Internet. Uma vez que a tecnologia VoIP utiliza a mesma
infraestrutura de Internet para o transporte da sinalização e da voz, està sujeita a todas as
ameaças de segurança que afetam a Internet. Uma dessas ameaças é o spam de voz (em
VoIP chamado SPIT), que é semelhante ao spam de e-mail mas que tem consequências
mais severas do que o spam de e-mail porque uma chamada de voz requer uma resposta
em tempo real do destinatàrio da chamada. De modo a aumentar a produtividade dos
utilizadores desta tecnologia e prevenir perdas devido à fraude a ao spam, é
extremamente importante identificar e bloquear o spam antes que afete e desagrade um
número potencialmente elevado de utilizadores da tecnologia.
O desafio no desenho de sistemas autónomos de deteção SPIT é a utilização em
simultâneo de características da chamada e da rede social que sejam difíceis de contornar
pelos spammers. Para endereçar este desafio, esta tese apresenta um sistema de deteção
autónomo de SPIT chamado Caller-REP que consiste em dois módulos. 1) Um módulo
de reputação – que calcula a reputação do utilizador através da utilização simultânea da
duração das chamadas do utilizador, do débito de chamadas do utilizador, e do número
de destinatàrios únicos que o utilizador chama. O càlculo da reputação desta forma
poderà atribuir valores de reputação pequenos aos spammers devido às suas redes de
chamadas desequilibradas e valores de reputação grandes para os utilizadores legmos. 2)
Um módulo de deteção – que, utilizando os valores de reputação, calcula de forma
automàtica um limiar abaixo do qual o utilizador é classificado como spammer.
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vSpammers e geradores de publicidade à distância têm como alvo um grande número de
destinatàrios que estão geralmente distribuídos por vàrios fornecedores de serviço (SPs).
Os sistemas de deteção autónomos consideram informação dos utilizadores registada
localmente para distinguir spammers de utilizadores legítimos. Parece óbvio que a
colaboração entre SPs poderà melhorar a exatidão e o tempo de deteção mas isto
depende da quantidade de informação partilhada entre SPs. Os SPs partilham
informação com outros SPs de forma relutante, tipicamente porque são concorrentes e
porque estão preocupados com a privacidade dos seus clientes e da sua operação. Uma
abordagem para convencer os SPs é a de partilha apenas de informação sumarizada e
com um sistema central confiàvel para protejer a sua privacidade. Para atingir o objetivo
de colaboração atenta à privacidade entre SPs, esta tese prope COSDS (Collaborative
SPIT detection System, sistema de deteção de SPIT colaborativo) que requer a
colaboração entre SPs e um repositório centralizado através da partilha de valores de
reputação. O repositório centralizado (CR) calcula a reputação global (GR) dos
utilizadores através da agregação dos valores de reputação local e responde aos SPs com
a decisão e com os valores de GR. Um adversàrio no CR estaria numa posição mais
difícil para obter informação privada sobre os utilizadores e os fornecedores de serviço.
Spammers e geradores de publicidade à distância poderão ter identidades de chamada
múltiplas para contornar o sistema de deteção de SPIT. Estabelecer uma ligação entre
identidades que pertencem a uma mesma pessoa física é importante para a identificação
mais atempada de spammers e para a caracterização completa do comportamento de
utilizadores legítimos com mais de uma identidade de chamada. O desafio no que diz
respeito a isto tem duas partes: a ligação de identidades e o càlculo de valores de
reputação para cada indivíduo através da combinação de informação das suas vàrias
identidades. Para endereçar este desafio, esta tese apresenta um sistema chamado EIS
(Early Identification of Spammer, identificação atempada de spammer) que utiliza
características da rede social e das chamadas para interligar identidades semelhantes que
pertençam ao mesmo indivíduo. A reputação é então calculada para o indivíduo em vez
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da identidade de chamada e o indivíduo classificado como spammer se a sua reputação
estiver abaixo do limiar calculado automaticamente. A ligação de identidades de
chamada poderà não só ser útil na deteção de spammers que mudam frequentemente de
identidades de chamada mas também poderà ajudar na deteção de redes criminais.
As abordagens propostas nesta tese podem, juntas, ter um impacto significativo na
identificação atempada de spammers numa rede VoIP sem serem intrusivas para o
utilizador nem precisarem de mudanças na semântica e na arquitetura da rede VoIP.
Abstract
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is the technology that allows people to make cheap
telephone calls over the Internet. As VoIP uses the same Internet infrastructure for the
transport of signaling and voice, it is subject to all security threats already effecting the
Internet. One such threat is voice spam (termed as SPIT in VoIP), which is similar to
e-mail spam but has more severe consequences than the email spam because voice call
requires real-time response from the call recipient. In order to increase productivity of
users of this technology and preventing losses due to fraud and spamming, it is
extremely important to identify and block spam before it affects and displease a
potentially large number of users of the technology.
The challenge in a design of standalone SPIT detection system is to simultaneously use
call and social network features that are difficult to be circumvented by spammers. To
address this challenge, this thesis presents the standalone SPIT detection system called
Caller-REP that consists of two modules. 1) A reputation module – that computes
reputation of the user by collectively using call duration of the user, call-rate of the user
and total number of unique recipients the user called. The computation of reputation in
this way would assign small reputation scores to spammers because of their unbalanced
calling networks and high reputation scores to legitimate users. 2) A detection module –
that computes automated threshold using reputation scores below which the user is
classified as a spammer.
Spammers and telemarketers target a very large number of recipients usually dispersed
across many Service Providers (SPs).The standalone detection systems consider locally
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recorded information of users while differentiating spammers from the legitimate users,
thus prolong detecting spammers. Obviously, collaboration among SPs would improve
the detection accuracy and detection time, but this depends on the amount of information
shared between SPs. SPs are reluctant in exchanging information to other SPs because
they are business competitor and are worried about privacy of their customers and their
operational data. SPs can be convinced with the exchange of summarized information to
the centralized trusted system so to protect their privacy. To achieve the objective of
privacy-aware collaboration among SPs, this thesis proposes COSDS (Collaborative
SPIT detection System) that require collaboration between SP and the centralized
repository with the exchange of reputation scores. The Centralized Repository (CR)
computes global reputation (GR) of users by aggregating their local reputation scores
and responds back SPs with decision and GR scores. The adversary on the CR would be
in a more difficult position to obtain private information about the users and service
providers.
Spammers and telemarketers would have multiple calling identities to circumvent the
SPIT detection system. The linking of identities that belongs to one physical user is
important for early identification of spammers and for characterizing the complete
behavior of legitimate users having more than one calling identity. The challenge in this
regard is twofold: first linking of identities and secondly computation of reputation
scores for individual by combing information from all his identities. To address this
challenge, thesis presents a system called EIS (Early identification of Spammer) that
uses social network and call features for connecting similar identities that belong to one
individual. The reputation is then computed for the individual rather than for the identity
and individual is classified as spammer if his reputation is less than automated threshold.
The identity linking would not only help in early detection of spammer frequently
change identities but would also provide effectiveness in detecting criminal rings.
All approaches proposed in this thesis can together have a significant impact on the early
identification of spammer in a VoIP network without being intrusive to end-users and
ix
without requiring any change in the VoIP network semantics and architecture.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Voice over IP (VoIP) - an Internet Protocol (IP)-based voice communication system is in-
creasingly used by a large number of people along with a traditional circuit switched net-
work (mobile, landline) for business and personal communications. In recent years, VoIP
has seen an enormous growth in the number of subscribers because it offers affordable
calling rates for any destination across the world. Moreover, it provides affordable value
services and flexibility of using IP networks for the voice communication. VoIP market
is expected to reach more than 1200 million subscribers worldwide by 2018 [CIS18] with
the expected revenue of more than $77 billion [INF15]. Figure 1.1 depicts the growth of
residential VoIP subscribers from year 2013 to year 2018. The number of business sub-
scribers is also increasing at the rate of 7.58% and would reach to 244 million business
subscribers by 2018 [CIS18]. The affordable calling rates of VoIP, its easy integration
with the IP networks, and value added services has also created a lucrative opportunity
for spammers and telemarketers to make the unwanted, bulk un-solicited calls via VoIP.
In VoIP these calls are referred as SPIT (SPam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) and are
mainly used for advertising products, harassing subscribers, convincing subscribers to
dial premium numbers, making Vishing(voice equivalent of web Phishing) attack to get
private information of call recipients etc. Spammers can also make unwanted calls to steal
user’s information [NNS+07], make calls to check unsecure gateways within the service
provider for the termination of bulk un-billed calls [ZWY+07], and cause disruption in
the network services through flooding and denial of service attacks [EGM10, KER11].
Unwanted phone calls and instant text messages can come at any hour of the day.
These unwanted calls and instant messages require immediate response from the recipi-
ent, thus annoy call recipients while at work, disturb them in their family times, and can
even interrupt sleep in late hours at night. Recent statistics on telephony spam have re-
vealed that answering a spam call would result in an estimated loss of 20 million man
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Figure 1.1: Subscribers Forecast for the VoIP Technology 2013-2018 [INF15].
hours for a small business enterprise in the United States with the estimated loss of about
$475 million annually [SPA2015]. Moreover, FTC (Federal Trade Communication) has
estimated that every year scammers and spammers causes a loss of $8.6 billion annually
to citizen of USA due to frauds and majority of them are initiated from the telephone.
Every year service providers, regulators, and law enforcement agencies receive thousands
of complaints from consumers for unsolicited, unauthorized, and fraudulent callers trying
to abuse them. In 2012, FTC (Federal Trade Communication) in USA has received four
times more complaints against unwanted calls than number of complaints they received
in 2010 [JEN15]. The number of identified spam callers has also risen to 162% from
January 2013 to January 2014 and call center fraud has risen to 45% since 2013 [PIN16].
1.1 Spam Over Internet Telephony
Voice spam or SPIT (Spam over Internet Telephony) are the unwanted, unsolicited, pre-
recorded advertisement phone calls made by the spam sender to a large number of recip-
ients that has no prior social relationship with the recipients. VoIP spammers are similar
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to email spammers as both have the same intent of delivering unsolicited information to
the recipients that contains advertisements of legal or illegal products, commit fraud to
recipients by getting their private information, and spread viruses. The spam calls and
messages can also be sent to and from the mobile telephony system and the legacy PSTN
(Public Switched Telephone Network) telephony. The following are additional forms of
spam introduced because of telephony:
Instant Message Spam: Bulk unsolicited instant messages (similar to email spam
messages) but sent instantly to users of messaging system like Skype [RSM06], What-
sApp, and Viber etc.
Presence Spam: Presence spam is a bulk unsolicited set of presence requests mes-
sages sent to the subscribers in order to get subscribers buddy or white list for sending IM
and call spam.
Virus Spam: Sending viruses inside bulk SMS or IM messages that affects operating
system of phones and discloses system vulnerabilities to spammers.
1.1.1 Consequences of Spam over Internet Telephony
SPIT is one of the interactive forms of network abuse, where call recipient is required to
responds immediately for the incoming call. Unlike email spammer, VoIP spammers are
not only irritating to recipients but also would cause significant loss because of answering
a spam call while roaming and use of other value added services while answering the
spam call. In telephony, spammers can be a threat to the subscribers of technology for the
following reasons [3GPP2015]:
Callee Account Credit Telephony subscribers pay extra amount for the value added ser-
vices such as call forwarding, roaming, automatic call back, etc. The receiving of
unsolicited calls and messages while roaming would charge call recipients for the
nothing. Similarly, automatic call back service might result in a call back to some
premium numbers without user’s intentions.
Missing Important Calls Legitimate users normally do not want to miss important calls
and forward them to the voice mail box during their periods of unavailability. How-
ever, a typical voice mail box has very limited storage capacity which can be over-
whelmed by the spam call in the form of recorded message. This would result in
resource unavailability for the calls from legitimate callers being forwarded to the
voice mail box. It would also be irritating and a waste of time for the recipient to
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go through each spam message recorded in a voice mail box. More importantly, re-
cipient would also likely to miss some important recorded message if he dismissed
them as spam on fly or if the mail box already full with the spam messages.
Vishing Vishing is equivalent to Phishing in the Web. In Vishing attack, spammer tries to
steal someone’s private information by impersonating as a legitimate entity and later
use this information for the fraud activity. In email network, Phishing might have
small impact because recipients have some time to consult others before responding
to the message, but in telephony recipients need to decide immediately otherwise
they would miss the opportunity of getting some financial benefits.
Financial Loss to Service Provider Spam traffic consumes bandwidth and network re-
sources, making resources unavailable to the legitimate users. Additionally, spam-
mers or fraudsters try to identify some open and non-secure service providers for
un-billed call termination. This would result in a serious financial damage to service
provider if spammer remains undetected for a long time periods. In the perspective
of service provider’s Quality of Service, users become annoyed if they do not re-
ceive sufficient network resources at the time of their calls. They also become an-
noyed if they receive large number unwanted advertisement calls without their con-
sent. These scenarios would increase distrust of users on their service provider and
continuous bad service would convenience them to change their service provider.
1.1.2 Motivation of VoIP Spammer
The major motivation for all spammers is get financial benefits by making frauds with
the recipients of calls and messages. Spammers make spamming attempts for advertising
legal and illegal products, disseminating religious and political campaigns, convincing
recipients to buy product, call back to the premium numbers or disclose their private
information for prize etc. The main goal of the spammers is to deliver their message to
a large number of people for greater financial benefits with small investment. Figure 1.2
depicts the spamming model of the spam caller in a VoIP network. A SPIT caller can be
categorized into two groups: 1) auto dialer – where an automated machine or a computer
generates a large number of spam calls to a large number of recipients, and 2) a human
SPIT caller – where the spammers hire a cheap labor for making unsolicited calls to a
large number of recipients. In terms of financial benefits, spammers gain benefits in three
ways. Firstly, they convince the callee to call them back on the premium numbers. For this
purpose, spammers scam people by using social engineering attacks and exploit the needs
of people in the particular societies such as offering expensive gifts and attractive tourism
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Figure 1.2: Spammer’s Network Model.
packages to historical and religious places. Secondly, they convince the callee to disclose
his private information by impersonating as a legitimate entity. Thirdly, they make callee
to listen to the complete advertisement and convenience them to buy products.
Spammers can also make spam calls or send spam messages for scanning end-user
handset for the system vulnerabilities. The ability of making anonymous calls or miscalls
to the specific callees from VoIP network also encourages spammers to use VoIP medium
for threating or annoying recipients with the denial of service attack to a specific recip-
ients. Beside financial benefits, spammers can also use telephony to spread a real time
interactive religious hate or political messages to a large number of users. In perspective
of service provider or organization, spammers can make spam calls to learn the system
vulnerabilities and identify some open gateways for a free of cost call terminations.
1.1.3 SPIT Differences from E-mail Spam
SPIT exhibits some similarity with the email spam. Both email spammer and a SPIT
caller uses Internet as a medium for conveying his core message to recipients but SPIT
causes more serious discomfort to the victims because of the real time response for the
call. In telephony, the call recipient has to decide immediately whether to accept or ignore
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the call. A callee has already been affected (waste of time) after realizing that the received
call is a spam call. Besides similarity in motivations and IP medium, SPIT exhibits some
differences from the email spams. E-mail spammer utilizes text messages, images or
attachments for conveying their message to the victims, whereas SPIT caller uses digitized
speech streams over the Internet for conveying his messages. In terms of deciding about
sender and contents inside the message, the email service provider can hold e-mails for a
sometime before finally delivering them to the recipient’s inbox, which is not noticeable
to recipient. The VoIP or Voice service provider cannot hold speech streams and signaling
messages without addition of noticeable delay in a signaling and flow of speech streams
between users. In perspective of content processing, online processing of speech content
is more challenging and resource intensive than offline processing of text messages and
images.
From the user’s perspective, a single e-mail spam can remain in the inbox unattended
for as much time as the user wishes, but in the case of SPIT or voice call user has to
respond back interactively, which makes it more annoying and disturbing. In the perspec-
tive of user’s resources, a single spam email typically consumes small number of bytes,
but a voice message in a voice mail box requires much greater space thus making voice
mail box unavailable for the legitimate calls.
In terms of human effort, the deletion of a SPIT call is more annoying and intrusive
than the deletion of spam emails. In email network, firstly, the service provider assists
end-user in classifying senders, and secondly end-user decides about email on a first look
by reading the subject. On the other hand, in telephony, a user is required to listen the
recorded call before thrashing it away as spam. The detection and deletion of spam speech
content from the voice mail box is more time consuming at it requires at least 6 steps to
completely remove the speech content from the voice mail box [TDZ+16]. Moreover,
there exists no system that allows service providers to inform callee about the nature of
calls recorded in the voice mail box. Additionally, in telephony user might also delete
some important calls if he is making decision on a fly. In a perspective of protocol ar-
chitecture, an E-mail message is composed of two parts: a header and a body. The email
header part can also provide some information about sender’s nature. Telephony calls also
consists of two parts: a call setup phase and a speech streaming phase; but the messages
exchange in call setup phase though are available in a plain text but are not providing any
information about the sender’s nature and the speech stream is only available after the call
setup.
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1.1.4 Why is it Hard to Detect SPIT Caller ?
The affordable calling rates and use of telephony services over the Internet has convinced
many subscribers and organizations to adopt VoIP as media for the business and non-
business communications. Unfortunately, these features of VoIP have also attracted spam-
mers to make use of this media for unsolicited activities to a large number of victims in-
teractively. To make VoIP usable, to improve productive and trustworthiness of services,
it is extremely important for the service provider to identifies and blocks spammers in
a timely way. Unlike other forms of spams (for example email spam, blog spam, web
spam) VoIP spam or SIPT is much more difficult to detect. This is because spam is spread
with the use of speech streams, which is only available after the call setup. Moreover,
the service provider typically does not allocate sophisticated network resources for the
processing of large number of speech samples in a real-time. Though a human user can
distinguish spam speech from non-speech, but this is always late as spammer has already
annoyed recipients with the unwanted content. The design of an effective SPIT detection
system for a VoIP service provider is a challenging task because of the following reasons:
Non-Availability of Speech Contents Before Call-Setup: A typical VoIP call consist
of two phases: 1) a call setup phase where a call request messages are exchange between
caller, callee and the service provider, and 2) a real-time media exchange phase where a
speech stream is exchange after a successful completion of call setup process. The mes-
sages that exchanged between caller, callee and proxy server during the call setup phase
are in plain text and present call handling properties of involved parties. Though the sig-
naling messages contain some information about caller and the callee, but they cannot
provide enough information to be used for identifying SPIT caller. Additionally, it is very
easy for the spammer to change his signaling messages and make them similar to the sig-
naling messages of the legitimate users, thus leaving signaling content impractical for the
spam detection. The speech contents could provide information about whether caller is
spammer or not but speech content is only available after the call setup hence very late
as spammer has already annoyed the callee with spam content. Beside this limitation,
speech content- based spam detection systems have other limitations. Firstly, processing
real-time speech content requires sophisticated system resources for a real-time process-
ing of speech content. Secondly, speech processing on active stream flows would add
unnecessary delays to the conversations. Thirdly, processing content is prohibited by law
in many countries. In spammer’s perspective, content-based approaches can be easily
evaded by the spammers by adding a random noise in the speech streams.
Intrusiveness: Callers and the callees become annoyed and irritated if they are re-
peatedly asked for solving a certain challenge or asked to provide feedback about the
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caller’s at the end of every call transactions. Existing SPIT detection approaches in-
volve callee in two ways: 1) after the call termination, and 2) before the call establish-
ment. In the first way, callees are being asked to provide positive and negative feed-
back [KD07], [DK05], [WBS+09] about the caller’s transaction as soon as call ends. This
feedback is then used for computing global reputation of the caller within the network. In
the second way, the service provider provides credentials of the caller to the callee who
can then decides whether to accept or reject the call [BAP07]. Both of these approaches
are intrusive and require changes in a VoIP infrastructure: for example the addition of
email like spam button in the VoIP or telephony handset. In terms of caller, the exist-
ing approaches ask caller to prove authentication in two ways. First, the caller is asked
to solve a certain challenge in the form of CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) or Turing test, and second, the caller
is asked to authenticate himself through the exchange of valid private and public keys.
The first approach is intrusive while the second approach though is non-intrusive but re-
quire private-public infrastructure for the authentication and authorization. Moreover, the
challenge-response- based approaches require additional system resources for handling a
large number of concurrent callers and would significantly add call setup delay.
Calling Behavior and Automatic Classification: Telephony has become a popu-
lar medium for the communication. Through Telephony, users talk to their family and
friends, and conduct businesses. A clear understanding of the communication behavior of
spammers and non-spammers can help for the effective design of a SPIT detection system
for the VoIP network. Calling behavior of users such as call-rates, the number of unique
callees of the user, the time duration of user’s interactions with their peer callees, and
the number and duration of incoming calls to the user can significantly help in model-
ing the behavior of user. The use of single feature for modeling behavior of user would
not provide an effective resistance against spammers, as spammers can easily evade them
by manipulating the single feature. For example, SPIT detection approaches proposed
in [BAP07], [RSM06] use average call duration for computing global reputation of the
user for classifying user as a spammer and a non-spammer. However, these systems can
be evaded by spammers through the creation of a Sybil network among their own identi-
ties. Moreover, the use of an average call duration feature would assign high reputation
scores to the caller having small duration calls with majority of his callees despite hav-
ing large number of recipients and non-repetitive calls. The challenge in an effective
behavioral-based spam detection is three-fold: first investigating which set of features are
difficult to be manipulated by spammers, second, investigating which features could be
used collectively for the computation of global reputation, and third having the system
that automatically decides about nature of the user without any user intervention.
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Privacy-Aware Collaboration: Existing standalone SPIT detection systems con-
sider locally recorded call logs for modeling the behavior of the users within the service
provider network. The standalone detection systems lack global view of user’s behavior
in other service providers or home service provider. These systems can prolong the de-
tection of spammers that make low rate spam calls to the recipients of particular service
provider, but distribute calls to the recipients of many service providers. Collaboration
among service providers would naturally improve the detection time and detection accu-
racy, but this depends on the amount of information exchanged during the collaboration
process. Service providers are reluctant in talking part in collaborating with other ser-
vice providers because they are business competitors and are concerned about privacy
of their customers and their internal network configuration. The challenge in the design
of an effective collaborative SPIT detection systems is three-fold: first, determine what
filtered information should be exchanged among collaborators so that service provider
remains confident and take parts in the collaboration, second, understand with whom this
information should be exchanged such that privacy of collaborating service provider is
not compromised, and third, determine what information should be return back to the
collaborating service providers.
1.2 Behavior-based Collaborative SPIT Detection System
There exist several reputation-based detection systems that use identity of a subscriber 1
for computing reputation of the subscriber within the service provider network. The core
concept in the reputation-based systems is simple that is to use the behavioral communi-
cation patterns of the subscriber and classifies subscriber as a spammer if subscriber has
abnormal communication patterns. These approaches are based on the fact that spam-
mers and non-spammers exhibit different calling behavior towards their friends and non-
friends. The reputation-based approaches have shown some effectiveness in filtering
spammers in an email and the social networks [KRS+06], [LY07]. These approaches
mainly considered social network features such as total number of recipients, the clus-
tering coefficient, reciprocity and bi-directional communication patterns of subscriber in
a network. However, in a voice network, call duration and call-rate are additional fea-
tures that can provide additional information about the relationship strength between sub-
scribers. In a telephony, legitimate subscriber normally exhibit repetitive calling behavior
with their family members and friends with a relative long duration calls [BSG+11]. The
1subscriber, individual, users terms are interchangeable in this thesis. A subscriber can be a caller who
initiates a call, can be callee who receive a call or both.
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legitimate subscribers also receive repetitive long duration calls from their family mem-
bers and friends. However, on the other hand spammers normally try to have a larger
footprint by targeting large number of users that result in a large number of small duration
calls and non-repetitive calling behavior. This behavior is due to the fact that spammers
crawls the web or a telephone directory for their victims or randomly generate large of
identities of a specific series and large number of victims are not interested in talking for
a long time.
In a VoIP network, the performance of behavioral-based anti-SPIT systems depend on
the type of social network features used for modeling the behavior and computing repu-
tation of the subscribers. The challenge in reputation-based approaches is to ensure that
they do not involve subscriber at any stage of call processing. In terms of selection of
social network features these approaches require to use number of social network features
collectively rather than using a single social network feature alone. Several reputation-
based approaches have been proposed for filtering SPIT callers in a VoIP network [KD07],
[DK05], [WBS+09], [BAP07], [RSM06], [RS05]. These approaches compute reputation
of subscribers in two steps. First, a direct trust between subscriber and his called sub-
scribers is computed from the subscriber’s past call transactions with others. Second, a
global reputation of the subscriber is computed by aggregating the direct trust scores of
a subscriber. The direct trust scores between subscribers represents a level of direct rela-
tionship between them and can be computed explicitly by getting feedback from the called
subscriber after the end of call transaction [KD07], [DK05], [WBS+09], or implicitly use
information from the call logs recorded in the call detail records [BAP07], [BSG+11]. The
global reputation represents aggregate calling behavior of the subscriber by considering
the behavior of subscriber towards all interacted subscribers.
Presently, the existing reputation-based SPIT filters are intrusive to subscribers which
not only annoy subscribers but also required changes in a VoIP handset and signaling
messages. A non-intrusive reputation-based SPIT detection system computes reputation
of subscriber by extracting information from the user’s call logs for his past transactions.
Call-Rank [BAP07] is a reputation-based spit detection system that computes global rep-
utation of the subscriber by leveraging average call duration feature between subscriber
and his callees, and the Eigen trust algorithm. Additionally, Call-Rank asks callee for the
final decision about whether to accept a call or reject a call by relaying caller’s reputation
scores and caller’s social network credentials to the callees. This approach has few limi-
tations. First, it only leverages average call duration feature for computing the direct trust
that can be prone to be evaded by the spammers targeting large number of callees and
managing good duration calls with only few of them. Secondly, Call-Rank is intrusive to
the caller during the stage of CAPTCHA test and intrusive to the callee during the deci-
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sion phase. Third, it discloses social network credentials of caller to the callee that can
breach privacy of the caller. Fourth, it requires public and private key infrastructure for
authentication which is difficult to be implemented in VoIP telephony. In [ZG09], authors
used call duration with a threshold of 20 second as sign whether caller is spamming or
not. The system considered caller call as reputed if call duration of the call is greater than
20 seconds and consider caller call as a non-reputed if call duration of the call is less than
20 seconds. However, we believe spammers would easily evade such system and would
also have high false positive if legitimate callers also have calls less than 20 seconds. In
terms of feature usage, the existing behavior-based approaches use only one feature for
the computing reputation of the caller. However, we believe that collective use of features
for computing reputation of the caller would significantly improve the effectiveness of
a SPIT detection system without involving caller and the callee. Our objectives for the
design of reputation-based SPIT filtering system for the VoIP and voice network is three-
folds: 1) it must be non-intrusive (does not require any interaction with caller and callee
at any stage of call processing); 2) it collectively uses call duration, call rate, and total
number of recipients of the caller for computing direct trust and reputation of the caller,
and 3) it automatically learns the classification threshold below which the caller is con-
sidered as a spammer. To achieve the objective of non-intrusive, feature rich collaborative
behavioral-based SPIT filtering system we argue the following:
1. Direct trust and global reputation of caller: Subscribers usually develop two types of
connections over the time: strong connections and weak connections. Strong con-
nections are established with friends, family members and colleagues with whom
subscriber interacts more frequently and for a long time duration. Weak connections
are established with the people with whom subscriber interacts less frequently and
with the smaller call durations. Call duration and call-rate between subscriber and
his friends are important features that can provide information about the strength of
the trust between subscriber and his called friends. However, we believe it should
not be limited to call duration and call-rate in one direction (caller to callee) but
should also incorporate call duration and interaction rate in both directions. A
fundamental difference in call behavior of spammers and non-spammers is that
spammers normally target an exceptionally large number of callees, whereas non-
spammers have limited number of called callees. The use of total number of recip-
ients would discriminate spammer from non-spammer but using it alone might be
prone to be bypassed by the spammer and also have false positives. We believe that
the collective use of out-degree, call rate, and call duration in both directions for
computing direct trust and global reputation of a caller would probably result in a
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small direct trust score and small global reputation score to spammers and a high
reputation scores for the legitimate users.
2. Decision and Threshold Selection: The legitimate subscribers typically have high
global reputation scores because of their strong connections with their callees. On
the other hand, spammers have small reputation scores due to imbalanced in their
communications i.e. large number of recipients, small incoming calls and small
duration calls. Existing SPIT detection approaches rely on the callee for making a
final decision about acceptance or rejection of the call, which is intrusive and re-
quire changes in a signaling messages. To reduce the interaction with the callee, the
detection and reaction system within the service provider need to decide automati-
cally whether to allow or block the caller using automated threshold. Furthermore,
the threshold should be tunable and scalable so that it can be easily integrated with
other social network features for the improved detection accuracy.
3. Service Provider Collaboration: Intelligent and smart spammers disperse their spam
calls across many service providers without overwhelming a single service provider.
These small rate spammers remain undetected by the standalone SPIT detection
systems for a relative long time period. However, the behavior of spammers nor-
mally remains same across all attacked service providers, thus having collaboration
among service providers would possibly improve the detection time and accuracy.
However, convincing service providers to collaborate is a challenging task because
service providers are reluctant in sharing information that may affect their network
and customer privacy. There is a strong need for a resource intensive collaborative
system that convinces service providers to be part of collaboration without worrying
about the privacy of their customers.
4. Identity-Linking: A high number of spammers only make few spam calls to the
recipients. This is because of two facts: first the spammer acquired a large number
of identities and is targeting users from his different identities; and secondly, ser-
vice providers block spammers for his spamming activity. Moreover, once service
provider blocks certain spammer, the spammer either whitewashes his reputation
scores or starts making spamming from a new identity. Though spammers change
their identities but their target remains the same and there is a possibility that spam-
mer has overlap in targets from their different identities. The linking of different
identities of spammers would help in early detection of spammers that make small
rate intelligent spamming to a large number of recipients from their different iden-
tities over time. Moreover, identity linking would also help in characterizing social
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behavior of people with more than one identity and possibly identifies criminal’s
rings.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The thesis has three major contributions. First, we address the problem of spam from
the perspective of standalone service provider, second, we involve service providers to
take part in collaboration for early detection of spammer, and third we propose a method
for identity linking in a voice networks. The major contributions of this thesis can be
summarized as follows:
Standalone SPIT Detection System: A non-intrusive reputation-based standalone SPIT
detection system has been proposed that uses past calling behavior of subscriber
modeled from the call details record of subscriber. To achieve objectives of an
effective and non-intrusive standalone SPIT detection system, we contribute the
following:
• We present a method for computing direct trust between caller and the callee,
and a method computing global reputation of the caller in a service provider.
The proposed method explicitly uses information from the subscriber’s past
call transactions and computes global reputation of the caller in two steps.
In the first step, a direct trust between caller and the callee is computed by
using three features collectively, namely: call-rate in both directions (caller
to callee and callee to caller), call duration in the both directions and total
number of callees of the caller. In a second step, a global reputation of the
caller is computed by aggregating the normalized direct trust score of caller
with his callee using modified power iteration algorithm. The computation
of reputation in this way would assign a high global reputation scores to the
legitimate callers and a small reputation scores to the spammers because of
their non-connected social network and large number of target callees.
• We present an automatic procedure for computing dynamic threshold below
which callers are considered as spammers. For the automatic threshold, we
adopted a dynamic 25th percentile based threshold that is being computed for
each global aggregation cycle. The threshold is scalable and tuneable accord-
ing to the requirement of the service provider detection policies and can be
easily integrated with other call and social network features.
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• A model for privacy protection of caller and the callee while computing repu-
tation of the caller from the CDRs (Call Detail Records). CDR contains sensi-
tive information about the social relationships network of subscriber with the
other and the subscriber requires absolute protection of his data and relation-
ship information. The privacy of the subscriber is protected by sending filtered
information to the reputation engine. To achieve this objective, the proposed
system adopts the following: first, the task of reputation computation and the
detection is carried out on an independent system separated from the proxy
server or main CDRs database, and second, a filtered and anonymized CDR is
exchanged with the reputation and detection system. The detection and rep-
utation engine responds back with the final results about subscriber without
disclosing his friendship network.
• Telecommunication data-sets are not available to analyze the performance of
a detection system. In order to evaluate the performance of propose system, a
detailed synthetic model is therefore required for the generation of synthetic
data-set that can characterize the behavior of spammers and non-spammers in
a real telecommunication network. To achieve this objective, we developed
a comprehensive synthetic model for the generation of synthetic data-set that
considers social behavior of spammers and non-spammers in terms of call-
rates, call durations, and out-degree distribution. The synthetic data-set is
generated for a number of days and for different percentages of spammers and
non-spammers. Finally, the standalone SPIT detection system is evaluated for
the different performance metrics that are accuracy, true positive rate, false
positive rate etc.
Collaborative SPIT detection System: A collaborative SPIT detection system is pre-
sented that aggregates information from the collaborating service providers without
compromising privacy of collaborators and their customers. To achieve objectives
of a privacy-aware collaborative SPIT detection system we contribute with the fol-
lowing:
• A privacy aware collaborative model is presented for the exchange of infor-
mation among collaborating service providers. The proposed model protects
privacy of the collaborators and their customers through the use of trusted cen-
tralized repository and through the exchange of non-sensitive information to
the centralized repository. The centralized repository computes global reputa-
tion of the subscriber by applying a weighted average algorithm and updates
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collaborating service providers with the reputation scores and classification
decisions. The intruder or an adversary at a centralized repository would not
be able to infer social relationship network of subscribers and would also not
be able to learn private information of collaborating service providers.
• A procedure for aggregation of received reputation scores from the collaborat-
ing service providers and a detection decision. The proposed procedure uses
a weighted averaging mechanism for the reputation aggregation. Moreover, a
procedure for the computation of trust among service providers has also been
proposed. We have also analyzed the privacy breach analysis for different
adversarial information.
• A procedure for the generation of extended synthetic data-set which consid-
ers users behavior within their home network and the visiting networks. The
model is an extension of the model presented in contribution 1 and incorpo-
rates calls among different service providers. The collaborative SPIT detec-
tion system has also been analyzed for different numbers of collaborators and
for different calling behavior of spammers.
Identity Linking and Early Identification of Spammer: An Identity linking system that
connects multiple identities of a single individual within the service provider. In de-
veloping this, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce an ID-CONNECT system, a social network and behavior based
model that links similar identities that probably belongs to a one physical in-
dividual. In ID-CONNECT, the weights on the links between identities are
computed from the interaction rates and length of interactions. Individuals,
especially spammers normally exhibit similar call behavior and have overlap
in victims from their many identities. Two identities can only be considered
as similar if they have common friends have similar calling behavior towards
common friends. ID-Connect is a two-step approach: firstly, it estimates the
weighted similarity measure between identities by considering the call behav-
ior of identities towards their common friends. Secondly, it generates candi-
date set for the given identity using fixed thresholds.
• A reputation engine that computes reputation of the individual by using call-
rate, call duration and out-degree of the individual after connecting his identi-
ties. The input to the reputation engine is the data of linked identities formu-
lated from the ID-CONNECT module. We believe that reputation computed
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after linking identities of an individual and analyzing his aggregate calling
behavior would greatly separate spammers from the non-spammers.
• A detection module for computing automated classification threshold below
which individuals are flagged as spammers. A dynamic automated threshold is
being computed for each reputation cycle using the percentile based approach.
• We validate and evaluate EIS system through a comprehensive simulation
study using a synthetic data set that we have generated using true behavior of
spammers and non-spammers. The experimental results show that EIS system
outperforms other identity linking systems and has shown effective resistance
against spammers having many identities.
The work presented in this thesis is intended to identify and block spammers in voice
and VoIP service providers. The solution is non-intrusive and can be deployed within the
service provider as a standalone system without making any substantial changes in the
network. Additionally, the standalone system can also be integrated with other solutions,
for example Turing or CAPTCHA test as a solution for the improved detection accuracy.
1.4 Publications
The results of this thesis have been presented in the following publications:
1. Early Identification of Spammers Through Identity Linking, Social Network and
Call Features [Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Ricardo Morla] Submitted to Elsevier
Journal of Computational Sciences (Major Revision)
2. Blocking Spammers with Information Sharing across Multiple Service Providers
[Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Ricardo Morla] Submitted to IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing (Major Revision).
3. System and Methods for Detecting Spammers in a VoIP Network [Muhammad
Ajmal Azad, Ricardo Morla] To be Submitted.
4. Caller-REP: Detecting unwanted Calls with Caller Social Strength Muhammad
Ajmal Azad, Ricardo Morla] In Elsevier Computers & Security, Volume 39,Part
B, pp-219-236.
5. ID-CONNECT: Combining Network and Call Features to Link Different Identities
of a User [Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Ricardo Morla] In The 18th IEEE Confer-
ence on Computational Science and Engineering (18th IEEE CSE, Privacy, Trust
and Security Track), October 2015.
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6. COSDS: Privacy Aware Collaborative SPIT detection System [Muhammad Ajmal
Azad, Ricardo Morla] in Ist Symposium on electrical and computer engineering
June 2015.
7. Mitigating SPIT with Social Strength [Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Ricardo Morla]
In The 11th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Com-
puting and Communications (TrustCom) 25-27 June 2012.
8. Multistage SPIT detection in Transit VoIP [Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Ricardo
Morla] In The 19th International Conference on Software, Telecommunications
and Computer Networks (SoftCOM) 14-17 September 2011.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 describes the state-of-the-art research on the spam detection in a VoIP net-
work. We provide state-of-the-art for the following: Standalone SPIT detection systems,
collaborative SPIT detection systems, and identity linking systems. Moreover chapter 2
also discusses advantages and disadvantages of existing systems and motivates for the
design of our behavioral-based collaborative SPIT detection system.
Chapter 3 describes social behavior of the spammers and the non-spammers. This
chapter also describes call detailed records used for the generation of call graph of the
subscribers and examines the behavioral features that better characterize and differentiate
spammers from the non-spammers.
Chapter 4 motivates and describes our standalone SPIT detection system. A stan-
dalone method is proposed for computing reputation of the subscriber through his call
and social network features, and classification threshold is computed below which a sub-
scriber is classifies as a spammer.
Chapter 5 motivates the objectives and needs for the collaborative SPIT detection
system. A collaborative SPIT detection system is proposed that uses trusted centralized
repository and filtered information for the collaboration process.
Chapter 6 presents a mechanism for connecting identities that belong to one physical
subscriber. A method is proposed that estimates similarity between two identities from
CDRs at two different time periods. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the effect of
identity linking on the SPIT detection.
Chapter 7 discusses the impact of this thesis and highlights some future research issues
related to security and privacy in a VoIP and voice network.
Chapter 2
Systems for Detecting Unwanted
Communications in a VoIP Network
In the past few years, social networks and telephony (mobile, fixed and VoIP) have be-
come the most important form of communication media for instant messaging and inter-
active communications. Spam over the Internet has long been the problem in the form of
email spam that results in an overall loss of tens of billions of Dollars annually. However,
recently email spamming has dropped drastically [REP15] as spammers are finding new
ways to target users of other technologies such as telephony and social networks with
the unsolicited communications. Spamming in an interactive media such as VoIP, instant
messaging and traditional circuit switched network is more annoying than email spam-
ming as recipients are required to respond the incoming call request immediately. These
unwanted calls not only effect productivity of subscribers but also causes a financial loss
to the target victim. Besides gaining financial benefits, spammers also try to distribute
malware to infect recipient’s mobile and VoIP handsets or to find system vulnerabilities.
In recent years, VoIP telephony has shown tremendous increase in the number of
subscribers because of affordable telephony rates and flexible use of Internet technology
for a voice communication. It is of utmost importance for the service providers to have
an effective SPIT detection system that can significantly contribute telephony subscribers
from abuses and frauds. The effective detection of spammers would not only increase
productivity of telephony subscribers but also improve trust of subscribers on their service
providers.
Several approaches have been proposed for combating spammers in a VoIP network.
These approaches can be grouped into two categories: content-based SPIT detection sys-
tems and the identity-based SPIT detection systems. The content-based detection systems
process the speech streams that are being exchanged between sender and the recipient for
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the identification of a famous spam phrase or word. The identity-based SPIT detection
systems use identity of the subscriber (calling identity or IP-address) to monitor the be-
havior of the subscriber within the service provider network. This chapter provides an
overview of the prior works that have been carried out for identifying and blocking spam-
mers in a VoIP network. Specifically, this chapter is organized in three major sections: 1)
it provides detail discussion on approaches that have been proposed for blocking spam-
mers in a service provider network; 2) it provides detail discussion on the works that
have been carried out for collaboration among service providers; and 3) the works that
have been performed for linking identities that belong to the single individual across the
network.
2.1 Stand-alone SPIT detection
The stand-alone spam detection system monitors behavior of users within the jurisdiction
of a single service provider. This section outlines some of the standalone SPIT detection
approaches that have been proposed for mitigating spammers in a standalone VoIP net-
work. The taxonomy of standalone SPIT detection systems is shown in Figure 2.1, and
each block of the Figure 2.1 is described in sections below.
2.1.1 Content-based Detection Systems
Content processing has been widely used for mitigation of email spams [UT08], [SV99],
detection of spammers and spam content in the blogs [KJF+06], identification of mali-
cious and spam web pages [NNM+06], filtering of spam messages in the online social
networks [SML+14], and filtering of SMS spam in a mobile network. The content-based
approaches apply sophisticated machine learning mechanisms [UT08], [SV99] to the la-
belled (spam and non-spam) contents and classify new content as a spam and a non-spam.
The content-based approaches have also been used in the VoIP networks for processing
speech content in order to find famous spamming phrases and words.
In a VoIP network, content-based approaches can be grouped into two categories: on-
line speech processing and offline speech processing. In online speech processing, the
detection system processes the speech content in real-time that is flowing between sender
and the recipient, whereas the offline approaches process the speech content stored on
the voice mail box and the media servers. Spammers normally replicate their spam-
ming contents to all their target subscribers, which can be stored in the voice mail box
of the target subscribers. A content independent offline speech processing method has
been proposed in [ISW13] that estimates similarity between speech samples left on the
20 Systems for Detecting Unwanted Communications in a VoIP Network
Figure 2.1: A Taxonomy of SPIT Detection Systems.
media server for unattended calls by the caller. The similarity between speech samples
can also be estimated by estimating the distance between online speech samples and fin-
gerprints [SMG+12], [LGK+11], [PK08] of speech samples left on media servers. The
content-based approaches can also be implemented in the form of multistage systems col-
laborating with other approaches in order to improve the detection rate and minimize false
detection. In [SNT+06], a two stage Multi-layered Fusion-based method has been pre-
sented that considered information from signaling messages and speech contents while
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making decision about the behavior of a subscriber 1 as a spammer or a non-spammer.
Content-based approaches have shown great resistance against spammers in an email
or social networks. In these networks, contents are generally available in the form of
text and images that does not require sophisticated system resources for processing and
matching. Moreover, users of these networks are normally not worried about the delay in-
corporated between their conversations when spam detection systems have been deployed
for analyzing the contents. However, in a VoIP network, applying content-based systems
for spam detection have several limitations because of processing of voice streams in
real-time. Firstly, the deployment of speech processing engine would introduce some
noticeable delays between conversations of subscribers and this delay greatly annoy the
subscribers as they do not want to have long delays in their conversation. Secondly, the
service provider requires sophisticated signal processing system and network resources
for the processing of online speech streams in near to real-time. Thirdly, content-based
approaches decide about caller at a second stage and spammers have already annoyed
call recipients with the spam signaling (telephony ringing) and listening to some seconds
of call. In the perspective of spammers, content-based approaches can easily be circum-
vented by slight modification of speech contents and addition of noisy speech streams.
The call setup messages are exchanged between subscribers which are usually avail-
able in the form of plain text. The call setup messages can also be processed for the identi-
fication of spam content and spammers. However, the structure and messages exchanged
during the call setup phase and termination phase does not have valued information to
be used for spam detection. Additionally, the call setup messages of spam and non-spam
calls are same and do not provide any information to be used for classifying subscriber as
a spammer or a non-spammer. It is very easy for spammers to craft the call setup messages
so that it looks like a call that is originated from a legitimate caller. In some scenarios,
content-based approaches would not have a global implication as people from different
regions have different calling and greeting behavior. Lastly and most importantly, in most
countries listening, recording and processing speech streams of subscribers is prohibited
by law thus the privacy of the subscribers is not protected at all.
2.1.2 Challenge/Response-based Detection Systems
A C/R (Challenge/Response) system is a type of spam filtering system that initiates an
automatic challenge to the subscriber and subscriber needs to reply correctly to the given
challenge. The C/R-based systems allow subscriber to call if the subscriber correctly
responds the challenge and block subscriber if he fails to solve the challenge. Spam
1The terms such as subscribers, end-users and callers are interchangeable in this thesis
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call can be generated by the human or an automated machine. Humans (legitimate and
non-legitimate) can easily solve the challenge initiated by the proxy server, whereas ma-
chines would not be able to solve initiated challenges in a timely manner. The C/R-
based anti-SPIT approaches can be implemented in two ways: 1) through authentication
and authorization carried out in a non-intrusive way without involving subscriber for the
explicit response and instead using encryption or handshake mechanism with the sub-
scriber at the time of registration and call request [SS04] in a seamless way, and 2) a
method where the proxy server initiates a CAPTCHA challenge to be solved by the sub-
scribers [LK07], [QNT+08], [QNT+07] in a timely manner.
In [SS04], subscribers are asked to pass through two authentication phases before
placing a call to the callee. In the first stage, authentication of subscriber is carried out
through digest access authentication – exchange of credentials on which the VoIP proxy
server and the subscriber agreed upon such as username or password, and in the second
stage, a proxy server authenticates the subscriber through transport layer security and
DNS service records. Legitimate subscribers normally have pauses in their conversations,
whereas spammers do not have pauses especially at the start of the conversation that re-
sults in a speech overlap between spammers and their callees. A hidden Turing test mech-
anism has been proposed in [QNT+07] that considers talking behavior of subscribers and
monitors the overlaps in the speech streams flowing between subscriber and his call re-
cipients. In [LK07], service provider asks subscriber to solve a Human Interactive Proof
(HIPs) test by pressing phone keys against initiated challenge. Text and image-based
CAPTCHA are not feasible to deploy in a VoIP or voice network, therefore speech-based
CAPTCHA is the only available option for initiating the challenge to the subscriber. The
subscriber will then respond by pressing combination of certain phone keys in the form
of DTMF (Dual Tone - Multi Frequency) signals. In [SG10], audio CAPTCHA is gen-
erated to the subscriber and subscriber responds the challenge by pressing phone keys.
In [SKE+14], authors combine audio CAPTCHA and game theoretic model for authen-
ticating the subscribers. Besides, solving the challenge and providing the credentials,
subscribers are also asked to call back the service provider [CO05] for proving their au-
thentication. The approach presented in [CO05] uses anonymous verifying authority and
mediator for initiating call back request and block subscriber if call back request is not
fulfilled within a specific time period. A C/R-based system can also be combined with
other anti-SPIT systems so that challenge is initiated only to few subscribers or to only
new subscribers. The multi-stage C/R-based system would minimize the false detection
rate and improve the detection accuracy.
C/R-based approaches are well suited for blocking machine or auto-dialer spam-
mers but deployment in a real-network has problems. Authenticating subscriber via
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CAPTCHA or public-private key would introduce notable call setup delay which might
displease subscriber for each call made. Though public-private key-based C/R systems
are non-intrusive but they require public-private key infrastructure for assigning keys.
CAPTCHA test is intrusive to the subscribers and additionally has some other limitation.
A CAPTCHA system usually requires solving some challenge which might be difficult
to solve by the people with a certain degree of disability. In perspective of spammers,
CAPTCHA-based approaches can be circumvented by hiring cheap human spammers.
For example, spammers can set-up a network of cheap workers for solving the audio
CAPTCHA challenge and then relay voice streams from the media server upon successful
authorization of the call. In perspective of service provider, C/R-based system especially
CAPTCHA system requires additional network and system resources for initiating and
processing of challenges and their responses for a large number of subscribers in parallel.
2.1.3 Access List-based Detection Systems
The list-based approaches are the simplest identity based anti-SPIT filters. The proxy
server checks the database list during the call setup phase. Whitelist maintains the database
of identities that are allowed for using the network and blacklist maintains the database
of identities barred from calling. A list database can be either global – applied to all
subscribers or the local – applied to the particular subscribers. In addition to black and
white list, a grey list [HHM+06], [SAS06] can also be used for maintaining the list of
subscriber to be observed for further time period. A greylist maintains the database of
identities that are challenged for the authorization or monitored for some extended time
periods. In a greylist, if a subscriber exhibits spamming behavior over some pre-defined
extended time period then subscriber is permanently moved to a blacklist, otherwise sub-
scriber is moved to the whitelist. The list-based approaches need to be implemented
along with other approaches that actually decides which list the user should be placed
in [KD07], [DK05], [OS09].
A common problem with blacklist-based SPIT filtering is the inclusion of legitimate
subscribers who were mistakenly reported or classified as the spammers because of per-
sonal dislikes. Additionally, it becomes difficult for the subscribers to get their identities
out of the blacklist. Spammers can easily evade the blacklist database by spoofing iden-
tities of legitimate subscribers not included in the blacklist. A whitelist is useful for con-
trolling which subscribers are allowed for calling globally and local. However, it would
not allow new subscriber or a legitimate subscriber wishing to call someone for the first
time. In perspective of service provider, maintaining a large global and local list database
is problematic and requires continuous update. Moreover, list-based approaches need to
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be implemented with other SPIT detection approaches that actually decides whether to
include subscriber in the respective (black,white and grey) list or not.
2.1.4 Cost-based Detection Systems
VoIP offers affordable calling rates that has not only attracted legitimate subscribers but
has also attracted spammer for making unsolicited advertisement calls to a large number
of recipients. One way to block spammers is to impose some extra cost on subscribers
classified as spammers. In this scenario, a service provider first deducts some money
from the subscriber credit and returns back if subscriber is classified as legitimate later
at end of call. If subscriber is classified as a spammer later on then the service provider
will withhold the deducted money and distributes this money among spammer’s victim
callees. The cost-based approach needs to be implemented with other approaches [RJ08]
that actually decides whether to return back money or not.
A major limitation of cost based system is that it requires comprehensive micro-
payment system for the computation of deduction and holding of money. Moreover, cost-
based systems are dependent on other SPIT classification methods for the final decision.
It might also be possible that cost-based systems would charge legitimate subscriber and
would also mistakenly block legitimate subscriber if subscriber has insufficient balance
required for the deduction but greater than the amount required for the call.
2.1.5 Policy-based Detection Systems
In a policy-based anti-SPIT systems, service provider defines policies that instructs anti-
SPIT system to monitor the behavior of incoming call request according to subscriber’s
network-wide policies [GKB+12]. In [DSN09], authors proposed policy-based anti-SPIT
system that maintains subscriber preferences and policies using call processing policy
framework [STM] for blocking the spammer. In [SDG08], authors used adaptive pol-
icy system based on the definition of a set of rules along with actions and controls for
mitigating the SPIT attack. In [TFP+06], authors presented a system that uses Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) for authenticating the subscriber in the network.
The policy-based systems are well suited for the small operators or local enterprise orga-
nization because maintaining policies for thousands of users in a big operator are difficult
and unmanageable task.
The major limitation of policy-based SPIT detection systems is the maintenance and
updating of subscriber public and private policies. Moreover, policy-based systems would
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add noticeable delay during call setup phase because of processing of policies of sub-
scriber and his behavior towards these policies. In perspective of spammer’s attack,
policy-based system can be circumvented by spammer through spoofing the policies of
the legitimate callers.
2.1.6 Legislation-based Detection Systems
The primary goal of the legislation is to create a legislative framework that would make
spamming illegal and impose punishment on those involved in spamming activities. Eu-
ropean Union, USA and Canada has already made some reasonable efforts in terms of
legislation against initiators of spamming [ITU15], [CJE15], [LAW15]. These legisla-
tions prohibit unsolicited communication to reach the recipient unless prior consent of the
recipient is obtained. The major limitation of legislation-based anti-SPIT system is the
difficulty of tracing back the initiators of spam communication for the law enforcement
agencies. Moreover, if the regulator or law enforcement agencies trace-back the initiator
of unsolicited communication even then there is no such global law exists that will apply
to spammers across the world. Moreover, spammers make spams from anywhere around
the world thus make anti-spam law of one country inapplicable to the spammer spamming
from places where no such law exists.
2.1.7 Multi-Stage Detection Systems
The Multi-Stage anti-SPIT systems require internal collaboration among many indepen-
dent standalone systems within the service provider in order to improve the detection ac-
curacy and detection time. The multistage systems collectively utilize information from
many standalone components or systems in order to make decisions about behavior of
the subscriber. In [SNT+06], authors presented two stage system that processes speech
streams and signaling messages of the subscriber for blocking the SPIT caller. Similarly,
in [GM08], authors presented a two stage system that is based on the CAPTCHA test
and a speech processing. In [DK05], authors presented content independent multistage
system consisting of three stages: 1) a Rate limiting stage – that monitors call statistics
such as call rate in a certain time period, 2) a blacklist module – for including spammers
in a blacklist, and 3) a multivariable Bayesian network – for inferring reputation of a
subscriber from the subscriber direct trust scores with other subscribers. In [QNT+08],
authors use different thresholds for computing reputation at each stage of multistage de-
tection system. In a first stage, the system computes reputation score of the subscriber and
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compares this reputation score against two thresholds – low and high thresholds for for-
warding call to the next stage. In a second stage, the system invoke Turing test for autho-
rization and in a third stage the system asks call recipients for the feedback about the ini-
tiator of the call. In [AM11], authors presented a four stage system for blocking spammers
in a transit VoIP network using internal collaboration between many stages. In [SAS06],
authors use subscriber’s short and long time call patterns and blocks spammers using col-
laboration among various list databases – white, black and grey list. In [MNS08], authors
proposed multistage system that incorporates feedback from multiple stages while mak-
ing decision about subscribers as a spammer and a non-spammers. The multistage stage
system requires collaboration among well-known detection systems such as blacklists,
whitelists and call statistical analysis (call duration and call rate) into a multistage SPIT
detection system.
It is obvious that multistage systems would provide better detection accuracy and
detection time but their performance depends on the types of standalone systems used
together. The content-based multi-stage systems have same limitations as of approaches
based on the speech content processing. Similarly, the CAPTCHA and reputation-based
systems require interaction with the caller and the callee, thus are intrusive. Another
major issue with multi-stage systems is that they would introduce considerable high delay
during call setup phase.
2.1.8 Call Statistics-based Detection Systems
A VoIP call consists of two parts: 1) a signaling phase – a series of call setup message
exchanged between subscribers and the proxy server at the time of call request, and 2)
a speech streaming phase – the exchange of actual speech content between caller and
the callee after the call establishment phase. The statistics-based SPIT detection systems
monitor different call statistics of the subscriber that are: the call-rate, the call duration,
inter-arrival time between call requests made by a subscribers, number of speech pack-
ets exchanged between subscribers, which subscribers disconnected the call etc. Several
machine learning approaches have also been applied to call statistics and calling behavior
of subscribers for differentiating spammers from the non-spammers [TS13]. The infor-
mation from call statistics (call rate, call duration etc.) and calling behavior (number of
friends, number of incoming calls etc.) of subscribers can also be used for computing rep-
utation of the subscribers which is then used to block subscriber if reputation of subscriber
is less than certain threshold.
The major limitation of statistics-based approaches is learning the behavior of legiti-
mate and non-legitimate subscribers. It would be difficult in a statistical system to differ-
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entiate the spammer from the non-spammer with small false positives. In perspective of
spammers, statistics-based systems could be easily circumvented by spammers by con-
trolling the similar call statistics and also by spoofing identity of legitimate subscribers.
In perspective of deployment, learning a dynamic threshold for each subscriber and for
each aggregation cycle is also challenging and problematic.
2.1.9 Device Fingerprinting-based Detection Systems
A device fingerprint is the information that has been recorded on a proxy server or a re-
mote computing device for the purpose of identifying devices and software used by the
subscriber. The fingerprinting-based anti-SPIT systems create fingerprints for a set of
devices used for making calls in a VoIP network. The fingerprinting-based approaches
assume that spammers and non-spammers uses different telephony devices and commu-
nication protocol stakes for making and receiving calls. These approaches are grouped
in two types: active fingerprinting and the passive fingerprinting. In active fingerprint-
ing remote device asks subscriber for transmitting packets to remote system for device
analysis, whereas in the passive fingerprinting remote device actively monitor the finger-
prints of device originating the calls. In [HSZ+06], authors analyze fingerprints of several
commercial hard and soft phones for different call response messages using active and
passive fingerprinting. The use of device fingerprinting in real deployment is not practical
and scalable as it requires management of fingerprints large number of commercial and
non-commercial VoIP devices. Additionally, spammer can bypass fingerprinting-based
systems by adopting fingerprints and protocol stack similar to the devices used by the
legitimate subscribers.
2.1.10 Honeypot-based Detection Systems
Spammers normally crawls web or telephone directory for the collection of target iden-
tities without knowing whether target identities are real or virtual. Honey phones are
virtual phones not assigned to human users but are used for analyzing the behavior of
subscribers making calls to them. As honey-phone is not assigned to any physical person
thus naturally would not make any call to users or receive any call from the legitimate sub-
scriber. Subscribers calling honey-phones could be spammers but confirmation requires
analysis of subscriber behavior towards honey-phones [NNS+07], [GSB+15], [LCW10]
and other network users. In [GSB+15], authors deploy a large scale cloud based honeypot
system for analyzing the social behavior of callers making calls to these honey-phones.
In [BGG+16] authors deploy a MobiPot - a honeypot mobile system for collecting the
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fraudulent calls and SMS. These calls and SMS are then analyzed for studying the mech-
anism used by spammers for collecting the identities of target victims and spamming
attack patterns.
Honeypot-based solution can identify spammers that are targeting to them but would
not be able to identify those spammers spamming other users in the network. The spam-
mers can also bypass honeypot systems by learning the numbering pattern of honey
phones or by using phone numbers of confirmed human beings.
2.1.11 Reputation-based Detection Systems
Collaboration among subscribers can assist subscribers who wish to make decision about
whether to receive or reject the call from the subscribers not known to them. The reputation-
based systems operate in two ways: distributed – where each subscriber directly collabo-
rates with other subscribers and a centralized system – where subscriber directly collabo-
rates with the centralized service provider or system. Several reputation-based anti-SPIT
systems have been proposed for filtering spam in a VoIP network. These systems consist
of two steps: computing direct trust between subscribers engaged in communications and
then aggregation of direct trust scores of subscribers for their global behavior. The direct
trust represents strength of direct relationship between subscriber and his interacted sub-
scriber, whereas the global reputation represents aggregate behavior of subscriber towards
all his interacted subscribers. If trust and reputation score of the subscriber is higher than
some learned or fixed threshold then subscriber is considered reputed otherwise subscriber
is considered non-reputed.
The direct trust between subscriber and his interacted subscriber can be computed in
two ways: 1) intrusive way – that implicitly requires interaction with the call recipient
of the subscriber [KD07], [DK05], [WBS+09] for the feedback about subscriber, and 2)
a non-intrusive way – that explicitly utilize information from call logs recorded for the
billing purposes [BAP07], [RSM06], [RS05]. The global reputation score of the sub-
scriber can be computed in two ways: by applying Eigen Trust [BAP07] to the direct
trust scores and by applying machine learning approaches such as Bayesian networks and
clustering to the direct trust scores of subscriber [KD07], [DK05],
Spammers normally exhibit different calling behaviors from the legitimate subscriber
with the following properties: they target large number of recipients, receive calls from
only few callees and many of their received or made calls are of small duration. This
calling behavior normally results in a spammer’s disconnected social network with the
large number of their target victims. On the other hand legitimate subscribers normally
have small number of recipients, have repetitive calling behavior with many of their called
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callees and also receive good number of calls from their called callees. This calling be-
havior of legitimate subscribers results in a subscriber’s strong relationship network with
many of his callees. In [BAP07], authors proposed a Call-Rank system – a reputation-
based system that uses average call duration for computing direct trust between subscriber
and his called callees. The global reputation of subscriber is then computed by applying
Eigen trust algorithm to the subscriber’s direct trust scores. Finally, Call-Rank asks callee
for the final decision (accepting call or rejecting call) by sending reputation scores and
social network credentials of caller to the callee. In [ZG09], authors considered sub-
scriber interaction with his callee as reputed if call duration is greater than 20 seconds.
In [COB+11] authors used call duration along with seven degree separation as a social
network feature for the computing of reputation of the subscriber across the network.
In [BSG+11], authors proposed three reputation-based solutions for filtering SPIT sub-
scriber. In the first approach, they used concept of strong and weak social ties among
subscribers, in the second approach, they enhanced Progressive Multi Grey-Leveling list
to the Enhanced Progressive Multi Grey-Leveling by using call density and reciprocity-
index features, and in the third approach, they adopted Page-Rank algorithm for comput-
ing global reputation of the subscriber.
The direct trust between subscriber and his callees can also be computed by collect-
ing feedback (positive or negative) from the callee for the subscriber’s call transaction
which just ended. In [WBS+09], authors computed reputation of the subscriber aggregat-
ing callee’s feedback about the subscriber’s calls. The reputation scores and call statis-
tics of subscriber are then used along with MPCK-Mean – a semi supervised clustering
algorithm for clustering subscriber into SPIT and non-SPIT clusters. The proposed sys-
tem performs well only when callee provides honest and accurate information about the
caller. In [KD07] and [DK05] authors proposed a multistage system for the identifica-
tion of spammers. The system consists of three stages that collaborates with each other:
the direct trust stage computes direct trust between subscriber and his callees by aggre-
gating feedback from the callee for the subscriber call, the global reputation stage that
computes reputation by applying Bayesian network algorithm to the direct scores of the
subscriber to all his callees, and the list database that maintains list of black and white
listed subscribers. In [PD09], authors proposed an approach that aggregates callee feed-
back along with G-mail spam filtering method for blocking the spammers. In [PGK+08],
authors proposed two approaches based on the content processing and feedback aggrega-
tion about behavior of the subscriber from his callees. In [SDN+09], authors computed
reputation of the subscriber through a web of trust model between subscriber in a net-
work. In [GYH08], authors proposed a multilayer system that incorporates behavioral
characteristics of subscriber and his call signaling messages. One of the major limitations
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of intrusive reputation approaches is their intrusiveness and also requires change in a VoIP
handset and call signaling messages. Moreover, spammers can easily circumvent intru-
sive approaches by creating network among his identities and providing fake responses
for their identities.
Reputation based anti-SPIT systems have shown great effectiveness against spammers
in email and VoIP network but their effectiveness depend on the set of features used for
the computation of global reputation. In some cases, spammer could get high reputation
scores by creating a Sybil network between his acquired identities and also spoofed identi-
ties of the legitimate subscriber for spamming and getting the high reputation scores. The
CDR based-reputation systems minimize the effect of Sybil attack but its performance
depends on features used for the computation of global reputation scores. The spammer
normally targets large number of callees without repeating his callees thus normally re-
sults in a small duration calls to a large number of callees and good duration calls to only
few callees. In non-repetitive calls, the average call duration of caller with the callee is
same as of his aggregate call duration. This behavior might results in a high reputation
scores for the subscribers having good duration calls to a large number of their called
callees. Moreover, spammers can also collude among their several identities with good
duration calls that would also increase spammer’s global reputation. In some CDR-based
approaches, the global reputation score and social network credential of the caller are also
sent to a callee for the final decision [BAP07] which is not only intrusive to the callee but
also poses threat to the privacy of the caller.
2.2 Collaborative Detection Systems
Spammers always try to find ways for evading the spam detection systems. They manip-
ulate contents by adding noisy messages, acquire large number of identities for colluding
and Sybil attack, and controlling number of spam calls to a single service provider but tar-
get many service providers in parallel. Spammer can make a large number of spam calls in
aggregate from a given calling identity but distribute calls among many service providers.
Existing anti-SPIT system decides about behavior of the subscriber based on his calling
behavior observed at a single service provider. These approaches prolong detection time
and block spammers only if spammers make significantly large number of spam calls to a
single service provider. The non-availability of calling behavior of spammers across the
service providers limits standalone system to react effectively against spammers.
The calling behavior of subscriber becomes more meaningful when subscribers are
observed across many service providers. Naturally, collaboration among service providers
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would improve the detection time and detection accuracy because of collective use of
information about behavior of subscriber from many autonomous collaborating service
providers. Service provider or domain collaboration has been applied in various net-
working domains for identifying malicious intruders and spammers in a network. In this
section, we provide detailed discussion on the collaborative systems in the perspective of
SPIT and email- spam detection systems.
2.2.1 Collaborative SPIT Detection
In order to evade the standalone systems, spammer targets large number of recipients that
are dispersed across many service providers but his calling behavior remains same across
all service providers. Collaboration among service provider is a natural way for early
detection of spammer before they spam a large number of recipients. However, a very
few works have been reported that incorporate collaboration among service providers for
rating the subscribers. In [IMS2015] and [3GPP2015], 3GPP a standardization body on
next generation network formalized best practice standards for fighting spammers in a
VoIP and IMS networks. Particularly, they encouraged service providers to have collabo-
ration among themselves for early and effective IM (Instant Messaging) and voice spam
detection. However, this technical standard does not provide any information about how
collaboration is to be carried out. In [SLS+10], authors exchange scorecards of subscriber
among collaborating service providers and collaborating service providers react indepen-
dently against the subscriber’s scorecard whether to allow or block the subscriber. This
framework requires predefined trust relationship between collaborators which is practi-
cally not feasible in a telecommunication network. Additionally, no mechanism has been
presented for the computation of subscriber score and trust assessment of collaborators.
In [SS09], authors proposed a collaborative system where the home service provider
collaborates with the visiting service provider with the exchange of information about
their SPIT detection system in the form of call tags. The visiting service provider then
access the performance of SPIT detection system deployed in a home service provider of
the subscriber calling recipients of his network. This approach has some limitations: 1) it
only evaluates performance of a SPIT detection system deployed in a service provider that
provides the tag information, 2) it requires establishment of predefined trust between col-
laborating service providers, and 3) it requires change in the call signaling messages ex-
changed between collaborating service providers in order to incorporate tag information.
In [WAB+09], authors proposed SPACEDIVE that detects intrusion in a VoIP network
by correlating local and remote information from many collaborating service providers.
In [WMH07], authors presented P2PAVS that computes reputation of subscribers through
32 Systems for Detecting Unwanted Communications in a VoIP Network
collaborative response from the subscriber from many service providers. However, it does
not provide any mechanism for the propagation of trust among subscribers. In VoIP nor-
mally collaboration is achieved in the form of multistage systems or collaboration among
proxy servers within the service providers. In [SKE+14], authors proposed an approach
that uses collaboration among several local VoIP servers within the service provider. How-
ever, mechanism for collection and aggregation of feedback among subscriber and proxy
server is not provided.
2.2.2 Collaborative Spam Detection in Email Network
A number of collaborative systems have been proposed for filtering spammers in an email
network and detection of intruders in the IP-based networks. In perspective of email net-
works, the collaborative systems normally require collaboration in the form of exchanging
spam message contents, spam HTML (Hyper Text Markup Language) tags and exchang-
ing feedback about behavior of particular sender. Normally spammers send same spam
message to a large number of recipients and collaboration with the message content would
greatly improve the spam detection time but it poses threat to the privacy of email users.
In [LZR09], authors presented a privacy-aware collaborative system called ALPACAS
that invokes collaboration among service provider with the exchange of encrypted fin-
gerprints of message contents. The similarity between fingerprints of user messages and
messages stored in the database of ham and spam is estimated in order to classify the new
message as a spam or a ham. HTML tags are available within the email headers and can
be used to distinguish spam content from the non-spam. In [YPC+11], authors presented
a COSDES system that collaborates with the exchange of HTML tags and computes dis-
tance between spam and ham tages using near duplicate approach. In [FZN06], authors
presented a collaborative framework that requires distributed collaboration for making
decisions about users. The collaborating email domain directly exchange information to
each other and imposes some restrictions on domains not taking part in a collaboration
process.
The behavior of spammer remains same in all target service provider or domains and
when analyzed collectively would decrease the detection time. In [RFV07], authors pro-
posed a system called SpamTrackers that requires collaboration among domains with the
communication behavioral patterns of email senders within collaborating domains. In
a [DVP+04], authors presented a three layerd P2P architecture based on communication
patterns of spammers and non-spammers. The architecture requires collaboration among
end-users, mail service and the super peers. The super peer handles the exchange of mes-
sage among themselves for tagging and classifying incoming mail digest as a spam or a
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non-spam. In [SBK07], authors presented RepuScore that require collaboration among
email domains with the exchange of local reputation score of email sender within the
domain. In RepuScore, a centralized system computes global reputation of user by aggre-
gating local reputation scores. In [SKY11] and [CLO16] authors proposed social filter, a
centralized system that aggregates feedback from individual spam detection systems for
early detection of Phishers and spammers.
Collaboration can also be carried out directly among end-users. In [KRS+06], authors
presented a collaborative spam filter that uses collaboration and social network informa-
tion of users for blocking spammers. In [CDN05], authors proposed two spam detection
systems: a simple Mail-Rank and a personalized Mail-Rank that computes global repu-
tation of email user by aggregating direct trust score through power iteration algorithm.
Spammers are moving to different online social networks for increasing their footprint.
The collaboration among different social network platforms would greatly improve the
detection accuracy and detection time. In [WIP11], authors proposed a system that incor-
porates collaboration among different online social network platforms with the exchange
of spam contents to be used for effective spam detection.
All of the above proposed collaborative approaches classify incoming email into spam
or non-spam by analyzing the contents of messages, contents of HTML tags and static rule
for some features. These approaches cannot be applied directly for filtering spammers in
a voice networks. In a voice network, contents are available in the form of speech signals
and having collaboration with the exchange of speech signals is not feasible. Moreover,
it requires sophisticated system and network resources for speech processing, storage
and matching. In case of non-content-based collaborative approaches, the detection ap-
proaches utilize structure of the network while ignoring the weights on the links between
users. In a voice network, few additional features such as call rate and call duration could
provide information about relationship strength among users and should be used in a col-
laborative way.
2.3 Identity Linking
There are many countries where number of subscribers exceeds the country population.
For example Russia has 1.8 percent more mobile subscriber than its population, similarly
Brazil has 1.2 percent more subscriber than its population. These numbers are not at-
tributed to the fact that every citizen has one identity but attributed to the fact that many
individuals have more than one calling identity. As VoIP offers cheap telephony rates
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and acquiring new identity in a mobile and VoIP network is not costly that’s why spam-
mers are exploiting VoIP network with the spamming activities from many identities. The
spammer normally makes controlled attack from all his identity or rejoin network with
new identity if blocked by the detection system. Moreover, spammer’s identities also col-
lude with each in order to have high reputation score so as to remain undetected. The
standalone and collaborative SPIT detection systems are able to identify such spammers
that are making large number of calls from their each identity. The spammer can change
his identity once its blocked by the service provider and targets user with new identity
with same motive. However, connecting or linking multiple identities that belong to one
physical person would greatly decrease the detection time and would improve the detec-
tion accuracy. Identity linking would also help in characterizing the complete behavior of
physical user having multiple calling identities for other purposes such as recommenda-
tion and marketing of other value added service. To the best of our knowledge, we have
not found any such study that has been carried out for linking multiple calling identities
of the a physical individual in a voice network. For this reason, we are providing works
that have been done for linking multiple identities of user across same or different online
social networks.
Normally, an active social network user or Internet user has multiple accounts across
different social network or same social network with same or different identity. Current
statistics show that 20% of facebook users also have twitter account and 91% of Twitter
users also use Facebook to stay in touch with others [PER09]. In online social network
like Facebook, twitter or Instagram etc. profiles are linked together by estimating simi-
larity between identities in three dimensions. Firstly, profiles can be linked together by
matching the profile information provided by the user at the time of creation of account
across different social networks; secondly, profiles are matched by estimating the similar-
ity in content posted by the user across different social networks; and thirdly, profiles are
linked together by using information from friend’s network of users from different social
networks. In [RCD10], authors considered three dimensions and presented an identity
linking framework that links similar profiles together that belongs to one physical indi-
vidual. In [VHS09], authors proposed a system that links profiles of users by estimating
the similarity in profile information represented in a profile vector. Moreover, authors
also identify number of significant features that better characterize the profiles of the
same user. In [NCM12], authors represented user’s profile information as a feature vec-
tor and applied supervised machine learning (Support Vector Machines, Random Forests
and Alternating Decision Trees) for making decisions about identities that belongs to one
physical individual.
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Users usually exhibit unique communication behavior which they repeat across dif-
ferent social networking sites. In [ZL13], authors considered behavioral patterns of users
and proposed a MOBIUS system for finding a mapping function among profiles of sim-
ilar user from different social networking sites. Primarily, MOBIUS consist of two im-
portant components: first component uses behavioral patterns and the second component
employs machine learning approach for user identification and linking of the same pro-
files. In [ZL09], authors analyzed naming patterns of users across 12 different social
networks for finding features that better link accounts that belong to the same individual.
In [SCA08], authors consider tagging behavior for connecting user’s flicker profile to his
del.icio.us profile. In [IFA+11], authors linked similar profile by processing information
in two aspects: user ids and user tags.
The collective use of social network features, profile features and content features
would greatly improve the linking accuracy. In [JKJ13], authors collectively use the con-
tent and network connection of user to connect his Facebook profile with his MySpace
profile. In [ACF13], authors used partial social network of user semantic similarity be-
tween his profiles attributes for linking his identities. In [MLM+12], authors applied
jaro distance and TFDF vector space model to user’s profile information and his social
network. In [GLP+13], user’s accounts across social networks are correlated using in-
nocuous information such as location, content posted across social networks, writing
style of posted content and time when content posted. In [LWZ+14], HYDRA system
applies multi-objective optimization (MOO) to the heterogeneous behavior of users and
their core social network structure. The links between users can also be predicted by
applying supervised unsupervised link prediction algorithms to the user’s social network
attributes. [GTM+14]. In [BKP12], JAL system uses Conditional Random Fields to user’s
profile and his social network information for resolving identities of users across differ-
ent social networks. In [ZLC+06], a framework is presented that considered four type
features from messages for the authorship identification. In [SSB05], several similarity
measure approaches are compared and evaluated for recommending online communities.
Several works have also been proposed for estimating the node similarity in social
graphs through use of node’s social connections. The node connections are basic build-
ing blocks for link prediction, collaborative filtering, identity linking and record linking.
The similarity among nodes of different graph or same graph can be computed local or
global: local measure estimates similarity between nodes using information from imme-
diate neighborhoods (for example number of common friends between nodes) of nodes,
and global similarity computes node similarity considering complete graph structure of
nodes. The similarity between graphs and graph nodes can be computed by iteratively
adding the similarity scores between neighbors of nodes in a both graphs [BGH+04],
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[MMR02], [FZX15],. It is important to consider over all structure and connection of
nodes that is friends of friends of node and has been adopted in SimRank [JW02] system
used for link prediction and node similarity. In [HGL+11], ReFeX (Recursive Feature
eXtraction) system recursively aggregates regional features from the neighboring nodes.
These regional features represent the type of nodes to which a given node is connected to.
The identity linking problem can also be seen in terms of de-anonymization problem.
In [NS09], authors proposed a de-anonymization approach that identifies nodes using
structural information of nodes in a social graph. The algorithm requires few starting
seeds and propagates mappings through node edges. In [BKE+13], authors presented a
NetSimile approach that incorporates theories from social network for estimating similar-
ity between nodes of two graphs.
Many researchers have applied identity linking to the problem of spam detection on
social networks and email networks. In [XYY+13], authors proposed a VoteTrust system
that combine network structures of individuals and their feedback to detect individuals
having multiple identities. In [XFH15], authors presented a machine learning approach
that uses interaction patterns and profile information of users for detecting fake accounts
in online social network. In [JTJ11], authors proposed an approach that analyze the be-
havior of identity based on attribute similarity and similarity in friendship network to
detect the fake accounts.
2.4 Discussion
To date, existing anti-SPIT systems have taken two main mechanisms: 1) content-based
filtering and 2) identity-based filtering. If not properly designed, both mechanisms have
some limitations and can be evaded by the spammers with new ways. In Section 2.1,
we outlined existing standalone anti-SPIT systems and their limitations. Content-based
system could block certain type of spammers but they can be circumvented by spam-
mers through slight modification of speech content. Moreover, applying content-based
approaches in a VoIP for filtering spammer has some additional limitations as discussed
in section . Identity-based reputation systems are viable for blocking spammers in a
VoIP network but these systems can be evaded by the spammers if approaches are not
carefully designed as discussed in section 2.1. The challenge is to design a content inde-
pendent, reputation-based and non-intrusive SPIT detection system that does not require
any change in existing VoIP network and handset of subscribers.
A number of reputation based systems have been proposed [KD07], [DK05], [WBS+09],
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[BAP07] but all are intrusive to end-users. Call-Rank [BAP07] though computes sub-
scriber’s reputation automatically but it relies on the callee for the final decision and has
other following limitations as well. Firstly, it discloses subscriber’s reputation scores and
social network credentials to the callee which could be threat to the privacy of the sub-
scribers. Secondly, it requires public and private key infrastructure for authentication and
authorization. Thirdly, it asks subscriber to solve the CAPTCHA challenge to minimize
the false positives and handle calls from new subscribers. Fourthly, spammer can eas-
ily evade this system by creating multiple identities and developing strong relationships.
However, we believe that anti-SPIT systems must be non-intrusive and should collectively
use number of call and social network features. Moreover, classification threshold needs
to be computed automatically without incurring high false positives and small true posi-
tives. The collective use of social network and call features in both directions – incoming
and out-going could greatly improve the detection accuracy and reduce interaction with
subscribers. It also becomes difficult for spammers to evade such system because they are
not able to control multiple social and call features.
The standalone system either based on the reputation or the content prolongs detec-
tion of spammers if spammers make small rate spamming to the recipients of one service
providers but target recipients of many service providers. Collaboration among service
provider is the natural phenomena for blocking these small rate spammers in a timely
way. However, to-date, no collaborative system exists where telecommunication service
providers collaborate with each other by exchanging information about behavior of sub-
scribers in their network. Moreover, service providers are not willing to be part of collab-
oration with each other because they are business competitor and worried about privacy
of their customers. The challenge in the design of a collaborative system is to convince
telecommunication service provider for taking part in the collaboration process. The sim-
plest collaborative approach to convince service provider is to use the trusted centralized
system so that service provider directly collaborate with the trusted centralized reposi-
tory. However, service provider requires absolute protection of privacy of their customers
even in presence of trusted centralized repository, they are only interested in exchanging
such information which does not contain any threat to privacy of their customers and its
network configurations. There is strong need to have collaborative system that has fol-
lowing features: 1) it incorporates use of trusted centralized repository for aggregation
of information exchanged by autonomous collaborators, 2) it uses filtered non-sensitive
information from the collaborators, and 3) must protect privacy of the subscribers rela-
tionship network i.e. an intruder at a centralized repository would not be able to infer the
relationship network of the subscribers.
Spammers can acquire large number of identities because of cheap telephony rates and
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easy integration of telephony with Internet technology. These identities either colludes
with each other for the high reputation scores so to make spam calls to other users or use
new identity once blocked by the service provider. However, spammer having multiple
identities has overlap in target identities among his different identities exhibit similar call-
ing behavior towards many target identities. The standalone reputation based anti-SPIT
systems react very slowly towards these spammers having large number of identities. It
is of utmost importance to link the multiple identities that belong to one physical person
so as to collectively use the information for computing reputation of the subscriber. The
identity linking is not only beneficial for timely identification of spammers but would also
be helpful in characterizing the complete behavior of legitimate subscriber having many
identities. To-date, no anti-SPIT system exists that computes reputation of the physical
individual by connecting all his multiple identities that belong to him. Moreover, to the
best of our knowledge, there exists no such system that links identities that belongs to one
physical individual using individual’s behavioral and call features in a telecommunication
network.
The limitations of existing anti-SPIT systems mandate us to design a behavioral-based
collaborative SPIT detection system that identifies spammers without relying on the callee
feedback or content analysis. The proposed detection system is able to achieve number
of objectives. 1) It uses number of call and social network features while computing rep-
utation of the subscribers and make decisions without involving subscribers at any stage
of the call processing. This is merely achieved by investigating and selecting the so-
cial and call features extracted from the call logs recorded by the service providers. 2)
It incorporates privacy-aware collaboration among autonomous service providers for the
early identification of spammers making low rate spamming activities to subscribers of
many service providers. This is achieved through the exchange of filtered information
that would not allow intruders or adversary at centralized repository to learn the relation-
ship network of the subscribers. 3) The proposed system incorporates process of identity
linking to connect the identities that belong to one physical individual or subscriber for
identifying spammers who frequently change their identities. This is achieved through the
use of call and social network features for linking similar identities of the single individ-
ual and then reputation of an individual is computed rather than reputation of identifies.
4) A model is presented that generates a synthetic data-set for evaluating the detection
system. This is achieved by modeling the social behavior of spammer and non-spammer
for different graph networks. 5) Finally, a privacy breach analysis is performed for the
anonymized data set and presented a method as an absolute protection of privacy of user
when data is outsourced for research and analysis.
Chapter 3
SPIT Detection System Based on Social
Reputation
In this chapter, we present an overview of our proposed system for mitigating spammers
in a VoIP and voice networks. This chapter first briefly overviews VoIP technology and
protocol used in a VoIP telephony. Second, it briefly describes proposed system archi-
tecture and provides details about the information extracted from the call detail records
used for the construction of weighted call graph among subscribers. Finally, it briefly dis-
cusses and analyzes behavior of spammers and non-spammers for the different call and
social network features.
3.1 VoIP (Voice over IP)
VoIP enables voice and multimedia communication to be carried over the Internet Proto-
col rather than on the traditional Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Enterprises
and voice service providers are adopting VoIP technology as a preferred medium for the
long distance cheap telephony across the globe. A typical VoIP session has two phases:
a signaling phase and a voice transmission phase. The signaling phases are responsible
for the call set-up and tear down of established calls, and also perform other call manage-
ment functions. The speech exchange phase is responsible for the transmission of digi-
tized voice between end-users. The two major protocols used for establishing the calls in
VoIP network are H.323 and SIP (Session Initiation Protocol). A typical SIP based VoIP
network is shown in a Figure 3.1 and consists of variety of network devices that includes,
a VoIP proxy server for handling call requests between end-user, a registration server for
users registrations, a radius server for the authentication and authorization, and a billing
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Figure 3.1: SIP Based VoIP Network.
server for logging call detailed records to be used for the billing purposes and network
management.
3.1.1 H.323
H.323 is a suite of protocol defined by ITU (International Telecommunication Union) as a
standard protocol for voice communication over the Internet protocol. H.323 based VoIP
network consists of four major components: end user Terminals, Gateways, Gatekeepers
and Multipoint Control Units (MCUs). The H.323 protocol suite consists of three major
control functions: H.225 for the RAS (Request, Admission and Status) signaling that
controls call between end users, a H.245 for the the transport of media and signaling
message and a H.235 for the secure communication between end users.
3.1.2 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an IETF standard and the most popular proto-
col used for managing the calls between users of the VoIP and NGN (Next Generation
Networks) network [RFC3261]. The exchange of SIP messages between end-users de-
termines the capabilities and location of communicating entities before exchange of actual
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speech signals between them. The SIP based VoIP network consists of two major com-
ponents: the SIP User Agent (UA) and SIP Network Server. The SIP UA is the user soft
or hard phone responsible for initiating and accepting calls. SIP Network Server manages
signaling sessions among participating entities and consists of three main functional com-
ponents: the SIP Registrar, the SIP proxy server and the SIP redirect server. SIP exhibits
request and response model for the session management among communicating entities.
Request messages are sent from the user to the Registrar server for the registration, call re-
quest messages are exchange between end users for the start of new session, updating the
parameters of existing session, acknowledging session establishment between users and
terminating the existing sessions [RFC3261]. Response messages are used for providing
the appropriate reaction to the request messages, depending on the type of request mes-
sage. Figure 3.2 represents the exchange of signaling messages used for call management
between end-users and core VoIP network. The SIP based VoIP network also consists of
other supporting servers such as: a CDR server for storing Call Detailed Record of users
call transactions, billing system for billing and presence servers for storing the location
and status of users.
In addition SIP and H.323 protocols, VoIP networks may use other protocols estab-
lishing, terminating and managing the sessions. These protocols includes: SCCP (Skinny
Client Protocol)– a CISCO proprietary protocol used by CISCO IP phones and CISCO
call manager, a MGCP (Media Gateway Control Protocol)– for controlling media gate-
ways on a VoIP network and an ITU MEGACO (Gateway Control Protocol) for providing
interconnection between traditional public switched telephone network (PSTN) and mod-
ern packet networks. For the transport of speech streams or voice signals, The Real-time
Transport Protocol (RTP) and Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP) are widely
used in a VoIP network.
VoIP transports signaling and voice over an IP network thus vulnerable to the security
threats already affecting IP network. These attack includes: Voice Phishing (Vishing),
VoIP Spam (SPIT), scanning operator’s configurations for toll fraud, Dos and DDos at-
tacks, billing attacks etc; and not only affect the performance of VoIP network but also
causes serious discomfort to the end-users.
3.2 System Overview
The architecture of our proposed collaborative, social reputation-based anti-SPIT system
is shown in the Figure 3.3. The system consists of three parts: the standalone detec-
tion system, the collaborative system and the identity linking system. Of three parts, two
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Figure 3.2: SIP Session Establishment and Termination.
parts operates independently, whereas the third part requires collaboration among inde-
pendent standalone systems placed in different service providers. The intuition for this
design choice is based on three observations. 1) Spammers and non-spammers normally
exhibit different calling patterns towards their callees. We make use of this difference
in the calling behavior of spammer and non-spammer and present an approach that uses
call and social network features for making decision about behavior of the subscriber in a
service provider network. 2) Spammers normally slowly make calls to recipients of many
service providers; however, their behavior remains same across all service providers. For
early identification of the spammer, we incorporate collaboration among service providers
without having any threat to privacy of subscribers and service providers. 3) Spammers
only make few spam calls from one identity and if blocked by the detection system re-
joins the network with a new identity. However, spammers have some overlap in the
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target recipients of his different identities with more or less similar calling behavior. We
incorporated identity linking procedure to the link the similar identities that belong to
one physical individual and then computed reputation of an individual rather than call-
ing identity. All systems process information from the CDR for the construction of call
graph of subscribers and perform certain computations without having interaction with
the subscriber. Each system of design approach is described as follows:
Standalone SPIT Detection: The Standalone system can be placed in a service
provider networks and uses a mechanism that uses subscribers social and call network
features for identification of spammers in the network. The standalone system is based
on the intuitions that legitimate subscribers normally have long duration calls with many
of their called callees thus develop strong social connections with many subscribers and
have weak social connections with only few subscribers. On the other hand spammers
normally call large number of subscribers which more often results in a large number
of small duration calls to many of his callees. This calling behavior thus develops a
strong social connection with only few subscribers and has a weak social connection with
the large number of subscribers. We incorporated behavioral patterns of subscriber for
computing reputation of the subscriber with in the network. The system finally classifies
subscriber as a spammer and non-spammer based on reputation scores and automated
threshold below which subscriber are flagged as spammer. We called standalone system
as Caller-REP (Caller-REPutation) and Chapter 4 provides further details on the approach
used within Caller-REP system and its deployment in a real network.
Collaborative SPIT Detection: The collaborative system in a proposed system is
termed as COSDS (COllaborative Spit Detection System). COSDS perform its operation
by have privacy-aware collaboration among independent standalone reputation systems
deployed in the service provider network. The COSDS system is based on the following
observations: 1) spammers distribute low rate spam calls to subscribers of many service
providers without overwhelming any single service provider with a high rate spamming.
2) The behavior of spammers remains same across all service providers. Having col-
laboration among service providers would greatly improve the detection accuracy and
decreases detection time, but it has challenge of convincing the service provider to be part
of collaboration process. Service providers are not willing to take part in the collaboration
because to them collaborating with peer service provider means exchange of information
which might be threat to the privacy of their customers and its network configurations.
However, use of trusted centralized repository and exchange of non-sensitive filtered in-
formation to the centralized repository would somehow convince service provider for tak-
ing part in the collaboration process. Chapter 5 provides further details on the design of
a privacy-aware collaborative detection system that involve collaboration among service
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Figure 3.3: Block Diagram of SPIT Detection System.
providers without making any threat to privacy of subscribers of collaborating service
provider.
Identity linking and Spam Detection: The third component of proposed system is
termed as EIS (Early Identification of Spammer) – an identity linking and Spam detection
system that uses call and social network features of identities to connect similar identities
together and perform spam detection process. The intuition for the design of EIS system
is based on the following observations: 1) spammers frequently change their identities
in-order to remain undetected and 2) spammer has overlap in a call network among his
several identities with more or less similar call patterns. The linking of identities that
belong to one physical individual would identify the spammers having multiple identities
in a timely way. Chapter 6 provides further details on the design of EIS system and its
effect on the identification of the physical spammers having multiple identities.
3.3 Call Detail Records
Telecommunication service providers (VoIP, Mobile, and Legacy Telephony) records call
transactions of their subscribers in a Call Detail Record (CDR) that are basically used for
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Figure 3.4: Social Network of Subscribers Extracted from the CDRs.
billing purposes and network management. Service providers can utilize these call records
for characterizing the behavioral patterns of their subscribers for other purposes such as
marketing, personalized offering of new products and identification of malicious users
targeting legitimate subscribers. CDR normally contains meta-data of call transactions
without any recorded speech contents. A typical CDR widely consists of many fields
but of them few are enough for characterizing the behavior of the user. These fields are:
identities of a subscribers involved in a call (Caller and the Callee), time of call when
subscriber initiates the call to the callee, time when call disconnected by caller or the
callee, duration of a call, who disconnected the call, call type (voice, SMS,MMS) and
status of the call (successful or failed) etc. In this thesis, we modeled behavior of the user
using four fields and construct a weighted social graph of the subscriber. These fields are:
calling identity of the caller and callee, time of the call and the call duration.
3.4 Social Call Graph
Since CDRs stored detail information about call transactions (incoming and outgoing call)
of the subscriber but are normally available in a raw form. The raw call records need to be
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processed in order to have meaningful information for business intelligence and identifi-
cation of malicious subscribers abusing other subscriber or service provider for financial
benefits. A complete weighted call graph G of the subscriber is required for analyzing
the behavior of the subscribers towards others. A weighted call graph G is represented
as G(N,E,W ) which is generated for each identity or subscriber present in the raw call
records. In G(N,E,W ), N denotes the set of vertices representing the VoIP subscriber
which can be either caller or the callee or both, E denotes the a set of links between
subscribers, and W denotes the weights on the links representing social strength between
subscribers. The N can be either Caller S or a Callee R where (S,R) ∈ A. Specifically, if S
is the caller and R is the callee then an edge exists between S and R if S and R interacted
with each other at-least once. Social call graph can be directed or the undirected depend-
ing on the type of network. The direction of the link determines whether call is outgoing
call from the subscriber or the incoming call to the subscriber. The weights on the links
can be assigned from the call- An example call graph of subscribers from the CDRs is
shown in a Figure 3.4 and is represented as a sparse adjacency matrix, where 1 represents
that caller S has interacted with callee R and 0 represents that there happen no interaction
between caller and the callee. A sparse adjacency matrix A of subscriber is represented
by an nxn adjacency matrix A with elements as:
Ai j =
1 if i interacted with j0 no interaction (3.1)
In-case of weighted call graph, Ai j are replaced by the weights determined from the
frequency of interaction and call duration of interactions. In this thesis, a weighted call
graphs is constructed by extracting the following three parameters from the call records
for the specific time period.
Call Duration: Call Duration represent the time two subscribers spoke to each other.
Specifically, out call duration of caller S to a callee R is the sum of duration of all calls
made by caller S to callee R and incoming call duration of caller S is the sum of duration
of calls S received from callee R. The aggregated call duration, therefore is the sum of
call duration of all calls made and received by the subscriber A.
Call-Rate: Call-Rate represents the frequency of interaction between caller and the
callee. Specifically, out call rate between caller S and callee R is the sum of all calls made
from caller S to callee R and in call rate of S is the sum of calls made by R to S. The
aggregated call-rate, therefore is the sum of all calls made and received by the user A.
Partners: Partner is the total number of unique subscriber a certain subscriber initi-
ated calls to or received call from and can be grouped into incoming and outgoing partners.
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The incoming partners of caller S is represented as PIS and out-going partners of caller S
is represented as POS. The out-going Interactions represents that user is more important
to the certain user than those he did not initiate any call.
The goal in this thesis is to compute the direct trust and global reputation of the sub-
scriber from the weighted call graphs G and then classifies subscriber as a spammer and
a non-spammer.
3.5 Social Network Features
People use telephony for the interactive communication with each other and develop weak
and strong social relationship with others over the time. Spammers also try to exploit the
telephony network for financial intent (e.g. marketing of products, adverting, visihing,
frauds etc.) and also develop strong and weak social network with many users. How-
ever, the social behavior of legitimate subscriber is different from the social behavior of
spammers when analyzed in perspective of different social network and call features. This
section presents social and call characteristics of subscriber that can help in differentiating
spammers from the non-spammers. We outline calling behavior of spammers and non-
spammers for the following features: number of callees the subscriber calls, number of
callees calling the subscribers, call duration of subscriber’s incoming and out-going calls,
incoming and out-going call rate of the subscriber, centrality measure and reciprocity
measure of the subscriber.
3.5.1 Degree
One of the most important structural measures of a subscriber in a social call graph is
the degree of the subscriber. The degree of a subscriber in a social call graph is sum of
subscribers he received and made calls. In a directed social call graph, the subscriber
can have two degree measures: the out-degree and the in-degree. The out-degree of a
subscriber i in an adjacency matrix A is the sum of the row entries and the in-degree of
subscriber i is the sum of the column entries associated with the subscriber i and can be
represented as:
Out−degreei =
n
∑
i=1
Ai j (3.2)
In−degreei =
n
∑
j=1
A ji (3.3)
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Where Ai j = 1 if there is an outgoing link from subscriber i to subscriber j, and
zero otherwise. Similarly, A ji = 1 if subscriber j has out going link to subscriber i and
zero otherwise. In case of a weighted network, the out-degree and in-degree is simply
sum of weights of rows and columns of the subscriber i. The degree of the subscriber
can also be represented as the degree distribution which is the probability distribution of
the subscriber’s degree over the degree of a whole network. Many real networks such
as World Wide Web [NEW05a], phone call graphs [NSC+08], [NGD+06], network of
autonomous IP systems [FFF99] and online social network [MMG+07] exhibit a power-
law degree distribution. It might be possible that inclusion of a large number of spammers
in a network would divert the degree distribution from a power-law degree distribution
[MOT12].
In a VoIP and voice networks, spammer normally calls large number of subscriber and
hardly receives calls from a very few recipients thus has unbalanced out-degree and in-
degree structure. On the other hand, legitimate subscriber calls limited number of callees
and normally receives calls from many of his callees thus results in a balanced out-degree
and in-degree structure. The threshold on an out-degree and in-degree could be useful
for blocking spammers [LY07], but using one feature (small in-degree or high-degree as
sign of spamming) alone would result in a high false positive rate and small true positive
rate. For example, using high in-degree as a sign that subscriber is legitimate would
result in a blocking of some legitimate subscriber such as call centers and organizations
having small in-degree but have high number of long duration out-going calls. Similarly,
using small out-degree as a sign that subscriber is legitimate would block the legitimate
subscriber having high out-degree with high duration calls as well has high in-degree with
legitimate behavior. It is important that spam detection should not be limited to the degree
distribution (in-degree and out-degree) but is also required to consider degree feature
along with other call and social features such as call-rate, call duration and centrality.
3.5.2 Call-Rate
Call-Rate is the sum of total number of calls made or received by the subscriber. Call-
Rate can also be grouped into two types: in-coming call rate and out-going call rate. A
high number of calls between two subscribers represent that they are strongly connected
with each other. The in-coming and out-going call rate of a caller S with a callee R can be
computed as:
Out−CallRate(S→ R) =∑Calls f rom S to R (3.4)
In−CallRate(S← R) =∑Calls f rom R to S (3.5)
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The aggregate out-going and in-coming call rate of the subscriber i is represented as:
Out−CallRate(Ai) =
n
∑
i=1
CallRatei j (3.6)
In−CallRate(Ai) =
n
∑
j=1
CallRate ji (3.7)
Where CallRatei j is adjacency matrix of call-rate of subscriber i to his called callees
j.
A legitimate subscriber normally has repetitive calling behavior with the large num-
ber of subscribers (family, friends) and has non-repetitive calling behavior with the few
subscribers (strangers). On the other hand spammers or compromised calling identities
would like to reach as many subscribers as possible without repeating a target thus de-
velop a non-repetitive network with many subscriber. A large number of target victims
and non-repetitive calling behavior with the large number of called victims can be a strong
indication that subscriber is spamming. However, using a call rate feature alone would
result in a high false positive and small true positive. For example non-legitimate debt
collectors make calls to same recipients for payment of debt or a spammer making spam
calls to same subscriber to convince on certain offer. Therefore, it is necessary to use
the call rate feature along with other call and social network features. For example using
ratio of out-degree and out-call rate. Spammers normally have this ratio near to one while
legitimate subscribers would have this ratio near to 0.5 or less than 0.5.
3.5.3 Call Duration
In telephony, the call duration is the length of duration subscribers talked to each other
and can also be grouped into in-coming call duration and out-going call duration. The
out-going call duration of subscriber represents how much subscriber trust and want to
talk to other subscriber and in-coming call duration of a subscriber represent how much
other subscriber trust and talked to the subscriber. The call duration and call-rate together
characterize the strength of social ties between the subscribers. The higher the call-rate
and call-duration between subscribers, the stronger the social tie exist between subscribers
and smaller the call-rate and call duration between subscribers, the weaker the social tie
exist between subscribers. The in and out-call duration between caller S and the callee R
can be represented as:
Out−Call−Duration(S→ R) =∑Talk time f rom Sto R (3.8)
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In−Call−Duration(S← R) =∑Talk time f rom Rto S (3.9)
The aggregate out and in duration of a caller S is represented as :
Out−Call−Duration(Ai) =
n
∑
i=1
TalkTimei j (3.10)
In−Call−Duration(Ai) =
n
∑
j=1
TalkTime ji (3.11)
Where TalkTimei j is the adjacency matrix of call duration of subscribers. Similarly,
the average in and going call duration of the caller is represented as:
Avg.In−CallDuration(Ai) = ∑
n
i=1 TalkTimei j
∑ni=1CallRatei j
(3.12)
Avg.In−CallDuration(Ai) =
∑nj=1 TalkTime ji
∑nj=1CallRate ji
(3.13)
Call duration or average call duration is an important feature for estimating the strength
of social relationship between subscribers and is also useful for characterizing the behav-
ior of the subscriber in a network. Legitimate subscribers normally have some good
number of long duration calls with his friends, family members and colleagues, and have
relatively small duration calls with only few callees for example strangers. On the other
hand call recipients are not comfortable talking with unknown subscriber for the long time
periods thus disconnect call as soon as they realized the true identity and motivation of the
caller. Because of this behavior, spammers normally have large number of short duration
calls with their recipients with only small number of long duration calls. However, small
duration is not the only sign caller is spammer for example a school announces a short du-
ration urgent announcement to a large number of student. The use of call duration along
with call-rate and out-degree of subscriber would provide enough evidence to classify a
subscriber as a spammer and a non-spammer.
3.5.4 Eigen Centrality
Eigenvector centrality measures centrality of a subscriber in a call graph by computing
eigenvector of the largest positive eigenvalue. Eigenvector provides information about
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connectivity of subscriber with the other subscribers. Subscribers connected to high re-
puted subscriber or more significant subscribers would have high reputation score than
those subscribers connected to the non-reputed subscribers. The Eigen centrality mea-
sures of the subscriber from an adjacency matrix can be computed as:
EC(A) =∑Ai j ∗ x j (3.14)
Where Ai j is the adjacency matrix of a graph G and x j is the initial centrality score of
subscriber j. Spammers normally choose large number of reputed recipients, thus proba-
bly would have high centrality score, whereas legitimate user only have connections with
few reputed users thus results in a small centrality score than the spammers. Consider-
ing, high centrality score as a sign of legitimacy would result in blocking many legitimate
subscriber and allowing of many spammers. However, we believe that Eigen centrality
would not only be limited to structure of the network but also need to consider the re-
lationship strength between subscribers. Computing centrality by considering the trust
weights would probably results in a small centrality sore for the spammers and high cen-
trality score for the non-spammer.
3.5.5 Reciprocity
Reciprocity is defined as the fractions of edges that are reciprocated i.e. two subscribers
receive and make call to each other. Reciprocity measures the relationship strength be-
tween subscribers and is defined as:
Reciprocityi =
ODi∩ IDi
ODi
(3.15)
Where ODi is the set of subscriber that are called by the subscriber i and IDi is the
set of subscribers that calls the subscriber i. Reciprocal connection normally exists be-
tween the people having low degree and high connectivity [HS08]. Reciprocity measure
can be used to identify spammers in a network because legitimate and spammer exhibit
different reciprocity measures. Legitimate subscriber tends to have calls in both direc-
tions that characterize the strong social relationships of subscriber with his reciprocated
subscribers, thus would have high reciprocity score. On the other hand, spammer makes
calls to a large number of recipients and many of target recipients are interested in calling
back the spammer thus spammer developed a one way weak network with many of his
called recipients. This calling behavior and structural imbalances of spammer between
incoming and out-going calls from the same recipients would results in assignment of a
small reciprocity score to the spammer.
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3.6 Discussion
The service provider record all call transactions among its subscribers in the call detailed
records which is mainly used for billing and network management such as QoS mea-
surements, identification of spammers and fault detection etc. Social call graph between
subscribers of the network can be easily constructed from identity of subscriber and can
be used to infer the behavior of the subscriber in the network. The subscriber can be
grouped into two types: the legitimate user – using network resources according to signed
agreement and the malicious or non-legitimate users – using network resources for ma-
licious activities i.e. making spam calls or trying to steal private information or money
from the subscriber.
The legitimate subscribers and the spammer exhibit different social behavior that
could be used for classifying them as spammer and the non-spammer. A number of so-
cial network features have been proposed that differentiates spammers from non-spammer
based on their degree of their unique interactions, reciprocity measures, clustering coef-
ficient etc. [LY07], [WA10], [AMF10], [BR05] . However, in telephony network, two
important features i.e. frequency of interactions and call duration of interactions needs to
be considered along with structural properties of call graph for estimating the behavior of
the subscriber within the network. The combine use of different social network and call
feature would possibly improve the detection time, true positive rate and minimize false
positive rates.
To achieve objectives of effective detection and minimize detection time this thesis
proposes the combine use of social and call features of the user for modeling the behavior
of the subscriber used for differentiating spammers from the non-spammers. The con-
tributions of this thesis are three folds: 1) a standalone detection system-that considers
the collective use of call duration, call rate and out-degree of subscriber for the computa-
tion of reputation of the subscriber in the network, 2) a collaborative detection system-that
considers privacy-aware collaboration among standalone detection systems deployed with
the service providers in-order to minimize detection time and identifies smart spammers,
and 3) an identity linking system-that connects multiple identities that belong to one phys-
ical person and then collectively compute reputation of the physical person considering
all his identities together.
Chapter 4
Caller-REP: Detecting Unwanted Calls
Through Caller’s Social Strength
4.1 Introduction
The affordable calling rates of VoIP telephony to any destination across the world, and its
easy integration with the Internet technologies for the voice communication has attracted
a large number of subscribers for business and personal communications. The benefits
of VoIP include low management and maintenance costs, scalability, flexibility, and cost
savings of a using one network for the voice, data and video. These benefits have also at-
tracted large number of spammers and telemarketers for the unsolicited communications.
VoIP spam not only brings financial loss to the subscribers of the technology but also
causes displeasure among call recipients with the real-time ringing alerts. VoIP spam is
much more intrusive than the email spam as call recipient has to respond immediately and
it is too late if detected after the call has already been established.
A voice call consists of two phases - a call setup phase followed by the speech ex-
change phase. The content-based anti-SPIT systems could be effective for detecting
spammers but is already late as spammers have already disturbed callee with the ring-
ing alerts. Moreover, processing speech contents in a real-time requires sophisticated
system resources and would certainly add delay in conversations. The ideal SPIT detec-
tion system is required to block spammers without content processing and not involving
subscribers for the additional feedback about the received calls. The existing identity-
based reputation systems use only one feature for modeling the behavior of subscribers
that is further used for classifying subscribers as a spammers and a non-spammers. These
systems can be easily evaded by spammers by circumventing only one feature. Service
provider wishes to have a spam filtering system that fulfills four requirements: 1) the de-
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tection system must not require any interaction with the subscriber at any stage of call
processing, 2) the system collectively uses number of social and call features that would
be difficult for the spammers to circumvent, 3) it automatically computes the threshold
below which the subscriber is placed in the blacklist, and 4) it does not require any change
in the call setup messages and handset of the subscribers.
This chapter presents Caller-REP (Caller-REPutation), a new approach for ranking
VoIP subscribers and then blacklisting SPIT caller without any content processing, user
involvement, and changes in the VoIP network infrastructure. The main procedure starts
by creating the social call graph by using information from the past call transaction of
subscribers recorded in the call detailed records (CDR). Our approach is based on two
observations. 1) Legitimate subscribers tend to call the same recipients several times,
receive call back from the called recipients, and make long duration calls [SMS+08],
[BSG+11], [WBS+09] to a relatively large number of called recipients. 2) On the other
hand telemarketers and advertisers tend to have the opposite calling behavior: they try to
call a large number of people to deliver their messages [SMS+08], [DTN11] that often
result in a short duration calls to the large number of called callees. These subscribers
also have fewer incoming calls than outgoing calls, as large number of subscribers are not
interested in calling back to telemarketers.
For each VoIP subscriber in a network, Caller-REP first computes direct trust between
subscriber and his called callees. The direct trust between subscriber and his called callee
is computed from the following social and call features: number of calls made and re-
ceived between subscriber and the callee, call duration of received and made calls between
subscriber and the callee, and the number of unique callees of a subscriber. The global
reputation of a subscriber across the network is then computed through power iteration
method using normalized direct trust scores of a subscriber. Finally, Caller-REP com-
putes classification threshold by applying 25th percentile based approach to the global
reputation scores of the subscribers. The subscriber having reputation score less than
threshold are barred from calling. Service providers can also adopt other threshold ac-
cording to their spam detection policies and tolerance against spammers. Despite having
a non-intrusive reputation-based SPIT detection system, another major challenge is pro-
tecting privacy of subscribers while computing trust and reputation scores. This chapter
also identifies method for using the information from the CDRs in a privacy-aware man-
ner so that intruders at reputation engine would not be able to learn relationship network
of the subscribers.
This chapter also analyzes the performance of Caller-REP using the synthetic data set
that has been generated by modeling the social behavior of spammers and non-spammers
for different social network features. Our results show that Caller-REP is able to block
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all spammers within three days. Caller-REP achieves a false positive rate of less than
10% and true positive rate of almost 80% in the first two days even in the presence of a
significant number of spammers. This true positive rate would further improve to 99%
and false positive rate drops to less than 2% in three days. In a network with no spam-
mers, Caller-REP achieves a false positive rate of less than 10% and in a heavily saturated
network with more than 60% of spam callers; it achieves a true positive rate of 98% and
no false positives. We also compare the performance of Caller-REP with a closely related
spam detection approach named Call-Rank which shows that the Caller-REP system out-
performs Call-Rank in terms of detection accuracy and detection time without involving
subscriber for the feedback.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We present a social reputation-based SPIT detection system that effectively char-
acterizes social behavior of the subscribers using set of social network and call
features. To this extent, we modeled behavior of the subscriber as a weighted call
graph, compute direct trust of subscriber with his called callees and finally com-
pute reputation of the subscriber using power iteration algorithm. The collective
use of social and call features ensures that spammers would not easily circumvent
the detection system and would always have small reputation scores.
• We present a percentile based approach for computing automated threshold below
which the subscriber is classified as spammer. To this extent we adopted a 25th
percentile based approach which is also tunable according to the requirement of
service provider.
• We present a privacy protection mechanism that ensures that privacy of subscriber is
not breached during computation of reputation scores. The privacy of subscriber is
protected by exchanging pesudononymized information between reputation engine
and the call processing engine.
• We evaluated the proposed system on a synthetic data set that has been generated by
simulating the social behavior of the spammers and non-spammers. Moreover, we
have analyzed the performance of system under different conditions such as high
spamming rate, small spamming rate, and for different performance metrics.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.3 describes the design of Caller-
REP system and algorithms used for the computation of direct trust, global reputation and
automated threshold. Section 4.4 provides simulation setup that has been used for gener-
ating the synthetic data-set. Section 4.5 evaluates the Caller-REP’s performances for dif-
ferent performance metrics using different percentages of spammers and non-spammers.
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Section 6.5 briefly discusses important features of Caller-REP system and possible eva-
sion approaches, and Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Motivation
The challenge in a design of SPIT detection system is to block a SPIT caller during the call
setup phase – thus without content analysis and user involvement. The existing reputation-
based approaches are not only intrusive to the end-users but also use a single feature for
computing direct trust and reputation of the subscriber. Spammers can easily manipu-
late single feature and circumvent detection system for relative long time periods. The
average call duration between subscribers can be the sign that they trust each other but
trust between subscribers in telephony should not be limited to the average call duration
only. A SPIT caller always targets a large number of subscribers and may manage to have
good duration calls with many of his target subscribers. This would probably result in
a high trust and reputation for the SPIT caller across the network because of some high
duration calls to his callees. For example, consider a VoIP network with n subscribers. A
SPIT caller makes calls to a 50% of total subscribers and manages to have call duration
of 60 seconds to more than 20% of the subscribers it calls. In this case, the SPIT caller
would have strong calling network with at-least 20% of subscribers that would result in
an aggregate high reputation for the SPIT if average call duration is used as a sign of trust-
worthiness . This happens because SPIT caller calls a certain subscribers only once thus
his aggregate call duration and average call duration remains same over the time. Though
the SPIT caller exhibits non-repetitive calling behavior but would manage to circumvent
the average call duration-based reputation systems.
In voice networks, the legitimate subscribers normally have a repetitive calling behav-
ior with his friends and family members, whereas the spammers normally do not have
repetitive calling behavior. Legitimate subscribers also receive calls from friends and
family members thus have mutuality in their social network, whereas the spammers do
not receive good duration calls from a large number of their target victims. This behav-
ior would result in an unbalanced calling network of spammers (few in-coming calls and
large number of out-going calls). We believe that trust and reputation of the subscriber
should be computed collectively using call duration of subscribers in both directions, call-
rate of subscribers in both directions and out-degree of the subscribers. The collective use
of these features for computing trust and reputation of the subscriber would result in a
small reputation score for the spammers, despite small number of high duration calls with
their victims.
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4.3 Caller-REP:Caller Classification-Based on Reputation
This section describes requirements for the reputation-based SPIT detection system and
data source used for non-intrusive SPIT detection system. Moreover, this section also
describes components and algorithms of a Caller-REP system. Finally, we have also
compared Caller-REP system with other reputation-based systems.
4.3.1 Requirements for Reputation Based SPIT Detection System
Before describing our reputation-based SPIT detection system, it is important to point out
few requirements for the design of an effective SPIT detection system based on the trust
and reputation of subscribers.
• The computation of direct trust between subscribers and the global reputation of
the subscriber must not involve subscribers for the feedback at any stage of call
processing thus must have ideally zero subscriber’s involvement.
• The computation of the reputation and the direct trust of the subscriber needs to
consider the subscriber’s past call transactions within the network along with the
collective use of social and call features.
• The proposed system must be robust against different malicious attacks such as
Sybil attack and must not be easily circumvented by the spammers.
• The system must carry out all computation in anonymized way in order to protect
the privacy of network subscriber.
• The overall system must not require any changes in the network or handset of the
subscriber.
• The system must be tune-able in terms of classification threshold according to re-
quirement of service providers or carriers and can be easily integrated with other
systems.
4.3.2 Data Source
A VoIP service provider consist of a large number of networking devices that work to-
gether for providing telephony and messaging services to its subscribers. Each call trans-
action either received or made by the subscribers is recorded in the call logs at the proxy
servers or call handling engine, that are later pushed to the CDR server for the billing
and troubleshooting. The logs contain several fields providing information about the call
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transaction. The time-stamp provides information when call between subscribers estab-
lished , call duration represent the how much time two subscribers talk to each other„
caller id reflects the calling identity of subscribers. Besides these fields, the CDR may
also logs IP address of caller and the callee, type of call (SMS, voice or MMS), who
disconnected call etc.
In order to compute global reputation of the subscriber, we construct a directed call
graph between subscribers by extracting the following information from the CDR logs.
Call Duration: Talk time of the subscriber with his called callee. The subscriber
can be either caller or the callee. We are mainly interested in characterizing behavior of
subscriber as a caller. We represent call duration between the caller S and the Callee R as
CDSR which is the sum of duration of all calls made from a caller S to the callee R.
Call Rate: Call-Rate is the number of calls made and received by the caller. We
present call rate between caller and the callee as CallRateSR and is the sum of calls made
from the caller S to a callee R.
Partners: Partner is the number of unique callees a caller has interacted or received
calls from. We represent number of out partners as a POS which is the sum of unique
callee a caller S is calling.
Our goal is to use information from directed call graph and develop a SPIT detection
that classifies subscriber as a spammer and a non-spammer based on reputation of the sub-
scriber. The block diagram of a Caller-REP is shown in a Figure 4.1. Specifically, after
modeling the call graph from the CDRs, Caller-REP consists of three steps for classifying
subscriber as a spammer and a non-spammer: 1) it computes direct trust of the subscriber
with his called callee using social network and call features, 2) It computes global repu-
tation of the subscriber using power iteration algorithm, and 3) It automatically computes
the threshold below which subscriber is classified as spammer.
4.3.3 Subscriber Direct Trust
The calling behavior of the subscriber can be estimated from the level of a trust a sub-
scriber maintains with other subscribers. Trust represents the level of mutual relationship
between subscribers which they have developed over the time and is computed from their
direct call transactions. Direct Trust between subscribers represents the amount of dura-
tion and number of times the subscribers interacted to each other. Higher the call duration
and call rate between subscribers, higher the trust exists between them. This trust infor-
mation is then extended to estimate the network wide behavior of a subscriber termed as
reputation of the subscriber.
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Figure 4.1: Building Blocks of Caller-REP.
The direct trust between subscribers characterizes the strength [GRA73] of social re-
lationship between subscribers. In a voice network, subscribers can develop strong rela-
tionships if they have repetitive and reciprocated long duration calls to each other; and can
develop weak relationship if subscribers have non-repetitive and non-reciprocated short
duration calls to each other. In perspective of social behavior of legitimate and spam sub-
scribers, we argue that legitimate subscribers usually have strong social ties with a large
number of callees and weak social ties with a few callees , whereas a SPIT caller develops
a weak relationship with a large number of their called callees. This trust information or
relationship information can be used to classify subscriber as a spammer and a legitimate.
In existing trust and reputation based SPIT detection systems, the direct trust between
subscribers is computed in two ways: getting positive or negative feedback from the sub-
scribers about their callers from their past call transactions and 2) implicitly using infor-
mation from the call detail records. First approach is intrusive to subscribers and annoys
subscribers for the feedback. Moreover, it also require changes in the handset and call
setup messages which makes it infeasible to be deployed in a real VoIP network. Second
approach normally uses single feature for computing direct trust between subscribers i.e.
average call duration, but we argued that direct trust should not be limited to the single
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feature but should also consider number of features for computing direct trust between
subscribers.
As spammers normally target large number of callees and managed to have good
duration calls with many of their callees. The use of average call duration feature for
trust computation would result in a high trust score of the spammer with many of his
callees. This in turn would have high reputation score despite having a large number of
out-going calls and small number of incoming calls. For example, a subscriber with sum
of call duration of 10 minutes in 10 calls has average call duration of 1 minute which
is similar to the subscriber having sum duration of 1 minute in 1 call because average
duration is 1 minute. Additionally, high number of long duration calls would also make
spammer as a legitimate subscriber because a group of people may also be interested
in spam call because of greed for financial benefits or the calls that terminated on the
voice mail box. In a voice communication network, a subscriber can be either a caller or
the callee. In the rest of this chapter we are interested in dealing subscriber as a caller.
The subscriber’s transactions are represented as a sparse adjacency matrix in which rows
represent callers and column represents the callees. We are interested in computing the
direct trust between caller and the callee which is also represented as a sparse matrix.
We incorporated the following features for computing the direct trust between caller and
the callee: the frequency of interaction between caller and callee in in both directions
(incoming and outgoing) , call duration between caller and the callee in both directions
(incoming and outgoing) and the out-degree of the caller(number of unique callees of the
caller). The call duration (CDSR;), call-rate (CallRateSR) and out-degree vector (POS) are
collectively used to estimate the direct trust between subscriber S and his callee R using
equation 4.1.
TrustSR =
CDSR×CallRateSR+CDRS×CallRateRS
POS
(4.1)
For all subscribers in the network, the direct trust matrix is defined as NXN sparse
matrix. In equation 4.1 , TrustSR represents the trust score of subscriber S with his callee
R based on their direct call transactions. In equation 4.1 CD is the call duration between
subscriber S with his callee R, CallRate is the interaction rate between subscriber S with
his callee R, and PO is the out-degree of the subscriber S. The TrustSR is represented
as NXN adjacency matrix where row represent caller and column represent callee. The
direct trust computed from equation 4.1 would result in a small direct trust scores for
subscribers having large number of out-going partners with large number of small dura-
tion calls and have small number of incoming calls. On the basis of high call duration,
repetitive calling behavior and small out-degree, equation 4.1 would assign a high trust
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score to the legitimate subscriber and small trust score to spammers due to their high
out-degree and non-repetitive short duration calls. The spammer would only be able to
achieve high direct trust scores if he exhibits following behavior: 1) managed to have
large duration repetitive incoming and outgoing calls, and 2) develop strong relationship
with many callees.
The reputation of the subscriber is computed from the normalized direct scores and
present network wide view about behavior of the subscriber. The normalized direct trust
matrix is computed by dividing each element of a row by summation of the respective
row as shown in equation 4.2. This ensures that all trust scores will be between 0 and 1
and each row would sum to 1 as ∑R TSR = 1
TSR =
TrustSR
∑
R
TrustSR
(4.2)
The direct trust scores provide information about direct relationship between sub-
scribers and would characterize how strong or weak relationship exists between sub-
scribers. Once the direct trust score of the subscriber has been computed the next step
is to aggregate these normalized direct trust score to have network wide view about be-
havior of the subscriber.
4.3.4 Reputation of the Subscriber
The global reputation represents the aggregate behavior of subscriber towards his entire
interacted subscribers across the network. If a particular subscriber has no prior interac-
tion with the other particular subscriber then the subscriber would ask other subscribers
for the feedback about the subscriber. In this situation, the global reputation of the sub-
scriber within the network would provide information about the aggregate behavior of the
subscriber towards all his interacted subscribers. In this section, we outline procedure
used for computing the global reputation of the subscriber.
The global reputation of the subscriber is computed by aggregating the normalized
direct trust scores. Eigen Trust algorithm [KSM03] has been widely applied in P2P net-
work for computing reputation of the node from his direct trust scores. In Caller-REP, the
reputation of the subscriber is computed using power iteration method with a slightly dif-
ferent initial reputation scores. The input to reputation computation method is the matrix
of normalized direct trust TSR between each pair of subscribers (S,R). The output of this
algorithm is a global reputation vector G with a global reputation score of a subscriber
GS and is in between ∈ [0,1]. The algorithm first initializes the initial global reputation
values of each subscriber with the inverse of the out-degree POS of the subscriber S. The
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global reputation score of subscriber is then iteratively computed by multiplying the nor-
malized direct trust matrix and initial reputation vector as represented in equation 4.3 and
algorithm 1. The iteration process stops on the convergence of the norm of the global
reputation vector ‖GR‖ =
√
∑S GR2S. In each step of this iteration process, the global
reputation vector is updated from the normalized direct trust and global reputation score
as GR = T ×GR. GR is normalized and its norm gr is used along with the previous norm
grprevious for checking the convergence.
GR(t+1) = TrustSR ∗GR(t) (4.3)
The reputation computed in this way would result in a high reputation score for the
subscribers having long duration repetitive calling behavior with the reputed subscribers.
The spammers in this case would have a small reputation scores because of unbalanced
calling behavior and large number of recipients.
Algorithm 4.1 Reputation Computation
1: procedure GLOBAL REPUTATION OF ALL SUBSCRIBERS {S}
2: input← Trust (normalized direct trust matrix, with elements TSR)
3: out put← GR (Global reputation score vector, with elements GRS)
4: precision parameter← ε
5: Initialize reputation vector GR
6: GRS = [1/POS]
7: % Iterate until convergence
8: while δ < ε do
9: GR← Trust×GR
10: GR← GR/‖GR‖
11: gr←‖GR‖
12: δ ← gr−grpreviousgr
13: grprevious← gr
14: end while
15: end procedure
4.3.5 Detection of Spammers
The reputation of a SPIT caller deviates from the reputation of legitimate subscribers
and this deviation would help in distinguishing SPIT subscribers from the non-SPIT sub-
scribers. In this section, we provide a method used for computing the automated threshold
below which the subscribers is classified as a spammer.
The global reputation score of the subscriber can be used in three ways to decide about
the nature of the subscriber. 1) The global reputation scores can be sent to the callee as a
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part of a SIP invite message and callee decides whether to accept or reject the call. 2) The
global reputation scores can be compared with a fixed threshold. 3) The global reputation
scores can be compared with a dynamic threshold learn from the set of reputation values.
The first approach requires interaction with the callee thus is not only intrusive but also
requires changes in the call setup messages. In the second approach, the threshold is
decided based on a certain pre-defined true or false positive rate but this threshold is
not flexible to accommodate a continuous changing behavior of the subscriber. In the
third option, the threshold is computed automatically from the reputation score without
subscriber’s intervention and can also account the changing behavior of the subscriber. We
adopted third option for computing the automated threshold below which the subscriber is
classified as a spammer. The dynamic threshold is advantageous as compared to the fixed
threshold approach as it better minimizes false positive rate and maximizes true positive
rate by considering the traffic patterns of subscribers within a specific time window.
We set the dynamic threshold value based on a percentile method instead of a fixed
value threshold. We sort the set of computed global reputation scores of all subscribers
and set the threshold value to the 25th percentile of this set. The procedure for classifying
subscriber as a SPIT or a non-SPIT is presented in algorithm 2. As in algorithm 2, GR
is the global reputation vector of all subscriber and m is the 25th percentile value of the
global reputation. First, the 25th percentile of global reputation is computed for each time
window. Second, the mean of global reputation score of subscriber less than the 25th
percentile value m is set as a dynamic threshold for a specific time window.
Algorithm 4.2 Detection of Spammers
1: procedure SPIT DETECTION
2: input← Global Reputation(GR), with elements GRS
3: out put← SPIT (1) or non-SPIT(−1) detection vector, with elements SPITS
4: serviceprovider−de f ined parameter← β (β = 1 if service provider has no pref-
erence)
5: m← 1st-quartile(GR)
6: threshold← mean(GR < m)
7: for All subscriber S do
8: if (GR[S]<β× threshold) then
9: Place Subscriber S in a SPIT List
10: else
11: Do Not Place Subscriber S in a SPIT List
12: end if
13: end for
14: end procedure
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Subscribers can be classified as legitimate 1 or non-legitimate -1 based on a following
rule:
SubscriberS =
{
GRS > β × threshold ; 1
GRS < β × threshold ; -1
Other approaches like Inter-quartile distance, mean absolute deviation and machine
learning-based approaches can also be used for identifying the suspected SPIT subscribers.
We believe that at any given time period, the VoIP network possibly has SPIT traffic less
than 25% of the total incoming traffic and a dynamic threshold based on the 25th per-
centile would achieve better true positive rate. The service provider also wishes to block
all the top spammers. Moreover, technologies normally witness a few malicious users
until they become mature and attract large number of users. However, once it attracted
large number of users then, it also starts attracting large number of malicious users and
the percentage of spammers rises to as up as 40% of all identities joining the network on a
particular day. For example, currently, it is estimated that 36% tweets on tweeter contains
links [TWI16] and 25% of all personal computers may be infected by viruses. Over the
time, we expect similar behavior in case when VoIP and telephony becomes affordable
and a primary method for having personal and business communication. Furthermore,
this threshold is tunable and can easily be integrated with service provider policies against
spammer and non-spammer. However, the 25th percentile based approach would not pro-
vide good results if the percentage of SPIT traffic increases or if detection window size
is decreased for the reputation computation. The 25th percentile performs better when
large window size is used for the computation of reputation scores i.e. large number of
call records and user interactions. The true positive and true negative rates in a network
with high SPIT or legitimate traffic would be maximized by using Caller-REP with a β
parameter set by the service provider according to his SPIT detection policies.
4.3.6 Caller-REP System Components
Figure 4.2 shows the Caller-REP and its interactions with call processing system i.e. VoIP
proxy server. The Caller-REP system can be implemented in two modes; as a standalone
system having dedicated hardware resources or resides on the CDR or proxy server as
a detection module. The later implementation would probably increase load on a proxy
server and the former requires communication link between CDR server and Caller-REP
server. However, in both implementations modes the system would not add any additional
delay to the call setup message as the reputation is computed in the background and
blacklist is consulted seamlessly during the process of getting billing and authorization
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information. The Caller-REP system integrates with proxy server and operates in the
following way.
1. On receiving a call request from the subscriber for the particular subscriber resid-
ing either in his network or other network, the proxy server first checks whether
subscriber behavior is legitimate or not by checking subscriber status in black-list
and white-list database. If the subscriber is found in the black-list, the proxy server
immediately blocks the subscriber from calling and disconnects his call. If the sub-
scriber is found in the white-list, the proxy server allows subscriber to reach the
called subscriber and waits for the call termination.
2. Once a call between subscriber has been terminated, the proxy server records log
of the call transaction in a CDR and periodically send anonymized CDR to the
Caller-REP system for computing reputation of the subscriber.
3. Caller-REP system on receiving CDRs, extracts call and social network features of
subscriber from the anonymized CDRs and computes direct trust and global repu-
tation of the subscriber. The automated threshold is then computed from the global
reputation scores that classifies the subscriber as spammer and non-spammer. Fi-
nally, Caller-REP engine responds to the proxy server with the results about the
subscriber i.e status and global reputation score.
4.3.7 Caller-REP and Privacy
Caller-REP system is based on the use of information from the call detail records to
determine if a subscriber is a spammer or a non-spammer. The CDRs contain private
information about when, where, and who the subscriber calls along with the length of
phone calls and other personal information like billing addresses and IP addresses. The
availability of this private information can raise serious privacy concerns and enable illicit
activities that can put the subscriber at risk. The telecom service providers have to protect
the privacy of their subscriber if they want to use this information for specific purposes
- e.g. in our case for the spam detection. The following privacy protection requirements
apply. 1) Subscribers have to be informed if their call detail records are being used for
any specific purpose like intrusion detection or spam detection [OZ04] and be provided
with an opt-out option. 2) The service provider has to keep the subscriber data secure and
protected from un-authorized access [OZ04].3) The service provider has to make an effort
to hide information that can directly identify the user [PEN04] (e.g. user name and phone
number) even when providing authorized access to subscriber data to third parties and
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Figure 4.2: Interaction Between Caller-REP and Proxy-Server.
to specific-purposed managed software like spam detection system. This could be done
by removing user name and phone number from the data and tagging it with the random
identifiers that are unique for each subscriber. This approach does not guarantee that the
identity of the subscriber cannot be mapped to the data but makes it non-trivial.
Caller-REP protects the privacy of the subscribers and manages privacy risks in a
service provider network in the following way. 1) The service provider shall inform sub-
scriber that their call records will be analyzed for the purpose of blocking spammers and
allow subscribers to opt-out only if number of their unique callees are less than some
fixed threshold (a small possible threshold, for example 5 unique callees). 2) The service
provider should protect user data from unauthorized access using strong authentication
process and policies on unauthorized disclosure of subscriber information by their staff.
3) In order to minimize the risk of misuse of data for other purposes, Caller-REP engine
also assigns with a data after pseudonymizing [CKK05]. For that purpose, the service
provider first selects few attributes from subscriber call transactions (i.e. caller and callee
identity, call duration, and time of call transaction). It then replaces caller and callee
identities with a key by which he can later re-identify a user account in case that have
been positively identified as spammer. Additionally, in order to completely preserve the
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privacy of the subscriber we also anonymized the time information and duration fields
of the CDR. We anonymized the time information by stripping the seconds and minutes
information from the call-time before presenting data to the Caller-REP engine. This is
not an anonymization because the service provider is still capable to re-identify the user
account. With this design option, the service provider achieves privacy protection require-
ment 3. That is, the privacy of a subscriber S who has communicated with callee R is not
compromised because the Caller-REP learns nothing about the subscriber’s real identity,
thus unable to profile and describe the calling behavior of S and any other subscriber.
Additionally, the intruders having some background information about the particular sub-
scriber would not be able to find the pseudonmyized identity of the target subscriber. The
drawback of pseudonymization might be the possibility of getting pseudonymized iden-
tity of subscriber via data from public information, which cannot be prevented easily. We
would provide further detail on privacy preservation for different call features in chapter
5.
4.3.8 Comparison with Other Reputation-based SPIT Detection Sys-
tems
There are some reputation-based SPIT detection systems that share some similarity with
the Caller-REP system. The major difference between Caller-REP and other reputation-
based systems is the method adopted for computing direct trust between subscribers. Ad-
ditionally, Caller-REP uses slightly different procedure for the initialization of global rep-
utation scores. In this section, we compare Caller-REP system with the closely related
Call-Rank and VSD systems. Both Call-Rank and Call-REP computes reputation of sub-
scriber automatically from the CDRs but their procedure is different from each other. On
the other hand, VSD computes direct trust between subscribers by getting feedback from
the subscriber receiving calls from the particular subscribers.
Call-Rank uses average call duration between subscribers as a feature for computing
direct trust between subscribers and then uses Eigen Trust algorithm for computing rep-
utation of the subscriber by aggregating direct trust score. In Call-Rank, subscribers are
considered trusted and well reputed if they have high average call duration regardless of
their un-expected high number of called recipients. The use of average call duration fea-
ture would allow spammers to bypass the system with the little effort. Call-Rank would
assign high trust score to spammers, if spammers managed the followings: 1) convinced
subscribers even a few to call back them by offering some monetary incentive or prizes.
This would increase incoming call traffic and duration to the spammers which in-turn
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increase trust and reputation of the spammers. 2) Spammers calls terminated on the re-
cipient voice mail box would result in a high duration calls with many recipients. 3)
Spammers usually target large number of recipients only once and managed some good
duration calls to few callees. In this scenario, the average duration stays the same as of
call duration of one call. 4) The aggregate large number of good duration calls would re-
sult in a good reputation score despite having high number of recipients. For example, the
average call duration of a subscriber having average call duration of 120 seconds for 10
calls is similar to average call duration of subscriber having call duration of 120 seconds
for 1 call. This would consequently results in a same trust score for both subscribers. In
all these conditions Call-Rank will assign high reputation scores to both legitimate and
malicious subscriber having good duration calls. In perspective of deployment, Call-Rank
requires the followings: 1) a private and public key infrastructure for authorization and
authentication of subscriber, 2) a mechanism for transporting reputation scores and social
network credentials to the callee for the final decision, and 3) a deployment of CAPTCHA
or Turing test system for introducing new subscriber and minimizing false positives. The
exchange of social network credentials to called subscriber may also be a threat to privacy
of calling subscriber as callee is being informed which friends of callee have also been
interacted with the caller. These limitations make Call-Rank unlikely to be deployed in a
real network.
The major limitation of VSD [DK05], [KD07] is that it requires interaction with the
callee for the feedback about the subscriber. The system requires honest feedback and
interaction between different system stages for high detection accuracy. However, having
honest feedback from all subscribers is not always happening in a real network. Spammers
can easily manipulate feedback scores by creating a Sybil network or a network between
their own identities. Additionally, subscribers get annoyed for providing feedback for
each call. Additionally, the deployment of VSD requires the following: 1) it requires
changes in the handset and signaling message for getting the response from the callee,
and 2) requires a process for learning of responses of a callee towards certain subscribers
under different situations, and 3) it also requires interaction among multiple modules
which probably would increase the call setup delay.
Caller-REP is different from both Call-Rank and VSD. However it shares some simi-
larity with the Call-Rank that is automatic computation of direct trust between subscribers
from the CDRs. Caller-REP collectively utilizes call duration, call rate and out-degree for
computing direct trust between subscribers. Additionally, it considers call and social fea-
tures in both directions incoming and outgoing. The direct trust computed in this way
would result in a small direct score for the subscriber having huge number of unique
callees with a large number of short duration and non-repetitive calls. The reputation of
4.4 Experimental Methodology 69
subscriber is computed from power iterative method with different initialization proce-
dure. The subscriber having high out-degree would result in a small initial reputation
scores and vice versa. In Caller-REP, spammers will get a small reputation score even if
they have made and received some good duration calls from their callees. This is because
of non-repetitive calling and huge number of recipients of spammers. In perspective of
bypassing Caller-REP, spammers need to control call duration, out-degree and call-rate to
by-pass the system which is a costly process. In perspective of deployment, Caller-REP
does not require any change in the infrastructure for authorization and signaling mes-
sages. Additionally, it does not require interaction with the subscribers at any stage of its
decision process. However, it can be easily implemented with CAPTCHA or Turing test
system as a solution for introducing new subscribers and a way of minimizing the false
positive rate.
4.4 Experimental Methodology
In this section, we provide an overview of method used for generating the synthetic data-
set and the evaluation criteria used for the evaluation of Caller-REP system.
4.4.1 Synthetic Data-Set
No VoIP or telecommunications CDRs data-set exists for the testing of proposed detection
system. So to test our proposed SPIT detection system, we use synthetic data-set gener-
ated by randomly simulating the social behavior of spammers and non-spammers. We
considered well-known graph models from the literature. In real telecommunication net-
works, users exhibits power law degree distribution with α between 2 and 3 [NEW05a],
[NGD+06]. Specifically, the in-degree is between 1.5 and 2, and the out-degree in be-
tween 2 and 3. We generate the data set using following: 1) a power-law graph model is
generated for subscriber’s in-degree and out-degree distribution, 2) a Poisson distribution
is used for modeling the call-rate between users in a graph network; and 3) an exponen-
tial distribution is used for the call duration between users. We generated the data-set for
one service provider regardless the number of proxy servers within the service provider’s
network. We repeated simulations for at least ten times for different network sizes and
percentages of the spammers. The data is generated for 10 days. In evaluation, we pro-
vided the average values for specific evaluation metric. We generated data-set for two
types of subscribers: spammers and non-spammers. The detail of the data-set is as under.
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We have used a power law distribution for the out-degree distribution of the legitimate
users with the α as (2 < α < 3) shown in equation 4.4. The call graph is then generated
from the power law out-degree distribution using mechanism provided in [GKT+10].
p(OutPartnersS = x) = kx−α (4.4)
The legitimate subscribers interact with two types of callees: strongly connected
callees and weakly connected callees. We divide the callees of the subscriber accord-
ing to these groups with few callees in a strongly connected group and others in weakly
connected groups. The legitimate subscribers usually have a high calling rate within their
strong social group, and moderate calling rate to callee outside their social group. In our
simulation settings, the legitimate subscriber follows the Poisson distribution [CHA2015]
with the call rate of mean µ = 3 calls (equation 4.5) with the strongly connected group
and µ = 1 with weakly connected group. Additionally, the legitimate subscriber also re-
ceives calls from his strongly and weakly connected groups with the same out-going call
rate to respective group.
CallRateSR =
eµµe
x!
(4.5)
Similarly, legitimate subscribers have long duration calls with callees within their
strong social group, and average or short duration calls with callees outside their so-
cial groups. In our simulation setting, call duration exhibits an exponential distribution
[YL07], [JMN+13] with average holding time µ = 360 seconds (equation 4.6) for strongly
connected group and µ = 120 seconds for weakly connected group. The subscriber also
received calls with the same call duration distribution from weakly and strongly connected
groups. The out-going and incoming call rate of all users is shown in Figure 4.3.
p(CallDurationSR = x) = µe−µx (4.6)
SPIT callers exhibit different calling behavior then the legitimate subscriber. They
usually have large number of recipients in weakly connected group with only few callees
in their strongly connected groups. A SPIT caller tries to reach huge number of callees, re-
ceives a small number of incoming calls and has short duration for his called and received
calls. As such, SPIT caller follows different distributions from the legitimate callers. In
simulations, the out-degree of each SPIT caller is uniformly distributed between 20% and
60% of the total number of users in a network. The average call rate of a SPIT caller with
the strongly connected group is between 2 and 3, whereas it calls weakly connected re-
cipients only once. The incoming call-rate for SPIT caller is very low and the probability
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Figure 4.3: Caller Distribution: A) Caller Out-Degree to In-Degree; B) Caller Out-Degree
to Out-Duration; C) Caller Reputation to Out-Degree Using Caller-REP.
of receiving a call from recipient of any group is set to .2. The exponential call duration is
used for the spammers out-going call duration for both recipients groups with hold time
of 180 seconds.
Call statistics for one of our experiment is shown in Figure 4.3. The comparison
of caller’s out-degree with the in-degree is shown in a Figure 4.3.A, while Figure 4.3.B
shows the average call duration vs. the caller’s out-degree. Caller-REP assigns small
reputation values to callers with high out-degree, high number of short duration calls, and
non-repetitive calling behavior; this can be seen in Figure 4.3.C for out-degree.
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Prediction/Actual Spam Not-Spam
Spam True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP)
Not-Spam False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN)
Table 4.1: Confusion Matrix.
4.4.2 Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate the performance of Caller-REP against the metrics commonly used in infor-
mation retrieval and machine learning. The metrics include the followings: true positive
rate, false positive rate, and accuracy, and are computed from the confusion matrix pre-
sented in Table 4.1.
True Positive (TP): True positive rate measures the proportion of spammers that are
correctly identified as spammers.
T PRate =
T P
T P+FN
(4.7)
False Positive (FP): The false positive rate is the proportion of legitimate subscribers
incorrectly classified as spammer.
FPRate =
FP
T N+FP
(4.8)
Accuracy (ACC):The accuracy is the proportion of true results (both spammer iden-
tified as spammers non spammer identified as non-spammers) among the total number of
spammers and non-spammers.
ACC =
T P+T N
T P+T N+FN+FP
(4.9)
A well designed SPIT detection system requires to achieve high detection accuracy i.e.
correctly classifying spammer as spammer and non-spammer as non-spammer. Blocking
a legitimate subscriber would not only annoy legitimate subscribers but also affect the
revenue of service provider. On the other hand, allowing SPIT callers to call would not
only annoy callees but also affect the productivity of the network.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate Caller-REP for the evaluation metrics presented in section
4.4.2 and compare its performance with the performance of Call-Rank. In particular, we
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evaluate how fast the system is able to distinguish spammers and non-spammers. In Fig-
ures (5.5, 5.6, and 4.6), label "YYY-ZZ%" represent the number of legitimate subscribers
(YYY) and the percentage of SPIT subscribers (XX) in a simulated network.
4.5.1 True Positive Rate
The first experiment examines the effects of percentage of spammers and non-spammer
on the true positive rate of the Caller-REP system. The percentage of spammers is varied
from 10% to 30% and the number of legitimate subscribers varied from 100 to 1500
subscribers. Particularly, the performances of Caller-REP has been evaluated for two
aspects: 1) how true positive rate of system behaves when number of legitimate subscriber
increases, and 2) how true positive rate is effected with the increase of percentage of SPIT
callers. The results for true positive rate of both evaluation aspects are shown in Figure
5.5 which plots the fraction of spammers blocked with respect to time.
In a first evaluation scenario that is varying the number of legitimate subscribers with
a small percentage of spammers. In this scenario, Caller-REP allows few SPIT callers
to pass through the system during first two days, but it starts blocking all SPIT callers
with a maximum true positive rate after second day. This is because of the fact that some
SPIT callers have small out-degree during first two days and managed to have good du-
ration calls with good number of callees. But, as soon as the out-degree of spammers
increases and other call features (duration and call-rate) decrease, Caller-REP start iden-
tifying spammers. Specifically, Caller-REP achieves true positive rate of less than 90%
during first two days in a network with high number of legitimate subscribers. Over
the time, Caller-REP achieves acceptable high true positive rate and eventually achieves
almost 100% true positive rate after three days regardless of number of spammers and
number of legitimate users. This is because during first two days the behavior of legiti-
mate and non-legitimate subscriber might be same but over the time the legitimate caller
develop many strong connections with their callees and spammer develops weak connec-
tions with the many callees which is enough to differentiate spammer from non-spammer.
This start period or learning period is essential as it help legitimate callers in achieving
high reputation scores with the time. For all scenarios the increase in number of legitimate
callers, Caller-REP is not allowing any SPIT caller through the system after 3 days.
In the second scenario, the behavior of the Caller-REP system is analyzed for different
percentage of SPIT callers. The percentage of spammer varied from 10% to 30% while
fixing the number of legitimate user between 100 and 1500. It is expected that system
would have high true positive rate when percentage of spammer is small. The true positive
rate of Caller-REP decreases with the increase in number of spammers from 10% to 30%
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Figure 4.4: True Positive Rate Increases with Time: A) SPIT Rate of 10%; B) SPIT Rate
of 20%; C) SPIT Rate of 30%.
as shown in Figure 5.5. Specifically, on a first day, the true positive rate of Caller-REP
system decreases by 50% with the increase in number of spammers from 10% to 30%.
This behavior is because on a first day, some spammers have small out-degree distribution
similar to the legitimate subscriber and develop some relationship with many subscribers.
However, over the time as out-degree increases, the true positive rate also increases. The
results from Figure 5.5 reveals that Caller-REP is able to achieve true positive rate of more
than 90% when the number of spammers is less than 20% and prolong detection to third
day when percentage of spammer exceeds 20%. Specifically, Caller-REP is able to block
all spammers in three days regardless of number of spammers in the network.
We have also analyzed another critical performance aspect of Caller-REP system that
is the time it takes to make the correct classification about the subscriber. The results from
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Figure 4.5: False Positive Rate Decreases with Time: A)SPIT Rate of 10%; B) SPIT Rate
of 20%; C) SPIT Rate of 30%.
Figure 5.5 show that Caller-REP allows a significant number of SPIT calls to pass through
the system on first three days, but it blocks all SPIT caller after third day regardless of
percentage of spammers and number of legitimate subscribers. Specifically, Caller REP
has high true positive rate for small sized network during first few days rather than large
scale network. However, Irrespective of network size and spamming rate, Caller-REP
correctly classifies subscribers as a legitimate and a non-legitimate within three days of
its initialization.
4.5.2 False Positive Rate
Service provider does not want to block legitimate subscribers for various reasons: first
it affects the revenue, secondly it annoys callee expecting calls from some legitimate
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subscriber, and thirdly it annoys legitimate subscribers if they bared from calling being
honest. A well designed and effective system requires to have small false positive rate
without effecting the true positive rate. The false positive rate of Caller-REP for all simu-
lation scenario is shown in a Figure 5.6. The performance of Caller-REP for false positive
rate is analyzed for the same performance aspects that we have used while evaluating the
true positive rate. In the first simulation scenario where the number of legitimate sub-
scriber increases, Caller REP able to manage a false positive rate of around 15% on first
day, but it starts decreasing to less than 2% within three days. This is because some of the
legitimate subscribers have short duration calls with many of their callees which results
in a small reputation scores similar to that of SPIT callers. However, over the time, if the
user behaves legitimately, the reputation scores increases due its strong social connections
and if the user behaves non-legitimate, the reputation score decreases over the time due its
weak social connection. Caller-REP correctly classifies non-spammer as non-spammer in
three days with false positive rate less than 2%.
The analysis for second scenario shows that Caller-REP achieves a better false posi-
tive rate in a network with a high number of SPIT callers, as shown in Figures 5.6.B and
C as compared to false positive when number of spammer is small. Caller-REP achieves
a false positive rate of less than 10% for a SPIT rate of 30% on the first day and even-
tually decreases to less than 1% on the third day. This means that under high SPIT rate,
Caller-REP would not cause revenue loss to the service provider. Additionally, Caller-
REP achieves false positive rate of less than 1% within three days for any type of SPIT
rate. The false positive rate can be further decreases with the use of CAPTCHA or Turing
test to be generated for the subscriber classified as spammers. Additionally, Caller-REP
can also be used in combination with social network features like out-degree to decrease
false positive in non-intrusive way.
The high false positive rate under small spamming rate and small false positive rate
under high spamming rate on a first day is also attributed to the threshold computation.
As discussed, Caller-REP is using 25th percentile based threshold for classification which
results in a high false positive when spamming rate is small. The threshold can also be ad-
justed according to SPIT detection policies (require true positive and false positive rates)
defined by service providers. In this scenario the 25th percentile threshold is multiplied
with a some constant value between 0 and 1. A high threshold would block some legit-
imate subscribers whereas as small threshold would have small false positive rate. The
threshold value need to be chosen in such a way it does not affects true positive rate by
high margins.
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Figure 4.6: Caller-REP Accuracy: A)SPIT Rate of 10%; B) SPIT Rate of 20%; C) SPIT
Rate of 30%.
4.5.3 Detection Accuracy
The service provider wish to have such SPIT detection system that achieves high false
negative (non-SPIT classified as non-SPIT (1-FP)) and high true positive rate. The accu-
racy metric best characterize the behavior of detection system as it incorporates all four
terms of confusion matrix while computing performance of detection system. A small
true positive rate results in allowing spammers to reach the subscriber and the high false
mistakenly blocks many non-spammers from the subscriber. The True positive rate (TPR)
and false positive rate (FPR) of Caller-REP is shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 that shows that
Caller-REP stabilizes and achieves maximum TP and TN rate within three days. How-
ever, TPR and TNR needs to be analyzed together that is best characterize by computing
accuracy of the system i.e. systems capability of correctly making decision about the
78 Caller-REP: Detecting Unwanted Calls Through Caller’s Social Strength
subscriber behavior.
In first two days, Caller-REP allows many SPIT callers to pass through undetected and
blocks some of the legitimate subscribers which results in a accuracy less than 90% when
spamming rate is less than 20% and accuracy less than 80% when spamming rate exceeds
20% as shown in Figure 4.6 . Specifically on a first day the accuracy for all spamming
rate and number of legitimate user is less than 60% which further improves to almost
100% accuracy in 3 days. Results from Figure 5.5 and 5.6 reveal that the TP rate and TN
rate increases over the time which is a positive sign of Caller-REP for not blocking any
legitimate subscriber and not allowing any spam caller after 3 days.
The small accuracy during first few days is mainly because of the high false positive
rate or small true negative rate. In order to improve the accuracy we need to improve
the false positives without affecting the true positive. In view of the above results, we
believe that in addition to using a 25th percentile threshold, using some social network
features or service provider defined threshold in decision process would be effective in
improving the accuracy of the Caller-REP system. The Caller-REP can also relay the call
to voice mail box and implicitly analyze the behavior of callee towards the message from
voice mail box. It might be possible that subscriber develop only few relations during its
introduction periods which results in a subscriber’s small reputation score and a sign to
consider as spammer. Instead of directly blocking the subscriber having small reputation
scores, Caller-REP can collectively use reputation score, threshold and out-degree of the
subscriber. If out-degree is extremely small (less than 5) then it would not be sign that
subscriber is spammer.
4.5.4 Sparse Subscriber’s Network
In the context of social network, a sparse network is network where the nodes have edges
with only fewer nodes from all nodes in a network. In telephone, user develops a scale free
power law degree distribution which means that subscriber normally interacts with a small
group of callees. This interaction behavior results in a sparse network matrix or sparse
network for users. In this section, we analyze the performance of Caller-REP system in a
sparse network. We expect, that sparseness would not result in a small reputation scores
to subscribers having sparsity because of use of collective use of three call features: call
duration, call rate and out-degree. In Caller-REP network sparseness is not the only factor
that has an impact on a global reputation and direct trust. A sparse caller only gets bad
reputation when along with sparseness it also has low call duration and low call rate.
The evaluation of a sparse network requires a different simulation setup than the sim-
ulation setup that has been used for analyzing the TPR and FPR. For analyzing the effects
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of sparseness, we created a full network for 11000 users using the method from the section
5.5.1 and then added a percentage of users with a sparse network. We performed simula-
tions for two scenarios. In a first scenario, 25% of callers has less than 10 friends. In this
scenario, Caller-REP misclassifies only 11% of legitimate subscribers as spammers. In a
second scenario, 45% of subscribers has less than 20 friends and Caller-REP misclassi-
fies only 7% of legitimate subscribers. The results also show that decreasing the degree
of sparseness would decrease the FPR. Additionally, the sparseness has no effect on the
TPR. On further investigation, the sparse legitimate subscribers that were misclassified as
spammer were found to have small average call duration and calling rates.
4.5.5 Subscriber Reputation
The reputation of a legitimate subscriber increases and reputation of non-legitimate sub-
scriber decreases over the time. This is because of the fact that the legitimate subscriber
has repetitive long duration calls to a large number of their called callees and has short
duration calls with only few callees. On the other hand non-legitimate subscribers tar-
get large number of callees and managed strong connection with only few callees. This
behavior would result in a high reputation score to legitimate subscriber which further in-
creases over the time and small reputation score to the spammers which further decreases
over the time. The global reputation scores of spammer fluctuate around his initial rep-
utation score whereas non-spammer show increase in reputation scores from their initial
reputation scores. The small reputation score to spammers and high reputation score to
non-spammer is because of the collective use call-features (duration and call rate) and the
out-degree distribution. The high out-degree with small duration call will largely effect
the reputation of the subscriber.
In Caller-REP, it is difficult for spammer to obtain and maintain high reputation scores.
This is because the reputation is based on the call interaction, call duration, and the out-
degree of the subscriber. The spammer needs not to have good duration bi-directional
repetitive calls but also need to control his out-degree in order to have high reputation
score but this is not practical in real scenario and spammer would not have benefit from it.
A legitimate subscriber, on the other hand, will have a high reputation value due to high
number of repetitive long duration calls in both direction and relative small out-degree.
Figure 4.7.A shows the reputation score distribution of spammers and non-spammer over
the period of 10 days. From Figure 4.7.A, it is clear that reputation of suspect spammer is
not increasing much and does not vary over the time, whereas the legitimate subscribers
show continuous increase in their reputation scores. The reputation scores for Call-Rank
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Figure 4.7: Caller Reputation With The Time: A) Caller-REP; B) Call-Rank.
system for ten days is shown in Figure 4.7.B which shows that global reputation of spam-
mers is also increasing if subscriber has high out-degree and some moderate duration
calls. From a Figure 4.7.A, we also conclude that 25th percentile could provide better
detection accuracy for the Caller-REP than the Call-Rank system.
4.5.6 Caller-REP Vs. Call-Rank
In section 5.4.1 we have presented how Caller-REP is different from other SPIT detec-
tion systems. In this section we compare the performance of Caller-REP with its closely
related counterpart approach the Call-Rank. The social network of legitimate subscriber
becomes strengthen with the passage of time as compared to non-legitimate subscriber
having weak social network over the passage of time. The reputations of legitimate
and non-legitimate subscribers using Caller-REP and Call-Rank approach is presented
in Figure 4.7. The reputation of legitimate and non-legitimate subscribers in Call-Rank
increases with the time as shown in Figure 4.7.B. This means that if Call-Rank misses
a certain non-legitimate subscriber on the first day, it would not be able to detect this
suspected subscriber on next days because of his improved global reputation value. On
the other hand Caller-REP would not increase the reputation of suspected non-legitimate
subscribers over the period of time instead it decreases over the time. This means that
if Caller-REP misses a certain non-legitimate subscribers on the first day then it would
eventually detect it on the next days because of its slight change in a reputation values. In
terms of detection performance, the Call-Rank achieves a maximum true positive much
later then that of Caller-REP system. However, Caller-REP achieves a true positive rate of
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Figure 4.8: Caller-REP Performance Under Legitimate Network.
almost 100% on the third day under any type of spamming network. In terms of false pos-
itive rate, caller-REP blocks 10% of the legitimate subscribers, which is much higher than
the false positive rate of Call-Rank. However, with time this false positive rate decreases
to less than 1% and behaves similarly to a the Call-Rank.
4.5.7 Caller-REP under Legitimate Network
The deployment of Caller-REP in a real VoIP network may face another major challenge
when all subscribers in a network are legitimate. There are no SPIT subscribers in this
condition. In its original form, Caller-REP may wrongly classify weakly connected legit-
imate subscribers as SPITter. In order to minimize this misclassification, Caller-REP can
be improved using additional social network features and improved automatic threshold
detection. The following social network features could be used along with Caller-REP:
clustering coefficient, ratio of incoming to total calls, path distance measure and out-
degree distribution. The computation of few these features becomes difficult when the
subscribers are on different networks and service providers are not willing to share callee
internal network structure. However, out-degree and in-degree distribution of subscriber
can be easily computed without extra effort and provide information along with reputation
score.
Usually the SPIT caller tries to reach a large number of callees and consequently has
a more unbalanced out-degree distribution than the legitimate subscribers. In a legitimate
network, Caller-REP misclassifies callers with short duration calls and small number of
unique callees. The small number of unique callees in a day cannot be taken by itself
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as the sign of SPIT callers [SWN12]. Figure 4.8 presents the performance of Caller-
REP and Extended-Caller-REP under a legitimate network. In extended Caller-REP we
consider callers as legitimate if their number of out-partners is less than 5 even if the
subscriber is classified as non-legitimate by Caller-REP. Caller-REP achieves 90% true
negative rate (non-SPIT detected as non-SPIT) in a legitimate network. The extended
Caller-REP behaves well at start, but its true negative rate decreases to 96% with the
time. The decrease in true negative in extended Caller-REP is due to the fact that some
legitimate subscribers have low duration calls with few callees and also do not receives
calls from called callees.
4.5.8 Caller-REP under High SPIT Rate
Currently the email spam traffic dominates the total legitimate email traffic. However, in
Telephony not many SPIT events have been reported. In future, advertisers will likely
starts using VoIP as a mechanism for advertising their products. In a high SPIT attack,
where the network comprises more SPIT traffic than non-SPIT traffic, the Caller-REP
only blocks a limited number of SPIT callers having extremely low reputation values.
The positive aspect of Caller-REP under a high SPIT rate scenario and β value of 2
is that it would not block any legitimate subscribers. However, in order to block all
SPIT callers, the Caller-REP can be improved by carefully setting the β parameter. We
performed experiments for 2000 users, for a varying number of spammers from 45% to
80%, and a fixed β value of 2. Figure 4.9 presents the true positive rate of Caller-REP
under high number of SPIT callers and β value of 2. The true positive rate decreases
with the increase in a percentage of SPIT callers; however, Caller-REP only allows less
than 8% of SPIT callers to make calls under high number of SPIT callers. The Caller-
REP allows all legitimate subscribers with a zero false positives. The true positive rate
of Caller-REP under heavy SPIT attack also stabilizes with the time and achieves the true
positive rate of 96% within 3 days and around 98% in 8 days.
4.6 Discussion on Caller-REP
In this section, we discuss various aspects of Caller-REP system. We first discuss some
important characteristics of Caller-REP system and discuss how it can be bypassed by the
spammers. We then discuss deployment issues of Caller-REP in a real VoIP network.
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Figure 4.9: True Positive Rate Under High SPIT Traffic and β=2.
4.6.1 Features of Caller-REP
Caller-REP can be by-passed by the SPIT caller under certain conditions. The SPIT caller
is able to reach the callee only if he managed to have good trust with a large number of
called callees. This can be achieved by having long duration and repetitive calls to a
large number of callees. Caller-REP use three features for a direct trust computation and
out-partner is the only one under the subscriber’s control. The other features that are
call duration in both direction and repetitive behavior depends on callee behavior towards
the subscriber. The subscriber can be passed through the system even it has short or no
duration incoming calls provided that he has controlled out-degree with repetitive and
long duration calls with his called callees. There are some service providers offering flat-
rate packages for the domestic and international calls and is not profitable for the service
provider when abused by telemarketers or spammers for large number of calls. These
flat-rate telemarketers need to be distinguished from the normal flat-rate subscribers for
profit. The legitimate flat subscriber usually tries large number of callee in a short which
might have out-degree distribution same to low rate SPIT caller, but the legitimate flat
subscriber usually has social circle quite different from the SPIT caller. The social circle
of non-SPIT caller would result in a repetitive calling behavior and good call duration to a
large number called callees. This calling behavior of non-SPIT flat caller distinguish from
the SPIT caller even the SPIT callers are not receiving any call from their called callees.
However, Caller-REP would block flat-rate legitimate subscriber having large number of
called callees and small call duration.
Caller-REP blocks such legitimate subscribers having high out-degree and short dura-
tion non-repetitive calls to his called callees. As an example, an employer wants to convey
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short duration message to all his employees. This calling pattern would result in a high
out-degree and small duration calls to their called callees. Similarly, the organizations of-
fering services for the betterment of society also have high number of unique callees with
short or large duration calls and are considered as SPIT caller by Caller-REP. However,
these callers are very few in number and can be assigned high trust scores to be passed
through the system. There are other situations where Caller-REP also block legitimate
subscriber: for example when a job seeker tries to call many companies for job with a less
or few incoming short duration calls and. This can be overcome through personalized
Caller-REP.
It is also possible that a legitimate subscriber may has short duration calls to a large
number of his called callees and may be considered as SPIT caller because of call duration
similarity with the non-legitimate subscribers. However, the out-degree, repetitive calling
behavior, number of incoming calls to such caller and duration of these incoming calls to
the caller are different from the SPIT caller. No single feature such as short call duration
or small out-degree proves anything specific or absolute about the nature of a subscriber.
The call duration, repetitive calling behavior and number of unique callees of a subscriber
are the three features that have been used collectively in a Caller-REP and affect the
reputation of subscriber across the network. The subscriber having short duration calls
would have high reputation if he calls his callee frequently and receive calls from them no
matter how many unique callee he has. The Caller-REP also learns automated threshold
and would only block such subscriber having short duration calls with large number of
unique callees, has non-repetitive calling behavior and small number of non-repetitive
incoming calls.
4.6.2 Sybil Attack
In a Sybil attack subscribers achieve high reputation scores by acquiring large number of
identities, using them to gain high reputation in order to make negative impact on other
users with spamming. The detection of Sybil network depends on the cost imposed while
acquiring a new identity. The Sybil subscribers gain maximum advantage by creating
large number of fake identities, if cost on creating a Sybil subscriber is small. The strong
authentication and high cost for creating the new identity could limit the Sybil attack. In
VoIP or telephony, acquiring a new identity is not only easy but cheap. A Sybil user can
easily make calling network between all his identities by making calling network between
his identities before finally making calls to other users. Caller-REP can impose two meth-
ods for Sybil subscriber: firstly, it imposes some cost for new identity but this approach
would also limit number of legitimate subscribers. Secondly, it adopts social patterns of
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Sybil subscribers. Caller-REP is based on the assumption that Sybil subscriber would
have limited number of strong relationship to real users. The Sybil spammer gets some
profit when it calls to a large number callee outside its Sybil network, which normally
results in small reputation scores for the Sybil subscriber and a possible sign of spam-
mer. For the social pattern based Sybil detection, Caller-REP adopts mechanism of not
using trust values from the callees which are identifies as spammers or has extremely
small trust values. The effect of Sybil subscriber can also be minimized by considering
the combination IP-address and user identities during the creation of subscriber’s trust
network but it possible also limit legitimate caller for example a legitimate call center or
large organizations.
4.6.3 Betrayal Subscribers
Betrayal subscribers are those callers who start spamming after creating trust link with
the large number of subscribers. The large number of trusted links would result in a high
reputation score for such callers. This scenario can happen in two ways: 1) Betrayal
subscribers deliberately achieve some good reputation scores by creating trust link with
other spammers or legitimate callers, and 2) the spammer compromised or spoofed iden-
tity of the legitimate subscribers. The performances of the detection systems normally
degraded under these calling behaviors and allow Betrayal spammer for relatively long
time periods. It is utmost important that detection system must be adoptable to the chang-
ing calling behavior of Betrayal callers. Though the Betrayal callers can have high trust
and reputation score for some time period, but it would not possible for them to maintain
it when they target large number of callees. A change in the calling behavior and large
number of small duration calls to a large number of callees would drastically ruin their
achieved high reputation scores.
Caller-REP blocks Betrayal callers as soon as these callers start spamming the sub-
scribers of the network. Specifically, Caller-REP utilizes subscriber’s call patterns in a
specific time window for computing his direct trust and reputation. When a reputed sub-
scriber starts acting as a SPIT caller, his direct trust values start decreasing due to his
abnormal call patterns to a large number of unique callees. Caller-REP makes it diffi-
cult for the suddenly converted untrusted subscribers to maintain their high reputation for
the long time periods because of collective use of number of social and call features for
computation of global reputation.
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4.6.4 Addition of New Subscriber
When a new subscriber wants to join the service provider network, the existing network
subscribers do not have any information about the joining and reputation of the new sub-
scribers. Since new subscribers are new to the system they must by introduced to the
network. The new subscribers can be introduced in two ways: 1) by considering all new
comers as trusted and 2) a new user is not trusted. The first approach allow spammer
to pass the system and second approach might block some legitimate subscribers before
building their reputation. The first approach with some additional constraint is suitable for
introducing new subscriber to others. Calls to small number of unique callees is not the
sign that subscriber is spamming and can be used as threshold for allowing caller for some
fixed number of callees. In this way, the subscriber will get a fair chance of improving
their reputation score in order to have future calls. The selection of threshold for the fixed
callees should neither be small nor be large as a small threshold would block legitimate
subscribers and large threshold would allow spammers for considerable several callees.
Caller-REP expects that subscriber should maintain some level of trust with other
subscribers in order to have good reputation and future communication. Legitimate sub-
scribers normally have repetitive and long duration calls with their friends and family
members over the time which results them to high reputation scores. However, SPIT
callers make large number of calls as soon as they join the network which normally re-
sults in a high out-degree and small reputation scores. In order to provide fair chance
to subscriber for his introduction in the network, Caller-REP allows new subscriber to
remain unchecked as soon his number of unique callees is less than 5. As the number of
callees exceeds 5, Caller-REP starts computing reputation of the subscriber and classifies
him as spammer or non-spammer considering his reputation score. Imposing this form of
introduction ensures that the new subscriber gets fair chance of making social link with
the callees. Caller-REP can also be implemented with CAPTCHA test as a solution for
introducing new subscribers but this is not only intrusive but also requires some system
resources from the service provider.
4.6.5 Deploying Caller-REP in a Real VoIP Network
The VoIP service provider authenticates and authorizes subscriber before allowing them
to call the callees. The service provider is responsible for implementing call routing,
billing policies, and logging of call transactions. The Call detail records are generated
for every successful and failed call at the proxy server and are periodically parsed to the
CDR server for billing and backup. In a real VoIP service provider, a Caller-REP can
be placed on any of these locations: 1) the VoIP proxy server or call processing engine,
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2) the CDR server, and 3) deployed as a standalone network component. In any form
of deployment, Caller-REP requires interaction with CDR server and requires adjustment
of two parameters: the β parameters and a threshold for the number of unique callees.
These two parameters control the true positives and false positives. A small value of β
parameter and a high number of out-partners may minimize the false positives but might
result in some revenue loss. The number of unique callees can be fixed to 5 as such a
low call-rate cannot be the behavior of a SPIT caller. The network service provider can
choose small or high threshold for the number of unique callees. The high threshold on
the number of unique callees may allow SPIT callers to reach relatively large number of
subscribers and small threshold probably block legitimate callers having small duration
calls.
The service provider also wants to maximize his profit and may not be willing to block
all SPIT callers except the ones having very small reputation scores. Consider a Telemar-
keter who has fixed calling rate from the service provider but makes unsolicited calls to a
large number of network subscribers. Blocking these callers from calling would result in
a revenue loss to the service provider. The VoIP service provider can set β parameters ac-
cording to his requirements and SPIT detection policies. The high threshold would block
all suspected SPIT callers and would also results in some false positive which is again a
loss of revenue to the service provider. The low threshold would block maximum number
of SPIT caller’s and allow few SPIT caller to pass through the system which normally
results in a no false positives and no loss of revenue. The service provider can also use
reputation scores along with the callee consent and contractual agreement. In this case the
service provider first learn the callee threshold for his caller’s reputation and allow only
those caller to call the callee having reputation score greater than callee learned threshold.
4.6.6 Call Setup Delay
The primary use of VoIP telephony is to satisfy customers and provide committed QoS
(Quality of Service) comparable to traditional circuit switched telephony. The placement
of security system on call processing engine would introduce call setup delay and may not
be acceptable for service providers. Call setup delay is the delay between when the caller
enters the last dialed digit and when he receives the ringing tone. In a SIP-based VoIP
network, call setup time can be taken as the time interval between when the proxy server
receives the invite request and when it responses back with the "180 ringing message"
to the caller. Call setup delay is the only metric that can be affected by the placement
of Caller-REP in a network. Caller-REP is designed to work independently from the
call processing engine thus would not add any noticeable delay. The call processing
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engine requests Caller-REP for the reputation of a caller at the same time it is processing
routes for the call and getting billing policies from the billing server. As such this parallel
processing of getting reputation of a caller would not introduce any observable delay to
the caller call request.
4.7 Conclusions
The subscribers call transactions are recorded in a CDR that can be used to generate a
weighted social call graph between subscribers. The collective use of social network
and call features for computing reputation of the subscriber can be highly effective for
blocking SPIT caller. In this chapter, we presented a Caller-REP system – a SPIT de-
tection system that automatically identifies spammers in a VoIP network without content
processing and user involvement. Caller-REP considered variety of social network and
call features for computing direct trust between subscribers, and global reputation of sub-
scribers is computed by aggregating direct trust score of subscribers. The approach results
in a small reputation scores to the SPIT callers and high reputation scores to the non-SPIT
callers. The automated threshold is then computed from the global reputation score below
which the subscriber is considered as the spammer. We evaluated the proposed approach
through series of experiments consisting of different percentage of SPIT and non-SPIT
callers. The results show that the Caller-REP is an effective and efficient system for de-
tecting SPIT caller under any type of network conditions. It achieves true positive rate
of almost 98% and false positive rate of less than 1% within three days. The privacy of
subscriber is also being full protected as VoIP service provider is neither disclosing sensi-
tive information of caller to reputation engine nor providing any information to the called
callees. Finally, we compared the performance of Caller-REP with Call-Rank. In our ex-
periments, Caller-REP outperformed Call-Rank in terms of both detection accuracy and
detection time. The Caller-REP is specifically designed to be used within existing VoIP
infrastructure without any change in a network architecture and call flow. The system
can also be implemented with other existing solutions for improved accuracy and early
detection.
Based on these encouraging results, in a next chapter we present collaborative SPIT
detection system that involve collaboration among service providers for the early iden-
tification of spammers making low rate spam calls to many service providers. In col-
laboration, the VoIP service providers exchange the reputation scores of a subscriber to
the central repository, which in turn decides the nature of a subscriber on a behalf of the
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service provider. We believe that this collaboration would further minimize the detection
time and achieves high accuracy.
Chapter 5
COSDS: Blocking Spammers with
Information Sharing across Multiple
Service Providers
5.1 Introduction
Telecommunications service providers (SPs) can deploy standalone spam detection sys-
tems [DK05], [KD07], [WBS+09], [BAP07], [AM12], [AM13] within their network for
protecting their subscribers from unsolicited calls and SMS. The standalone detection
systems 5.1(a) consider data from one source for analyzing the calling behavior of sub-
scribers within service provider. Spammers can evade these standalone systems by mak-
ing a large number of spam calls in aggregate to recipients of many service providers
without overwhelming any single service provider with the spam calls. By doing so,
spammers remain undetected for a longer time period within the service provider, since
service provider is not receiving large number of calls from the spammers that flagged
them as spammers. An effective solution to detect low rate spammers requires monitor-
ing of behavioral patterns of subscribers across multiple SPs.
Obviously, collaboration and information sharing can be an effective way to block
such spammers making low rate spam calls to recipients of many service providers. How-
ever, there are two key challenges in collaborative spam detection: firstly, what infor-
mation should be exchanged during the collaboration process; and secondly, to whom
this information should be made available. Collaboration will probably achieve better
detection accuracy and time than the standalone detection systems but its performance
depends on the amount of information exchanged among collaborators. The collaborative
solution can be either the distributed 5.1(b) or the centralized 5.1(c): distributed - where
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(a) Non-Collaborative
(b) Distributed Collaboration
(c) Centralized Collaboration
Figure 5.1: Collaboration Methods: A) Non-Collaboration; B) Distributed Collaboration;
C) Centralized Collaboration.
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the information from each SP is shared and processed in a completely distributed fashion
without a central coordinator; centralized - where all information from SP is reported to
the single centralized location for analysis. The distributed data aggregation and analysis
lack privacy protections. The service providers are not willing to share operational data of
their customers with each other, because they are business competitors and are concerned
about compromising the privacy of their customers. Generally, better detection accuracy
is expected when collaboration is achieved through the exchange of complete call records
but at the cost of system and network resources. Moreover, SPs are likely to be reluctant
in a direct exchange of CDRs to peer SPs or the trusted Centralized Respository (CR)
because CDRs contain subscriber’s private information as well as operational details of
their network. SPs may be more comfortable in exchanging summarized information to
the trusted CR rather than exchanging information directly with other SPs. The exchange
of summarized information could deteriorate the system performance in terms of detec-
tion accuracy and time but it does not require extensive network resources and exchange
of call records. A key challenge in the design of a collaborative SPAM detection system
is to achieve high detection accuracy and minmizes the detection time without compro-
mising computation resources and without the exchange of CDRs.
To address the above challenges, we propose a Collaborative Spit Detection System
(COSDS) for an accurate and early detection of SPIT subscriber, which is based on col-
laboration among many autonomous SPs. The major feature of COSDS is that it does
not require direct collaboration among SPs. Instead the collaboration is carried out with
the exchange of summarized information with the trusted CR thus reducing the network
load. In particular, each SP submits the Local Reputation (LR) scores (summarized in-
formation) of their subscribers to the trusted CR. These reputation scores represent the
behavior of subscribers within the SP network and have been computed from subscribers
past call transactions within the SP. The CR is responsible for the computation of global
reputation of subscribers by aggregating the received LR scores and deciding about spam-
ming behavior of subscribers. The CR responds collaborating SPs with the GR scores
and decisions about subscribers, which also allows each SP to act independently against
spammers. In COSDS, only a summarized information i.e. LR scores are sent to the
trusted CR which are not resource demanding. Each collaborating SP interacts directly
with the CR and requires only two transmission cycles for getting GR of their subscribers
i.e. one cycle for sending LR to the CR and one cycle for receiving GR from the CR. Ad-
ditionally, the use of trusted CR and exchange of summarized information further likely
to convince SP to take part in a collaboration.
We evaluate our system using synthetic data that we have generated through models of
spammers and non-spammers social behavior. The evaluation has been performed for dif-
5.1 Introduction 93
ferent performance metrics and for different percentages of spammers and collaborators.
We demonstrate that collaboration among SP outperforms standalone detection systems
in terms of detection accuracy and detection time. Specifically, for a network having a
large number of spammers, COSDS managed to achieve zero FP rate and blocked all
spammers within 3 days. The results also reveal that COSDS achieves detection accu-
racy that is comparable to that of a system where collaboration is carried out through the
exchange of call detail records. COSDS approach is fast, requires small communication
overhead and only requires a few iterations for the reputation convergence within the SP.
The proposed approach is an extension of the SP level SPIT detection system pre-
sented in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we establish cooperation among SPs and focus on
defining the components and mechanism for collaborative SPIT detection. This enables
early and accurate detection of the spammer while considering the LR scores of the sub-
scribers across many collaborating SPs.
In a summary, the contributions of this chapter are:
• The design of a collaborative SPIT detection system that incorporates collaboration
from multiple autonomous SPs for an early identification of spammers distributing
low rate spam calls to recipients of many SPs. Each autonomous SP is capable of
processing locally recorded call transactions of their subscribers for computing LR
scores of subscribers, which are then sent to the trusted CR. The trusted CR com-
putes GR of subscribers by aggregating the reputation scores and makes meaningful
decisions about behavior of a subscriber as a spammer or a non-spammer. The ex-
change of summarized local reputation scores not only convince SP to be a part
of collaboration process but is also not resource demanding regarding network and
system resources. The proposed centralized design and exchange of summarized
information further ensures the privacy protection of subscribers within SP as well
as at the CR.
• A detailed evaluation has been performed on the synthetic CDRs. Particularly, we
evaluated the system for different number of collaborators, different percentage of
spammers and for the following metrics: true positive rate (TPR), false positive
rate (FPR) and accuracy. We also compare the performance of COSDS to a sys-
tem where collaboration is carried out through the exchange of CDRs or direct
trust scores with the CR. In addition, we also evaluate subscriber’s privacy aspects
within the collaborating SP and at the centralized repository for different auxiliary
information known to adversary.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.4, we describe architecture of col-
laborative SPIT detection system and design options for the collaboration. Additionally,
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Section 5.4 also provides discussion on deployment challenges of COSDS in the SP net-
work. The experimental setup is presented in Section 6.4 and detail evaluation for differ-
ent performance metrics is presented in Section 5.6. In section 5.7 we discuss features of
collaborative system and then conclude the chapter in Section 5.8.
5.2 Limitations of Stand-alone Detection Systems
Stand-alone SPIT detection systems are currently major systems for thwarting SPIT sub-
scribers. These systems are typical placed within one SP and consider only locally
recorded data within the SP for deciding about behavior of the subscriber as a spammer
and a non-spammer. Since there is no cooperation among SPs, no data from SP is passed
to other SPs except call handling messages. Standalone anti-SPIT systems may have high
false negative rate and prolonged detection when spammers are making low rate spam
calls to recipients of several SPs without making large number of spam calls to any sin-
gle SP. In particular, stand-alone systems could manage to detect low rate spammer over
time (after receiving enough number of calls) and when the number of spam calls from
the same subscriber spikes. However, this detection is too late as spammer has already
reached to a large number of subscribers in a particular SP and across several SPs. The
prolonged detection is because of unavailability of information for making reasonable de-
cision about the sender. The stand-alone systems can improve their detection capability
by combining several stand-alone detection approaches into a single multistage system
or asking subscriber for solving the CAPTCHA test. However, these implementations
have following limitations. First, CAPTCHA involves subscriber for solving the chal-
lenge that is not only resource intensive but is also intrusive to the subscribers. Second,
multistage systems require call request to pass through many detection components thus
would increase the call setup delays. Third, multistage systems still require a relatively
large number of calls from the same subscriber for making the final decision about the
subscriber and still still allows spammers to reach several subscribers.
5.3 Motivation
Existing SPIT detection systems classify subscriber as spammer and non-spammers based
on the call patterns of subscriber observed at a single service provider. A low rate spam
subscriber that distributes spam calls across many SPs may evade the stand-alone de-
tection systems. However, for financial benefits, a low rate spammer makes a low rate
unsolicited calls to recipients of many SPs and his calling behavior remain same across
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all target SPs. Thus, observing calling behavior of user across multiple SPs could help
in early identification of spammers that are responsible for making large number of spam
calls. The existing collaborative anti-SPIT systems [SS09] though involve collaboration
among SPs but it only rates detection capability of spam detection system placed in home
network of the subscriber. The COSDS approach is different from [SS09] in a sense that
it computes reputation of end users instead of computing reputation of detection system
placed in a home service provider of the end user. Moreover [SS09] requires changes
in the call setup messages to incorporate tags that are exchanged between collaborators,
whereas COSDS does not require any change in the network architecture and call setup
messages.
To increase the detection accuracy and reduce detection time, it is utmost important
to establish a collaboration among SPs for computing aggregate reputation of end-users.
The effectiveness of collaborative anti-SPIT system mainly depends on the amount of
information being exchanged in a collaboration process and has challenges of privacy
protection, communication overheads and system resources. There is a strong need to
have a collaborative system that fulfills following conditions. 1) Collaboration among
SPs needs to be carried out without establishing a direct trust relationship between col-
laborators. 2) The information used for the collaboration should not be resource intensive
regarding network and system resources. 3) The information exchanged should not con-
tain any sensitive information that could be used by the adversary to infer the relationship
network of users. 4) The design system should have high true positive rate and small false
positive rate.
5.4 Collaborative SPIT detection System
We consider four assumptions: 1) people calling behavior can change over time (they add
or remove links, have different call behavior with family and friends etc.) [SMS+08]; 2)
the calling behavior of legitimate subscriber is different from that of spammer [BSG+11],
[CMP+13], [DTN11]; 3) The calling behavior of a spammer remains the same across
many SPs; and 4) the detection approaches based on collaboration are more likely to have
better detection accuracy and detection time than that of stand-alone detection approaches.
Based on these assumptions, the rest of the chapter discusses a system called COSDS,
which blocks spam subscriber based on the collaboration from the autonomous SPs. The
basic components of our collaborative spam detection system are shown in a Figure 5.2. In
the following sections, we describe the method used for computing GR of the subscriber
(Section 5.4.2), the method used for classifying subscriber as spammer and non-spammer
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Figure 5.2: Building Block of Collaborative SPIT Detection.
(Section 5.4.3), and design options for collaboration and their effects on the detection
accuracy (Section 5.4.4).
5.4.1 System Design Overview
Figure 5.2 presents the system architecture of the COSDS system. COSDS consist of
three layers. At the lowest layers, subscribers (end-users or subscribers) make and receive
calls among each other. There is a local reputation engine placed in each SPs network that
computes local reputation of a subscriber using his local call patterns extracted from the
recorded CDRs at the SP. The SP reports LR scores to the trusted centralized repository
in a following format: [CallerID, LR, Trust for SP]. CallerID is the unique identity of a
subscriber (can be a telephone number, an IP address or both). We are using telephone
number as the identity of the subscriber. The LR is the local reputation score of the sub-
scriber and takes value in between 0 and 1. The third argument is optional and represents
SP trusts score on other SPs from where it receives traffic or sends traffic to.
The CR is a trusted third party or regulator entity responsible for reputation aggre-
gation and ensures that SP’s provided information would not be disclosed to any other
entity. The CR computes global reputation of subscriber by aggregating received LR,
makes decisions about subscriber (spammer and non-spammer) and report back results to
collaborating SPs in a following format [Caller ID, GR, Decision]. The GR score is the
aggregated reputation of the subscriber and the decision is the status of a subscriber as a
spammer and a non-spammer.
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Figure 5.3: SP’s Level Working of Collaborative SPIT Detection.
Figure 5.3 presents SP’s reaction towards a call request from the subscriber. Upon
reception of a call request, SP first checks caller-id against its local database. If a caller-
id is present in a spam list then the SP immediately blocks the subscriber and if the
subscriber is legitimate then SP allows subscriber to have communication with the callee.
At the end of conversation, the SP updates direct trust between subscriber and callee,
computes subscriber’s LR and periodically sends LR to the CR. The CR computes GR of
the subscriber considering new reputation score reported from the collaborators. At the
end of a collaboration process, the SP receives aggregate GR and classification result of
a subscriber from the CR. The SP can either rely on CR decision to update his spammer-
legitimate database or uses GR scores along with social behavior of subscriber within the
SP.
5.4.2 Global Reputation of a Subscriber
The GR of a subscriber is computed in two steps. First, a SP computes LR of the subscriber
and sends it to the CR, and secondly, a CR computes GR of the subscriber by aggregating
received reputation scores from the collaborating SPs.
The computation of LR of the subscriber in a SP is a two steps approach. First, a
direct trust between a subscriber and his called callees is computed from the subscriber’s
past call transactions with his callees. Second, a LR of the subscriber is computed using
the Eigen Trust algorithm. Existing methods used for computing direct trust of subscriber
uses two main approaches: getting positive and negative feedback from the callee about
the subscriber and using call features from the CDR e.g. average call duration. Relying on
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a subscriber’s feedback is intrusive and relying on a average call duration will lead to al-
lowing spammers having few good duration out-going calls from a large number of called
recipients. A combined use of several features would be more effective in characterizing
the real behavior of the subscriber within the service provider. In a combined approach, a
direct trust between subscriber and his called callee is computed by collectively consider-
ing the in-coming and out-going call rate of the subscriber to the callee, the call duration
of calls made and received between subscriber and the callee and the number of unique
callees a subscriber has for a particular time window. These features have been adopted
because of the fact that legitimate and spam subscribers exhibit different calling behavior.
The legitimate subscribers usually have long duration, bi-directional repetitive calling be-
havior with their friends and family members, and also have small duration bidirectional
calls to very few called callees. On the other hand, the spammer or the advertiser usually
targets large number of callees, which normally results in a short duration calls to a large
number of callees. Spammer also manages a moderate duration calls with a few target
callees as well as receives calls from the few targeted callees. This unbalanced calling
behavior of spammer i.e. high number of out-going calls and few in-coming calls would
result in a small direct trust score for a spammer with the large number of called callees.
Within a service provider SP, the direct trust TrustSPSR between subscriber S and his callee
R is computed by using equation 5.1.
TrustSPSR =
CDSPSR×CallRateSPSR+CDSPRS×CallRateSPRS
POSPS
(5.1)
In equation 5.1, CD is the in and out call duration between a subscriber and the callee
in a specific time interval, Call−Rate is a frequency of in and out calls made between
subscriber and his callee in a specific time interval, and PO is the out-degree of the sub-
scriber. The SP defines a sparse trust matrix of dimensions N×N, where N is the total
number of subscribers within the SP. If there is no interaction between subscribers then
TrustSPSR from subscriber S to subscriber R is set to be zero. The direct trust between
subscribers is asymmetric as the subscriber and his callee might have different number
of out-going callees. For the spammers, equation 5.1 would result in a weak trust rela-
tionship with a large number of callees and moderate trust with only few callees. For
the legitimate subscribers this would result in a strong trust relationship with many of his
callees and moderate trust relationship with a large number of called callees.
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Algorithm 5.1 Global Reputation of Subscriber S At CR
1: procedure AGGREGATING REPUTATION OF SUBSCRIBER S ()
2: input←Trust Matrix TrustSR of Subscriber S With Callee R within SP Using Eq.1.
3: output← Global Reputation GRS of the Subscriber.
4: for for each SPs do
5: for for All Subscriber within the SP do
6: initially GRS=1/POS
7: ;Iterate until convergence
8: while δ < ε do
9: LRS← TrustSR×GRS
10: GRS← LR/‖LR‖
11: gr←‖LR‖
12: δ ←
∣∣∣gr−grpreviousgr ∣∣∣
13: grprevious← gr
14: end while
15: end for
16: end for
17: Send the LR Scores [CallerID, LRS, Trust f or SP] to the CR.
18: for All subscriber S do
19: GRS =
∑NSP=1 WSP×LRSPS
N
20: end for
21: Exchange of Global Reputation GRS of a subscriber to each Collaborating SP.
22: end procedure
The SP then computes the LR of the subscriber by applying Eigen Trust algorithm
to the normalized direct trust of score of the subscriber. The direct trust of a subscriber
is normalized as follows: TrustSPSR = Trust
SP
SR/∑Trust
SP
S . The subscriber’s reputation in
the SP is represented as LRSPS and is computed iteratively from LR
SP
S = Trust
SP
SR ×GRS.
Where GRS represents the GR of the subscriber after collaboration. Initially, the GRS of
a subscriber is set equal to 1/POSPS . The computation of LR of a subscriber is an iterative
process that continues until the average relative error is less than ε as shown in algorithm
1(lines 8-16). On each aggregation cycle the SPs sends LR (LRSPS ) of a subscriber to the
CR and receives the aggregated GR(GRS) of the subscriber from the CR.
The CR aggregates LR of the subscriber provided by the cooperating SPs and makes
sure that reputation aggregation is done once for every reputation aggregation cycle. CR
computes GR of a subscriber using weighted average algorithm applied to received LR
scores and trustworthiness of cooperating SPs. The GR of the subscriber is computed as
presented in equation 5.2.
GRS =
∑NO=1WSP×LRSPS
N
(5.2)
In equation 5.2, N is the total number of SPs participating in a collaboration, WSP is
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the trust of a SP reporting reputation scores and LRSPS is the LR of the subscriber in a SP.
The weighted average aggregation allows CR to assign different importance to different
collaborating SPs. The spammers are not necessarily spamming all SPs equally and at
the same time. They make spam calls to one SP and when blocked by the SP they choose
recipients from another SP. The lower the LR of the subscriber in several SPs, the lower the
GR is - despite the subscriber having good reputation in only few SPs. In other words, if
the majority of the SPs assign small reputation value to subscriber S then subscriber S GR
would bend towards the reputation of S in the majority of SPs. The weighted aggregation
method is suitable for GR aggregation and would assign a high reputation score to the
subscriber only if the subscriber has high reputation in the majority of the called SPs. It
is also necessary to assign different weights to the collaborating SPs. The call-receiving
SP can assign weights to sender SPs on the basis of the fraction of subscribers classified
as spammer to the total number of subscriber making calls to the recipients of SP.
Wi j = 1− No.o f Subscribers f rom SPji identi f ied as spammersTotal No. o f Unique Subscriber f rom SPji (5.3)
In equation 5.3, SPi receives calls from SPj and Wi j is the trust weight of SPi for the SPj.
The SP periodically exchanges the reputation score of their subscriber to the CR. The
convergence process measures the number of cycles required for local and global conver-
gence and affects the resources required for the collaboration process. In algorithm 1, the
convergence is measured as the number of iteration required in step 8. This is bounded by∣∣∣gr−grpreviousgr ∣∣∣ rate, where gr and grprevious are the first and second largest eigenvalues of the
trust matrix LRS. In COSDS, convergence is carried out locally and final LR is sent to the
CR for GR computation. This process is not resource intensive as each SP requires only
two transmission cycles for computing GR of the subscriber; one transmission cycle for
sending its LR to the CR, and one cycle for receiving the GR from the CR. The commu-
nication overhead is much less than the communication overhead required for computing
GR by having direct collaboration among SPs in a distributed way similar to how P2P trust
systems work. COSDS is also independent of the number of pre-trusted subscribers and
the traffic overhead remains constant even if the out-degree of the subscriber and number
of collaborators increases but depends on the number of subscribers within the SP.
5.4.3 Detection of SPIT Subscriber
CR maintains a vector representing the GR of each subscriber and has a value between
0 and 1. The subscriber can be classified as spammer if GR of a subscriber is below a
threshold value T . There are two design choices for selecting the T : 1) a fixed threshold
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based on a TP or FP tolerance policy of each SP, and 2) a dynamic threshold chosen au-
tomatically from the global reputation of the subscribers. The design of a fix threshold
is straight forward, but it does not necessarily adopted with the calling behavior of sub-
scribers. Computing the dynamic threshold requires analysis of present and past calling
behavior of all subscribers and is adoptive.
In COSDS, we expect that subscriber having small GR scores are more likely to be
considered as spammers and subscribers having high GR score are likelier to be consider
as the legitimate. Spammers usually have similar call patterns and their GR lies near
to each other and much distanced from the GR scores of the legitimate subscribers. In
addition, SP may also wish to block the top spammers. Moreover, new technologies
normally witness a very few malicious subscribers until they become mature and attract
large number of subscribers. However, once it attracted large number of subscribers, it
start attracting more malicious subscribers and the percentage of spammers rises to as up
as 40% of all identities joined the network on a particular day. For example, currently,
it is estimated that 36% tweets on a tweeter contains spamming links [TWI16] and 25%
of all personal computers may be infected by Viruses. Over the time, we expect similar
behavior in case when telephony becomes less costly and primary method for the personal
and business communication.
Considering these facts and intension for blocking only top spammers, we adopted
a percentile-based dynamic threshold [AM13] approach for computing the classification
threshold below which subscriber is classified as spammer. Specifically, we compute
the distributions for the reputation scores for two classes: spammer and non-spammers.
The procedure for classifying subscriber as a spammer or a non-spammer is presented in
algorithm 2. In algorithm 2, first, the 25th percentile of GR(GR vector) is computed and
then the mean m of the GR score of all subscriber below the 25th percentile is used as a
final threshold T . Subscribers can be classified as spammer 1 or non-spammer -1 based
on a following rule:
SubscriberS =
{
GRS > β × threshold ; 1
GRS < β × threshold ; -1
Spammers normally increase their number of callees over time. Although, it might
be possible that spammers bypass our system during first few aggregation cycles but over
time or after few iterations they would not be able to bypass COSDS system. Specifically,
COSDS would have almost zero FP rate (non-spammer classified as spammer) under high
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Algorithm 5.2 Detecting Spammer and Updating Service provider Trust
1: procedure SPIT SUBSCRIBER ()
2: input←Reputation GRS and threshold β
3: SP−de f ined parameter← β (β = 1 if SP has no preference)
4: m← 1st−quartile(GRS)
5: T ← mean(GR < m)
6: for All subscriber S do
7: if (GR[S]<β× T ) then
8: Subscriber S is Spammer
9: else
10: Subscriber S is non-Spammer
11: end if
12: end for
13: Update Weights of SP using Eq.3
14: end procedure
spamming rate, thus maximizing SPs profit by not blocking legitimate subscribers. The
25th percentile would not provide optimum detection when percentage of spammer ex-
ceeds 30%. A small adjustment in the threshold could improve detection performance
even under when number of spammers are very high. The threshold T can also be imple-
mented with a SP’s parameter β (greater or less than 1) in order to behave under extreme
conditions i.e. extremely high and low spamming rates. The CR responds to the SP with
a vector representing GR and status of all subscribers. The SP can also adopt different
threshold based on its own detection tolerance or use local call and social features such
as the inter-arrival time of the call request, the call rate along with GR for the final clas-
sification. The SP can also ask callee to accept or reject the call by sending GR score of
the subscriber calling to the callee at the time of call request but this requires changes in
a call request message and is intrusive to the callee.
5.4.4 Design Options for Information Summarization and Collabo-
ration
VoIP SP records subscribers call transactions in a CDR database that holds information
about each call made or received by the subscriber of the SP. CDR contains diverse set of
information including caller-callee unique identifiers (calling identities), IP addresses of
the subscriber involved in communication, duration and time of a call, and a call status
(successful, failed, busy).
A very high accuracy (correct classification of spammers as a spammers and non-
spammers as non-spammers) is expected, if the SP exchanges CDR or direct trust scores
of subscribers to the CR but does not ensure privacy. Moreover, the exchange of CDR
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and direct trust also increases the communication overhead. The major challenge in de-
sign of collaborative system is to achieve a trade-off between information summarization,
detection accuracy and communication overhead.
The trade-off between accuracy and information summarization can be achieved in
three levels: 1) no summarization, 2) call detail summarization, 3) network summariza-
tion.
In a first design option, the SP filters locally recorded CDRs and exchanges CDRs con-
taining caller-callee identities, call duration, and call time to the CR. The CR aggregates
the CDRs from all collaborating SPs and computes GR of the subscriber using approach
presented in chapter 4 . This means that a large amount of data needs to be transmitted to
and processed at the CR. Although the trusted CR guarantees protection of sensitive in-
formation provided by the SP but an intruder on the CR is still able to infer social network
of a target subscriber. This design option may provide better detection accuracy because
of the availability of complete information about behavior of subscriber from all SPs on
a single place but has limitation of communication overhead. This design choice also
increases computation load on the CR because of processing of millions of call records.
Another limitation of this approach is that SPs are not easily convinced to provide raw
CDRs of their customers to trusted and non-trusted authorities.
In a second design option, the SP sends caller-callee direct trust scores to the CR. In
this case, the SP computes direct trust between subscribers from locally recorded CDR by
using equation 5.1 and sends direct trust to the CR. The CR then aggregates direct trust
scores, computes GR of subscribers and classify them as a spammers or a non-spammers
using approach presented in chapter 4. This design option has benefit of distributing com-
putation load between SPs and the CR, and hides subscriber critical personal information
such as call-rate and call duration. However, intruders at CR are still able to infer the so-
cial relationship information and trust of subscriber with his called callees from the trust
scores.
In a third design option, the SPs locally compute the LR of a subscriber within the SP
and exchange this score to the CR. The CR then computes GR of the subscriber by aggre-
gating LR scores and make decision about subscriber based on an aggregated GR. This
approach has a small communication overhead compared to other collaboration options
and fully protects privacy of subscribers.
It is expected that CDR based collaboration has better detection accuracy than the
COSDS approach. This is because in a reputation based collaboration, SP computes the
LR of subscriber and has no information about subscriber behavior in other SPs. On the
other hand in CDR based collaboration, the whole call-rate, call duration and out-degree
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of subscriber across all called SPs is known to the CR for the computation of global
reputation of a subscriber.
5.4.5 Communication overhead
Each SP taking part in a collaboration process incurs a communication overhead. The
communication overhead between a collaborator and the CR depends on the amount of
information delivered from the collaborator to the CR and the number of communication
rounds taking place between them. Our approach reduces the communication overhead
by reducing the amount of information delivered from the SP to the CR and reduction of
communication rounds between SP and the CR. In COSDS, the SP stores and delivers LR
of his subscribers to the CR which requires only 22 bytes for a one subscriber (14 Bytes for
Caller-Id and 8 Bytes for the Reputation score). The CR computes GR and makes decision
about subscriber (spammer or non-spammer) and delivers this to the all collaborating SP
which requires 23 bytes (14 bytes for the Caller-ID, 8 Bytes for the Global Reputation
and 1 Byte for the decision). The overall communication overhead require for sending
scores to CR is n ∗ 22 Bytes (where n is the total number of subscribers in a SP) and
communication overhead requires for sending GR and decision to collaborating SP is
k∗26 Bytes per SP (where k is total number of subscribers from all SP). The exchange of
CDRs and direct trust require high communication and memory overhead when compared
to COSDS. The overhead requires for sending CDR to CR depends on the total number
of call records and exchange of direct trust depends on a total number of subscribers in
the SP.
5.4.6 Discussion on Privacy Protection
VoIP SP needs to protect privacy of his customers in two aspects: 1) Protection of sub-
scriber’s Pseudonymized Identity: preventing the adversary having some auxiliary (AUX)
information to find anonymized identity of his target; 2) Social Relationship Network Pro-
tection: The existence of social relationship and strength of social relationship between
target subscriber and his friends should not be learned by the adversary.
5.4.6.1 Adversary Model and the Privacy Breach
We assume that subscribers are not intrusive and SPs are not misusing recorded CDRs
but there exist some intruders who wish to extract private information of subscribers. The
adversary has some information about the target subscriber, which may include time of
few calls, call duration of few calls, and the call rate. The objective of adversary is to use
this auxiliary information to learn pseudonymized identity and infer social relationships
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of the target subscriber. The Probability that an adversary can breach the privacy and get
true records given AUX information is presented as:
Pr(PrivacyBreach|AUX) =
{
1/X ; i f X > 0
0 ; i f X = 0
(5.5)
Where X is number of subscribers returned for the AUX information.
5.4.6.2 Privacy Protection at SP
The SP processes CDRs for the computation of LR score of the subscriber. The adversary
learns following information for breaching the privacy of subscriber during computation
of LR:
AUX1: An adversary knows call related information of the target user and wants to find
anonymized identity of the target user. For example, an adversary knows target user
called someone known person at 11:20 am.
AUX2: An adversary knows out-degree of target user along with AUX1. For example, an
adversary knows call times of calls made by the target user and number of callees
target user called.
AUX3: An adversary knows the calling behavior of target user along with AUX1 and
AUX2. For example, an adversary knows call rate and call duration of target user’s
few calls and wants to learn complete relationship network of the target user.
COSDS protects privacy of the subscriber within the SP by setting the following best
practices. 1) The SP shall protect records of the subscribers from unauthorized access
using strong authentication processes, 2) The SP shall provide opt-op option to the sub-
scriber if his out-degree is small, and 3) The SP shall pseudonymized identity of sub-
scriber for further reducing the risk of misuse of the data. Pseudonymized identities can
provide one level of protection but adversary can still find pseudonymized identity of tar-
get by using single AUX or correlating multiple AUX. In Section 5.6.7, we will show that
Pseudonymized identity is not providing absolute privacy protection for AUX1, AUX2
and AUX3. We use following mechanism for the CDR anonymization:
P1: The local reputation engine computes reputation for the specific time period, we strip
the minutes and seconds information from the time and date of the CDR. By doing
this the probability of inferring the pseudonymized identity is small for the AUX1.
106
COSDS: Blocking Spammers with Information Sharing across Multiple Service
Providers
Social Network Calling Behavior Trust Network
Complete CDR YES YES YES
IDs with Rate and Duration YES YES YES
IDs with Trust Matrix YES NO YES
IDs with Reputation Scores NO NO NO
Table 5.1: Subscriber Level Privacy Breach for Different Collaboration Methods.
P2: The out-degree of the subscribers in the CDR can be k-anonymized. For subscribers
having unique out-degree, random noisy subscriber can be generated which is ex-
actly similar to the subscriber but with different pseudo identity. This k-anonymization
would affect the detection accuracy but provides privacy protection for AUX2.
The adversary knows AUX1 of his target subscriber; for example, adversary learns from
media that presidents of two countries talk to each other for some duration on some spe-
cific time and wants to learn pseudo identities associated with both presidents. The adver-
sary can find possibly a small candidate-set if time in CDR is not properly anonymized
and by correlating more information adversary can find correct identities of both presi-
dents. However, in our scheme, striping minutes and second further minimizes the risk
of de-identification. In some scenario, the adversary can make some calls to the target
subscriber and intends to find whether the target has interactions with his friends or not.
In a first case, adversary knows call duration and call time of all his calls to the target
subscriber. Again, the adversary can learn his target’s pseudonymized identities and so
the presence of link between target and his other friends if time of call is not stripped. The
adversary can also correlate multiple AUX to reduce the size of candidate set. However,
our proposed anonymization approach significantly reduces the risk but adversary can
breach privacy by making some large number of bi-directional links which are normally
not under his control.
Subscriber Home SP Calling Behavior SP Network
Complete CDR YES YES YES
IDs with Rate and Duration YES YES YES
IDs with Trust Matrix YES YES YES
IDs with Reputation Scores YES NO NO
Table 5.2: Service Provider’s Level Privacy Breach for Different Collaboration Methods.
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5.4.6.3 Privacy Protection at CR
In a centralized collaboration, the CR computes GR of subscribers by aggregating infor-
mation received from the collaborating SP. The use of trusted CR ensures that provided
information would not be misused but still has possibility of privacy breach attack by
the adversary. The exchange of reputation scores to the trusted CR is not disclosing any
information about underlying relationship network of subscribers but adversary or other
SP can try to infer some information about target given local and GR scores. The goal
of adversary at a CR is to utilize the reputation of the target subscriber and learn his pos-
sible relationship network. In some scenarios, the SP itself become adversary and wants
to learn relationship network of target belonging to other SP from the received GR and
locally recorded CDR of the target. The adversary has the following AUX information at
CR:
AUX4: The adversary knows LR of target user and other subscribers in a target SP. The
adversary also learns that target user only interacts with highly reputed subscribers
or subscribers having similar reputation scores. The goal of adversary is to predict
possible relationship network of the target user in a target SP.
We assume that the communication between CR and collaborating SPs is secure. The
exchange of single reputation score ensures privacy protection against AUX 1, 2 and 3 as
shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for subscriber level and SP level privacy breach. However, the
adversary SP can make a guess about relationship network of target subscriber given AUX
4 but the probability of breach is extremely small and further computationally impossible
when the number of reputed subscribers are high.
5.5 Experimental Methodology
In this section, we provide an overview of method used for generating the synthetic data-
set and the evaluation criteria used for evaluating the performance of proposed detection
system.
5.5.1 Synthetic Data-Set
We generated a synthetic call detail records using same approach as discussed in chap-
ter 4. Our objective is to generate synthetic CDRs that exhibit similar characteristics
to that of the real world CDRs. The communication behavior of the subscriber within
the service provider is modeled through three fundamental features such as call-rate, call
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Figure 5.4: Collaborative Simulation Model.
duration and number of unique callees of the subscriber. The communication behavior
of legitimate subscriber is different from the spammer in perspective of following three
features. Firstly, the legitimate subscriber normally has long duration calls with many
of his recipients, whereas SPIT subscriber has large number of short duration calls with
his called recipients because recipient disconnects call immediately as soon as he real-
ized that subscriber is a telemarketer or an advertiser [CMP+13], [DTN11]. Secondly, the
SPIT subscriber does not exhibit repetitive calling behavior, but legitimate subscribers
have repetitive calling behavior with many of his callees [DTN11]. Thirdly, the SPIT
subscriber targets large number of recipients thus has high out-degree, whereas the legiti-
mate subscriber has some controlled out-degree.
The basis of our synthetic CDRs is a graph representing the social network of the
subscribers in a service provider. Vertices represent the calling identity of the subscriber
and edges between vertices represent the phone call between two vertices (caller and the
callee). In a simulation setup, legitimate subscribers has following distributions for the
out-degree, call duration and call rate [AM13]. 1) The degree of legitimate subscriber
fits into the power-law distribution [NGD+06]. In order to have a power-law distribution,
we modeled the social network of subscriber as a Barabasi-Albert graph model with the
average out-degree of 10 [NGD+06]. 2) The call duration of the legitimate subscriber
is modeled using exponential distribution with the average call duration of 360 seconds.
3) The call rate of the legitimate subscriber is modeled using Poisson distribution with
mean value of 5 calls. The simulation model in Figure 5.4 consists of five VoIP service
providers and each service provider has 50000 legitimate callers with different percent-
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ages of spammers. The callees of legitimate caller are distributed across all the service
providers with 60% of the callees belong to callers registered network and remaining 40%
are equally distributed in across other service providers.
The spammer usually tries large number of callee. In simulation, spammer calls 10%-
to 30% of unique calls per day and each callee is randomly selected from the legitimate
caller. The call duration of the SPIT subscriber is modeled through exponential distri-
bution with different average duration i.e. average duration of 180 with few callees and
average duration of 60 seconds with majority of callees [CMP+13], [DTN11]. The de-
gree of the SPIT subscriber is randomly chosen between 500 and 4000 [CMP+13] and
has non-repetitive calling behavior. The spammer equally distributes callee across all the
service providers.
We provided results for 2, 3, 4, and 5 collaborators. Each SP consists of 50 thousands
legitimate and different percentage of spammers. The collaborating SP computes LR of
their subscribers and periodically updates CR with subscriber’s reputation. In a simula-
tion, the SP updates CR after one day and all SPs update CR at the same time. We assume
secure communication channel between SP and the CR for the exchange of information.
For each scenario, we performed simulations for 10 times and show the average results
with standard deviation.
5.5.2 Evaluation Metrics
We use the standard information retrieval metrics of True Positive (TP) rate, False Positive
(FP) rate and Accuracy (ACC) to measure the spam detection capability of COSDS. The
true positive rate is defined as the ratio of the number of subscriber identifies as spammer
to the total number of spammers. A legitimate subscriber that is classified as a spam
subscriber by the detection system is termed as a false positive. The false positive rate
is defined as the ratio of the number of false positive subscriber to the total number of
legitimate subscriber in the call record. The evaluation metrics can be explained through
the confusion matrix illustrated in a Table 4.1. The TPR, FPR and accuracy is computed
as TPR= TP/(TP+FN), FPR = (FP)/(TN+FP) and ACC=(TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FN+FP).
5.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the performance results of COSDS and compare its perfor-
mance to the performance of Caller-REP and Call-Rank. Additionally, we also provide
privacy breach analysis for the different auxiliary information.
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5.6.1 True Positive Rate
We evaluated detection rate of COSDS and other system for three parameters: TP rate
over the time, TP rate against different percentages of spammers, and TP rate against
varying number of collaborators. It can be seen from a Figure 5.5 that COSDS approach
out-performs other approaches and is able to block almost all spammers within 3 days in
any percentage of spammers. Specifically, COSDS manages to achieve a TP rate greater
than 80% on a first day which increases further to a 100% TP rate over the time regardless
of number of spammers in the network. On the other hand, the non-collaborative Caller-
REP achieves TP rate of up to 97% in 5 days when the number of spammers are small
and prolongs detection time when the number of spammers in the network are high. This
behavior is due to the fact that stand-alone detection systems only consider the local view
of subscriber while computing direct trust and reputation of the subscriber within the SP.
Nonetheless, non-collaborative systems are still capable of identifying local spammers
and spammers from the other service providers spamming at a high rate. The improved
performance of COSDS is attributed to the followings: firstly, it collectively uses different
features while computing local reputation of the subscriber within the service provider;
and secondly, SP collaborates for the computation of global reputation. The TP rate of
COSDS increases as the number of collaborators increases since more collaborators are
providing information about subscriber’s reputation in their network as shown in Fig-
ure 5.5. Figure 5.5 also reveals that TP rate increases over the time regardless of number
of spammers and it it can also be seen that COSDS achieves almost similar detection rate
to that of CDR based collaborative system.
From a Figure 5.5, we also observe that the TP rate of COSDS decreases slightly
with the increase in the number of spammers and decreases considerably more for the
non-collaborative system. Specifically, the TP rate of COSDS decreases to 60% when
percentage of spammers varies from 40% to 70% as shown in a Figure 5.9.A. This can be
further improved by using SP’s-defined β parameter greater than 1.
Figure 5.5 also presents the detection rate of Caller-REP and Call-Rank under varying
number of spammers. The detection rate of COSDS is much better than that of Caller-REP
and Call-Rank. We observe that Call-Rank has degraded detection rate when compared to
the Caller-REP. We can attribute TP rate of Caller-REP and Call-Rank to the following.
Call-Rank considers average call duration while computing global reputation of the sub-
scriber which allows spammer having some good duration calls to achieve high reputation
scores within the network despite having high out-degree. On the other hand Caller-REP
collectively uses call-rate of the caller in both directions, call duration of caller in both
directions, and out-degree of the caller which results in a small reputation score to those
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(a) 5% Spammer (b) 10% Spammer
(c) 20% Spammer (d) 30% Spammer
Figure 5.5: True Positive Rate of COSDS for SP trust=1 and β threshold=1.
subscribers having high out-degree and manage some long duration calls.
The scalability of the collaborative system is dependent on the number of collaborator
participating in collaboration. The results from figure 5.5 show that 4 SP are enough for
blocking above 98% of SPIT subscriber regardless of spamming rate. In a scenario where
collaboration scores are received from the 50% of the total SPs, COSDS manages to block
all spammers in 4 days for a spamming rate of less than 20% and achieves detection rate
of more than 90% in 10 days when the number of spammers exceeds 20%. It can also
be observed that the detection rate increases and the detection time decreases with the
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number of collaborators.
We also observed that in all simulation scenarios COSDS approach provides almost -
but not exactly - similar detection rate as the Direct-CDR approach. This happens despite
COSDS preserving privacy and being less computationally and network demanding.
5.6.2 False Positive Rate
Although TP rate is the key performance measure for evaluating the performance of SPIT
detection system but it should have ideally zero FP rate. The FP rate not only annoys
legitimate subscribers and callees but also results in a revenue loss for the SP because
of blocking a legitimate subscribers. COSDS outperforms non-collaborative system in
terms of FP rate and achieves FP rate of 0% in 3 days when percentage of spammer is
high. The non-collaborative Caller-REP suffers from a high FP rate even after 5 days as
shown in a Figure 5.6. The FP rate decreases further with the number of collaborators.
It can be seen from a Figure 5.6 that with the 5 collaborators COSDS achieves FP rate
less than 5% in three days for any percentage of spammers. Specifically, under a small
percentage of spammers such as 5% and 10%, COSDS misclassifies large number of
legitimate subscribers as spammers on a first few days and further improves it to FP
rate of less than 5% within 3 days as shown in Figures 5.6.A and 5.6.B. In a condition
of high spamming rate COSDS manges to achieve almost zero FP rate in 2 days with
five collaborators as shown in Figures 5.6.C and 5.6.D. The FP rate of non-collaborative
Caller-REP and Call-Rank is not acceptable as both have FP rate more than 5% even after
5 days. Specifically, the non-collaborative Caller-REP system has FP rate of more than
15% on first few days and achieves almost zero FP rate in 10 days which is too late.
COSDS uses local reputation scores for the computation of global reputation and de-
cision about the subscriber. Some social behavioral features may provide some additional
information about subscriber, for example a subscriber cannot be categorized as a spam-
mer if his out-degree is extremely small. The FP rate can be further minimize by allowing
SP to utilize other behavioral features along with the received global reputation scores and
decision from the CR. Few such features are number of unique callees of the subscriber
or ratio between total calls and number of friends. The FP rate can also be minimized by
using a fixed threshold β defined by the SPs according to their requirements. The FP rate
of COSDS and collaboration with Direct-CDR is almost similar to each other.
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(a) 5% Spammer (b) 10% Spammer
(c) 20% Spammer (d) 30% Spammer
Figure 5.6: False Positive Rate of COSDS for SP trust=1 and β threshold=1.
5.6.3 Detection Accuracy
The detection accuracy is the proportion of true identification (both true positives and
true negatives) to the total number of subscribers (either spammer or legitimate). It char-
acterizes system’s capability of making correct decision about all subscribers (classifying
spammer as a spammer and non-spammer as a non-spammer). Under small spamming
rate, the COSDS approach achieves high true positive rate with considerably high FP
rate. However, under high spamming rate, COSDS manages to achieve better detection
rate with a small FP rate. Figure 5.7 shows the detection accuracy of COSDS and other
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(a) 5% Spammer (b) 10% Spammer
(c) 20% Spammer (d) 30% Spammer
Figure 5.7: Detection Accuracy for COSDS and non-collaborative system for SP trust=1
and β threshold=1.
approaches when the number of spammers varied from 5% to 30%. COSDS achieves
high detection accuracy than non-collaborative system because of collaboration which in-
creases TP rate and decreases FP rate. Our experimental results show that, on an average,
the accuracy of COSDS with five collaborator reaches to almost 100% in 4 days for any
spamming rate which is much better than non-collaborative system as shown in a Fig-
ure 5.7. Specifically, we observe that COSDS reaches an overall accuracy of 99% in 5
days when the number of spammers are small (<10%) and reaches to overall accuracy of
99% in three days when number of spammers are high (>10%). This is due to the fact that
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at small spamming rate COSDS misclassifies many legitimate subscribers as spammer i.e.
about 7% in 3 days, and further goes to less than 2% in 5 days. CDR based collabora-
tion indicates high detection accuracy than the COSDS approach. However, CDR based
collaboration has some drawbacks in practical implementation as it requires more com-
munication overheads, processing overheads and also exchanges private information of
subscriber. The detection accuracy can be further improved by incorporating other social
network features such as out-degree, clustering coefficient etc. along with the global and
LR scores.
5.6.4 Information Summarization and System Performance
The detection accuracy increases with the amount of information being exchanged but it
requires system and network resources. The recommended system should provide high
TP, small FP and high detection accuracy without too much system and network over-
heads. Figure 5.8 provides results for TP rate, FP rate and detection accuracy for different
collaboration mechanisms.
As represented in Figure 5.8, the detection accuracy is opposite to that of information
summarization. If SP does not participate in a collaboration process then no information
is being exchanged and SP has own stand-alone detection system. The standalone system
considers local view of the subscriber thus has poor detection accuracy on first few days.
We considered three different collaborative mechanisms in our experiments: 1) Collabo-
ration with complete CDRs; 2) Collaboration with direct trust scores of subscribers with
their callees; and 3) collaboration with the reputation score of subscribers. The CDR
based collaboration achieves best detection accuracy but it requires extensive network
resources and also increases load on the CR. Additionally, the exchange of CDRs con-
tains private information of service provider operational aspects and his customers. The
exchange of direct trust summarizes the subscriber’s call information but is not hiding
subscriber’s relationship network. Though it minimizes the load from the CR but still has
a threat of privacy breach of subscriber. In comparison to first two approaches, COSDS
collaborates with the summarized information without sending either CDR or relationship
trust network to the CR. The results from Figure 5.8 show that the detection accuracy of
collaboration with summarized information and collaboration with CDR become same
over the time. The results in Figure 5.8 are shown for 5 collaborators and 30% spammers.
The data used for the Figure 5.8 has been taken from Figures 5.5,Figure 5.6 and Figure
5.7.
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(a) True Positive Rate (b) False Positive Rate
(c) Accuracy
Figure 5.8: Information Summarization and True-Positive, False Positive and Accuracy
trade-off for different Collaboration Methods.
5.6.5 Effect of Threshold on Performance
Until now, we have provided the performance results for only percentile based threshold.
COSDS approach can also be implemented with the additional parameter defined by the
service provider according to its defined policies for spammer and non-spammer. The ser-
vice provider set value for the β parameter that is used along with the percentile threshold.
The choice of an optimal β parameter depends on the relative tradeoff between the true
positive rate and false positive rate. The major challenge in choosing a β parameter is
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(a) True Positive Rate (b) False Positive Rate
(c) ROC Curve
Figure 5.9: The Effect of Threshold β for TP and FP Rates for 5 Collaborators and for
the First Day.
that it would incur small false positive rate and has high true positive rate. The TP and
FP rate of COSDS for different β values and different percentage of spammers is shown
in Figure 5.9.A and Figure 5.9.B. It can be seen from Figure 5.9.A that COSDS is not
providing optimal TP rate at a small β value. Specifically, in a network with more than
30% spammers it shows poor resistance against spammers but provides better FP rate for
any percentage of spammers as shown in Figure 5.9.B. The choice of high β value could
improve TP rate to 100% for any spamming rate, but it has high FP rate for a network
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(a) True Positive Rate (b) False Positive Rate
Figure 5.10: System Behavior Against Spammers Having High Out-Degree and High
Duration Calls.
having spammers less than 10% as shown in Figure 5.9.B. The FP rate at low spamming
rate can be improved further by using β value in combination with the number of unique
callees of the subscriber. We recommend that β value should be between 2 and 3 and
should be used in conjunction with the number of unique callees of the subscriber. The
tradeoff between TP rate and FP rate for varied threshold is shown in a Figure 5.9.C. It
can be seen from the Figure 5.9.C. that TP rate of COSDS increases with the increase in
FP rate and is able to achieve 100% TP rate with relatively smaller FP rate.
5.6.6 Resilience Against Different Spam Calling Behaviors
It is possible that different spammers have different calling behaviors. In this simulation
setup we consider three types of subscribers [CMP+13]: 1) subscribers calling a large
number of callees, all their calls being successful and with a good duration, but without
receiving any call from their callees. This would be a representative behavior of telemar-
keters and prank subscribers because of their large out-degree. 2) Subscribers calling a
small number of callees per day, having only a few calls with good average duration, and
also not receiving any call from the callees. These spammers always try to call a lim-
ited number of new callees within a specific time period. 3) Subscribers calling a small
number of callees per day and manage to have high duration calls with many of them.
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(a) True Positive Rate (b) False Positive Rate
Figure 5.11: System Behavior Against Spammers Having Small Out-Degree and Small
Duration Calls.
In the first experiment of this series we evaluated the system performance when spam-
mers manage to have long duration calls to a large number of their callees (spam calling
behavior 1). The experimental setup consists of 15000 spammers and 50000 legitimate
subscribers equally distributed across five SPs. Each spam subscribers randomly choose
a callee and calls to the 50% percent of the total number of customers in a SP. The call
duration of these spam subscribers vary from 180 seconds to 400 seconds with an average
call duration of 220 seconds. The legitimate subscribers in this experiment follow the
same distribution as provided in section 5. The FP rates and TP rate of COSDS (collab-
oration with 3, 4 and 5 collaborators) is presented in Figures 8.A and 8.B. The FP rate
decreases with the number of collaborators and at five collaborators COSDS achieves a
FP rate of less than 0.5%. COSDS achieves TP rate of above 95% in six days much later
than what it able to achieve with the spamming model presented in a section 5. This is
because of the long duration calls of spammer to a large number of callees. Despite hav-
ing high duration calls to a large number of callees, these subscribers are still identified
as spammer because of their high number of callees and non-repetitive calling behavior.
These subscribers also got small global reputation which also decreases over time.
In the second experiment of this series, we analyzed the resistance of the COSDS
for the spam subscriber controlling his out-degree (spam calling behavior 2). In this
experiment the spammer calls only 15-25 unique callees per day. The call duration varies
from 90 seconds to 200 seconds with the average duration of 150 seconds. The TP and
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(a) True Positive Rate (b) False Positive Rate
Figure 5.12: System Behavior against Spammers Having Small Out-Degree and Long
Duration Calls.
FP rates of COSDS with 3, 4 and 5 collaborators is shown in Figures 5.11.A and 5.11.B.
COSDS is able to block all spammers in 4 days, which shows that controlling out-degree
would not allow spammer to call for the longer time period. As the spam subscriber
increases the number of callees over time, his reputation scores starts decreasing as it
does not receive many calls from his callees. The FP rate in this scenario is less than
0.5% from the day one.
In the third experiment of this series, we evaluated the performance of COSDS against
spammers having large duration calls and small number of unique callees (spam calling
behavior 3). In this scenario, the number of spammers and non-spammer are same as
above. The spammers only calls 35-50 unique callees per day and the duration for each
call is greater than 300 seconds, with average duration of 350 seconds. The TP and FP rate
of COSDS with 3, 4 and 5 collaborating SPs are presented in Figure 5.12.A and 5.12.B.
COSDS does not show effective resistance on first few days because of the fact that call
duration of spammer is almost same as call duration of legitimate subscribers. However
COSDS blocks almost all spammers after 6 days. The FP rate in this scenario is also
decreasing and remains less than .5%.
From the Figures 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12, it can also be seen that non-collaborative sys-
tem behaves poorly in terms of TP and FP rates for any type of spammers. From Figures
5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 we also conclude that spammers would be able to bypass COSDS
system for relatively long time if they managed to have long duration calls without con-
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(a) SP Anonymization (b) Percentage of Subscriber Identified Network
Figure 5.13: Privacy Breach Analysis for Different Scenarios: A) Probability of Breach
for Some Auxiliary Information at SP; B) Percentage of Subscribers whose Relationship
network identified to some percentage varying number of reputed subscriber.
trolling their number of callees or have to control out-degree. In order to remain un-
detected by COSDS, spammers need to control their number of callees with repetitive
calling behavior.
5.6.7 Privacy Breach Analysis
One design consideration of COSDS approach is privacy preservation of relationship links
of the subscribers. To estimate the possibility of privacy breach, we simulated the system
for two privacy breach models: first, a privacy breach model where an adversary gets
access to the local reputation engine and secondly, a privacy breach model where an
adversary gets access to the global reputation scores of the subscribers at the CR.
In a first privacy breach model, the adversary learns some auxiliary information (call-
rate, call-time, call duration, out-degree etc.) from the external source and intends to find
the anonymized identity of the target subscriber so as to breach the relationship network
of the target subscriber. Figure 5.13.A shows the CDF of privacy breach for the different
auxiliary information that clearly shows that call time feature is more vulnerable to rela-
tionship privacy breach followed by the out-degree feature. We believe that collectively
using the out-degree and call-time feature together would further increase the risk of a pri-
vacy breach. However, COSDS incorporates identity anonymization along with stripping
of the call-time (stripping of seconds and minutes information from the call transactions)
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thus reduces the risk of relationship privacy breach to almost zero using call-time as an
auxiliary feature as shown in a Figure 5.13.A. However, it still vulnerable to the privacy
breach using out-degree feature. The risk of privacy breach through use of out-degree
auxiliary information can be minimized by using k-anonymized out-degree distribution
but it will affect the detection accuracy.
In a second privacy breach model, an adversary obtains a part of highly reputed sub-
scribers in a SP from the global reputation scores at CR and intends to make a guess for
the relationship network of the target subscriber. The adversary creates predicted obitu-
ary relationship network of target subscriber by computing similarity between reputation
score of target subscriber and other subscribers in a SP. If the predicted subscriber from
obituary reputed list is also part of original relationship network of the target subscriber
then we conclude that privacy breach has occurred to some extent. Figure 5.13.B shows
the relationship level privacy breach percentages of COSDS approach as the number of
subscriber in the adversary generated reputed list varies from 100 to 5000. The results
from 5.13.B show the adversary would not be able to get at-least one friend of the target
subscriber in his reputed list for more than 60% of the time. Normally, the percentage of
relationship privacy breach increases with the increase in the number of subscribers in the
obituary reputed list but it would not provide 100 % privacy breach even for high number
of subscribers unless the adversary use all subscriber of particular SP in his reputed list.
The number of friends in a reputed list can be too spare to form a detectable friendship
network for the target. The adversary can guess with high probability that a part of rela-
tionship network of the target subscriber is a subset of his generated reputed list (say 10%
has high probability shown in Figure 5.13.B), but he still does not have any clue which
subscribers are common in adversary generated list and original target’s friends list.
Another way to ensure the privacy of collaborators and their customers is to com-
pute global reputation score through Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) protocols.
SMC enables collaborators to carry out computation task without revealing their repu-
tation scores or private data. One such approach to perform encrypted computation is a
homomorphic encryption scheme that performs computation on the encrypted data. There
are a number of homomorphic schemes for example secure sum [CKV+02] and Paillier
encryption [PAI99], which are homomorphic in summation and multiplication. However,
the use of homomorphic approach would introduce overhead in computation process and
further require evaluation for other performance metrics such as how privacy is protected
in presence of malicious and honest but curious collaborators. Moreover, we believe that
use of homomorphic encryption or secure sum would not affect the spam detection results
of COSDS but would incorporate some additional overhead.
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The spammer may be able to bypass COSDS when it spams to only a few subscribers of
the SP and then targets the SP again with a new identity. In this case the CR responds to SP
with the same reputation score that the subscriber has within the SP. This can be overcome
by binding the number of identities to the IP-address within the SP, linking many identities
to same physical person or through imposing cost for a new identity. Linking identity to
same physical person is a part of our future work. The spammer can also bypass COSDS
by creating calling links between identities from multiple SPs. This allows spammers to
call a reasonable large number of recipients but COSDS is able to block these spammers
over the time. A new subscriber does not have social links and must be introduced within
the SP in order to develop social relationships with their callees. If the SPs do not have
any information about subscriber’s local or global reputation then the SPs allow such
subscriber to pass through network for few calls.
Although the percentile based detection shows resistance against top spammers, there
is still much room for improvement with respect to collaboration with more features and
classification approach for low- to mid-rank spammers. The detection approach can be
improved by incorporating local social network features of the subscriber and a SPs-
defined threshold along with the global reputation for final classification. This would
minimize the FP rate caused by the low spamming rate and improve TP under high spam-
ming percentage. COSDS can also implemented in a distributed way where the SP collab-
orate with their directly connected SPs in a privacy protection way. The COSDS approach
can also be implemented with other reputation based approaches with slight changes and
also involve callee for the final decision.
5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented a collaborative SPIT detection system called COSDS,
which employs collaboration among autonomous SPs for an accurate and early detection
of spammers making low rate spam calls to recipients across many SP. The designed sys-
tem requires collaboration with the exchange of non-sensitive summarized information to
the trusted CR, which is not resource demanding regarding system and network resource,
and is non-sensitive regarding subscriber’s private information and operational aspects
of SP. COSDS computes local reputation of the subscriber from subscriber’s past call
transactions within the SP and exchanges it to the CR for reputation aggregation and de-
cisions about behavior subscriber. Our evaluation on synthetic data show that the COSDS
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approach is very effective in detecting spammers, has reduced the detection time and pro-
vides privacy protection to the collaborating SPs. Specifically, it out-performs SAS in
terms of detection time and accuracy, and achieves considerable same detection accuracy
when collaboration is carried out through the exchange of CDRs and direct trust scores.
Chapter 6
EIS: Early Identification of Spammers
6.1 Introduction
In recent years, telecommunication networks have seen a dramatic increase in the number
of subscribers around the world. According to GSMA statistics, there are more than 7
billion mobile users in total and more than 4 billion unique mobile users across the world.
Malicious users can also acquire large number of identities to gain financial benefits be-
cause of spamming, advertisements and phishing attacks.
Users having multiple identities are able to evade the defense against spamming by
pretending to be multiple, distinct individual in the network. Multiple identities can be
misused to spread malicious information and spams. A spamming individual with mul-
tiple identities can use some of its identities to provide high recommendation to its other
identities so to increase their reputation and evade detection system. Recent statistics
revealed that Facebook has 1.23 billion active users and of which more than 90 million
accounts are duplicate [FAC14]. This means that multiple accounts are owned by one
individual and are mainly used for the malicious activities. A Phoneypot [GSB+15] study
over seven weeks reveals that 36,912 unique phonetokens have received 1.3 million calls
from the total of 252,621 unique sources. This can be attributed to the fact that telephony
users receive large number of spam calls when scaled over a large number of users. Spam-
mers in the telephony are more intrusive, require immediate response from call recipients
and undermine the use of telephony for legitimate users.
Traditional reputation-based spam detection systems utilize user’s identity for combat-
ing spamming activities [KER11], [AM13], [TDZ+16]. If spammers make spam directly
from one known identity to victims, they would be easily blocked by the spam detection
system. However, spammers are adopting new ways to evade the spam detection systems
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and stay undetected for unsolicited calls by acquiring large number of identities. Spam-
mers can have a large set of calling identities for small cost and effectively obfuscates
these calling identities to evade the spam detection systems. Although the spammer can
have many identities but their victim network largely remains the same. Furthermore,
spammer is not able to develop a strong social network with legitimate users from his dif-
ferent calling identities. The service provider requires an effective spam detection system
against spammers having multiple identities in order to improve the experience of users,
to ensure the trustworthiness of services provided and positively gain trust of customers.
Recently, several approaches have been proposed to link profiles of an individual
across different and same social networks. These approaches estimate similarity between
two profiles that belongs to one physical individual by using several features in three di-
mensions: 1) attempt to connect similar profiles owned by an individual by using social
network structure of an individual across different social network platforms [ACF13], 2)
attempt to estimate the similarity in profiles (age, sex, religion, location, name) of an in-
dividual on a two different social network platforms [VHS09, LWZ+14], and 3) attempt
to measure the similarity in content posted by an individual on both platforms. In tele-
phony, applying these features for connecting similar identities is not straight forward.
Content-based similarity measure cannot be applied in telephony because content in tele-
phony is speech which is resource intensive in terms of storing, retrieving and processing.
As there is no profile information available in telephony, the feasible option left is social
network connections of identities for estimating the similarity between identities. The in-
formation from user’s social network connections have also been used for linking profiles
of an individual from different social networks [ACF13], [JKJ13], but these approaches
have only considered network connections and did not consider connectivity strength of
an individual with others.
This chapter presents EIS (Early Identification of Spammers), a novel system that lim-
its and blocks set of identities that are owned by a same spamming individual in a VoIP
and voice networks. We exploit the notion that spammers can have multiple identities
but they cannot establish strong connection with honest users and also have similar set
of victims with similar calling behavior. The basic idea is that if the spammer has many
identities, his social call graph become same in the sense that it has many common users
between his identities. Our design is based on a use of call patterns and social network
graph of identities. EIS system consists of three modules. 1) An ID-CONNECT mod-
ule that connects similar identities that belongs to one physical person or individual by
utilizing social network structure and calling behavior of identities. 2) A reputation com-
putation module that computes reputation of an individual by using call-duration, call-rate
and out-degree of the individual. 3) A spam detection module that flagged individual as
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a spammer if reputation of the individual is less than automated dynamic threshold. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first that utilizes weighted call graph for link-
ing similar identities together in a voice network and uses identity linking for a spammer
identification. We evaluate our proposed approach through experimental study using a
synthetic graph dataset for the number of graph models and different spamming behav-
iors. We find that the proposed approach achieves high linking rate with a small candidate
set size and is effective for the early identification of spammers frequently changing their
identities. We believe that EIS system can be easily applied for connecting similar profiles
in social networks by analyzing the social structure of profiles.
In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• We introduce an ID-CONNECT system, a social network and behavior based model
that links similar identities that probably belongs to a one physical individual. In
ID-CONNECT, the weights on the links between identities are computed from the
interaction rates and length of interactions. Individuals, especially spammers nor-
mally exhibit similar call behavior and have overlap in victims from their many
identities. Two identities can only be considered as similar if they have common
friends and have similar calling behavior towards common friends. ID-Connect
is a two-step approach: firstly, it estimates the weighted similarity measure be-
tween identities by considering the call behavior of identities towards their com-
mon friends. Secondly, it generates candidate set for the given identity using fixed
thresholds.
• A reputation engine that computes reputation of the individual by using call-rate,
call duration and out-degree of the individual after connecting his identities. The
input to the reputation engine is the data of linked identities formulated from the ID-
CONNECT module. We believe that reputation computed after linking identities of
an individual and analyzing his aggregate calling behavior would greatly separate
spammers from the non-spammers.
• A detection module for computing automated classification threshold below which
individuals are flagged as spammers. A dynamic automated threshold is being com-
puted for each reputation cycle using the percentile based approach.
• We validate and evaluate EIS system through a comprehensive simulation study
using a synthetic data set that we have generated using true behavior of spammers
and non-spammers. The experimental results show that EIS system outperforms
other identity linking systems and has shown effective resistance against spammers
having many identities.
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents scenarios where
users can have more than one calling identity and will provide definition of the identity
linking and spam detection problem in a voice network. Section 6.3.1 overviews the pro-
cedure by which the proposed approach link identities together to be used for computing
aggregate reputation of an individual and detection of the spammer. Section 6.4 explains
our data generation process and presents some performance evaluation metric. Section
6.4 presents experimental results for different network models and different percentages
of spammers. Section 6.5 provides discussion on an EIS system and finally, conclusions
and future works are presented in Section 6.6.
6.2 Motivation and Problem Definition
In this section, we discuss the problem of spamming in a voice network, why legitimate
users own more than one calling identity and define identity linking problem in a voice
network. Furthermore, in section 6.2.5 we provide some necessary background definitions
about social call graphs used towards design of identity linking system.
6.2.1 Spammer Network
In VoIP and other communication network (email, social network etc.), a legitimate user
can receive spam calls and messages from several spam identities. It might be possible
that several spamming identities are owned by one physical person or controlled by a one
botnet. In email network, it is estimated that there exist more than 20% overlap in the
distribution lists of the typical spammers [GCA+04] [JMG+09]. This large overlap is
because of the fact that spammers normally use automatic ways to create the target iden-
tities, harvests identities or acquires identities of targets from some sources and launched
spam attack from their different identities. The larger overlap in victim is also due to a
fixed number of users in the network. In VoIP and mobile network acquiring a new iden-
tity is virtually not very costly, support plug and play, and can be easily integrated with
the spamming systems over the Internet. A Phoneypot [GSB+15] study over two months
reveals that 36,912 unique phonetokens have received 1.3 million calls from the total of
252,621 unique sources. This can be attributed to the fact that few unique sources share
similar victims as many unique sources called phonetokens only once. The spamming
model of the spammer is presented in a Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Attack Network of Spammer.
6.2.2 Why Users Have More Than One Identity
The number of active mobile connections around the world stands at more than 7 billion1
and there are many countries where number of active cellular users are more than coun-
try’s population. For example, Russia has 1.8 times more active cellular users than its
population. This does not mean that every person in the country has exactly one mobile
phone but can be attributed to a large number of people owning multiple calling iden-
tities. Legitimate users can have multiple calling identities for various reasons such as
business and personal communications or to take advantage of cheap calling plans for the
local and long distance calls. In addition to legitimate users, there are also non-legitimate
users: users that are involved in illegally obtaining financial benefits by tricking people
with scams. Spammers can purchase a large number of calling identities for free2 or with
minimal cost 3 and can use them from anywhere across the world with a simple Internet
connection. Multiple calling identities can be misused to spread the malicious informa-
tion and spams. The reputation of an individual is associated with the calling identity.
A spamming individual can have many identities to defeat the reputation system by pre-
1GSMAIntelligence https://gsmaintelligence.com/
2google voice, inum
3http://www.voipfone.co.uk/
130 EIS: Early Identification of Spammers
tending that identities belong to multiple individuals. A spamming individual with many
identities can also use some of its identities to provide high recommendation to its other
identities so to increase their reputation and evade detection system. Furthermore the use
of Do not call lists in many countries also induce system abusers to frequently change
their identities so to reach their targets without being blocked.
6.2.3 Motivation
A spammer can have more than one calling identity either by buying identities or fak-
ing identities of legitimate users. The spammer then uses these identities to target the
legitimate users of the service provider. Connecting identities that belong to the same
individual would provide detailed view about the behavior of the individual. In the spam
detection domain, the linking of multiple identities of spammers would help in early iden-
tification of spammers and minimize the chances of Phishing and identity theft attack in a
telecommunication network. One way to limit the number of identities to one individual
is to cap the number of identities any single person can buy or impose some extra cost for
buying identities. However, this still does not ensure that acquired identities would not be
used for non-legitimate activities and it would also require a mechanism for linking simi-
lar identities if not properly linked at the time of identity purchase. However, in telephony
identities can be acquired with minimal cost and plug and play is straightforward as users
can buy SIM card or VoIP identity and start using. Another possible way to link identities
is to link IP address in-case of VoIP and IMEI number (International mobile Equipment
Identity) in-case of Mobile to link the identity and logs records of which identity belongs
to which IP-address and IMEI. However acquiring new IP-address is not costly and the
IMEI number can be manipulated. There is a strong need to have a system that automat-
ically links similar identities together using calling behavior of identities and further use
this to identify spammers and criminal rings.
The Spam detection systems presented in Chapters 4 and 5 decide about status of sub-
scriber as a spammer or a non-spammer on the basis of observed call patterns for a specific
subscriber identity. Since there is no identity linking, the spammer can easily bypass such
system by simple changing their identity or whitewashing their global reputation system
and rejoining the network. An important feature which can be used to distinguish spam-
mers from non-spammers is the overlap in victims from spammer different identities and
similar call behavior towards the overlapped victims. Beside spam detection, identity
linking would also be effective for characterizing behavior of legitimate user for their
different identities and identification of criminal groups.
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6.2.4 Problem Definition
Every telephony service provider records call transactions of its customers in a Call Detail
Record (CDR) database – a metadata that is used for a billing and network management.
CDRs usually contain information including the calling identity of parties involved in a
communication, the date and start time of calls, and the call duration of calls. In our
problem setting, raw CDRs are used to build a directed graph G = (V, E) to represent a
call network of identities V. In addition to network structure, we also have weights on the
edges E derived from the call statistics between identities such as the call rate and the call
duration. For example, in a voice social call graph, nodes are the identities of individuals
registered in a network, edges represent who calls who, and weights on edges represent
connection strength between nodes. An individual can have more than one calling identity
with a separate call graph for each calling identity. Let P denote the set of all individuals
registered in some service provider (SP) and there exists some individuals those have
more than one calling identity. Consider the set of all identities that belong to a single
individual {Pi}(Pi ∈ P). We define identity linking problem as follows.
Definition 1 (Identity linking Problem): Let GT1 and GT2 be the social call graphs
of all identities at time periods T1 and T2. The identity linking problem requires that given
some identity from GT2, to find a set of identities from GT1 that are similar to the given
identity. When Sim(ID(GT 2), ID(GT 1)) > threshold then identities are considered as
similar to each other.
The process of a identity linking is depicted in a Figure 6.2 and can be defined as
follows:
IL(ID2, ID1) =
{
True if ID2 and ID1 belong to Pi
False otherwise
The identities from GT1 can be added to the candidate set of the given identity if the
similarity score is greater than a defined threshold.
Once similar identities that belong to one physical individual are linked, the next step
is to compute the aggregate reputation of an individual by considering call statistics from
all his identities and then further makes decision whether individual is a spamming or not.
Definition 2 (Spam Decision Problem): Let P denote the set of all physical individ-
uals registered in a service provider (SP). There are some individuals that have more than
one calling identity. Consider the set of all identities that belong to the single individual
{Pi}(Pi ∈ P). We define spam detection problem as follows.
Decision(Pi) =
{
Spam; if Reputation(Pi) < Threshold
Non−Spam; if Reputation(Pi) > Threshold
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Figure 6.2: The Calling network of physical individual for two different time periods with
two different identities ID1 and ID2.
6.2.5 Background Definitions
Telecommunication operators record transactions of their users in a call detail record
(CDR) database, which is normally available in the form of plain text. In order to for-
malize our social network based identity linking system, a call graph is to be created for
each unique identity in the raw CDRs. In this section we provide definitions of terms and
notations used for the design of identity linking system.
Definition 3 (Identity): A calling identity is the telephone number or VoIP identifier
that identifies a user in a service provider and is particularly used to make and receive
calls. The service provider records every transaction of a user under this identity. An
identity can be a caller S, a callee R, or both.
Definition 4 (Call Detail Records): A CDR represents a call transaction record be-
tween a subscribers and can be mainly defined with five major fields: (S,R,T,Du); where
S and R are the identities involved in a call, T is time when the call initiated, and Du is
the duration of a call.
Definition 5 (Call Graph): A call graph G (V,E) is a directed graph where V is an
identity and E represents edges between identities. If the number of identities in V is n,
then the adjacency matrix graph is an n× n matrix in which entry ASR is equal to 1 if
(S,R) ∈ E, and 0 otherwise.
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Definition 6 (Friendship Network): Let Rin be the set of identities from whom R
receives calls and Rout be the set of identities to whom R makes calls. The combined
network is the reunion of the sets of in and out friends of an identity is (Rin ∪Rout) and
can be represented as R⊆ P.
Definition 7 (Weighted Call Graph): A weighted call graph is a call graph where
the edges between identities are assigned non-binary weights. The weighted graph can
also be represented as an adjacency matrix WG where WGSR[0,1] is the weight of link
between identity S and identity R. In a voice network these weights are assigned from the
call frequency, call duration, or both. In this chapter we use definition 8 below.
Definition 8 (Average Call Duration WSR): In ID-CONNECT, the edge weights WSR
are computed from the average call duration. The average call duration between S and R
is computed by dividing the sum of the duration of all calls (CDSR) by the total number
of calls made between S and R (CallRateSR) during a given period.
WSR =
∑CDSR
CallRateSR
(6.1)
Definition 9 (Mutual friends): Let GT1 be the friendship network of identity ID1
at T1 and GT2 be the friendship network of identity ID2 at T2. The mutual friends
MF(ID2, ID1) between ID2 and ID1 can be computed as follows:
MF(ID2, ID1) = FID2 ∩FID1 (6.2)
where FID1 and FID2 denote the set of friends of ID1 in GT1 and ID2 in GT2, respectively.
6.3 EIS: Early Identification of Spammers through Iden-
tity linking and Reputation Aggregation
In this section, we present an EIS system. The goal of an EIS system is to link identities
that belongs to a physical individual; computes reputation of an individual, and classi-
fies an individual as a spammer and a non-spammer. Specifically, EIS system consists of
three modules: an ID-CONNECT module for linking identities that belongs to a phys-
ical individual, a reputation module which computes reputation of an individual and a
classification module which computes automated threshold below which an individual is
classified as a spammer. The system architecture of an EIS system is shown in a Figure
6.3 and modules are detailed as following.
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Figure 6.3: Building Block of EIS System Consisting of Three Major Modules.
6.3.1 ID-CONNECT Module
Given CDRs for the two time periods, the goal of an ID-CONNECT module is to iden-
tify similar identities that probably belong to a physical individual. To this extent, ID-
CONNECT module uses social and call features of identities to link similar identities.
The building block of an ID-CONNECT module is shown in a Figure 6.4 and procedures
for linking identities are presented in an algorithm 6.1 which are called sequentially. The
rest of this section explains the following three concepts.
Construction of a Call Graph: The call graph of identities is constructed from the
raw CDRs of two time periods. Section 6.3.1.1 provides details of the process used for
the construction of the call graph.
Weighted Similarity Measure: The weighted similarity between a given identity
from time T2 and all identities from time T1 is computed by considering calling behavior
and social connections of identities towards friends. Section 6.3.1.2 provides details on
the procedure used for estimating similarity between identities.
Candidate Set: Once a weighted similarity between identities has been estimated,
the next step is to generate candidate set for the given identity from T2. Section 6.3.1.3
provides details on the process used for finding Candidate List(CL) of the given identity.
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Figure 6.4: The work-flow of ID-CONNECT for identity linking. The approach outputs
list of all identities from CDR1 which are similar to a given identity from CDR2.
6.3.1.1 Call-Graph Construction
A CDR contains all the information about the call transaction such as time of call, duration
of call, who originated the call, who received the call etc. The CDRs are logged at the
call processing engine or the proxy server and stored in the CDR data server. In this
chapter we consider CDRs of identities for two time periods T 1 and T 2 and construct
a weighted social call graph. From the processed CDRs if we consider node in a social
call graph as an identity of the subscribers, and a call transaction between identities as
the link connecting the two nodes. We can construct a weighted social call graph G =
(V,E,W ) , where V is the set of nodes associated to each identity, while E is the set of
link between nodes, and W is the weight on the link between nodes and is computed from
the call duration and call rate between nodes. In this chapter a non-negative weight WSR
is computed from the average call duration. After constructing the weighted call graph
our goal is to estimate the similarity between identities and generate candidate set for the
given identity.
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Algorithm 6.1 Extraction of Candidate-Set
1: procedure EXTRACTION OF MUTUAL FRIENDS ()
2: input←Call Detailed Records at Time T1 and T2.
3: output←Mutual Friend List.
4: Extract New Identities that appears at T2.
5: Extract List of Identities from T1 which have mutual friends to a given identity
from T2.
6: for each Identity from T2 do
7: if MFS(ID2, ID1)>0 then
8: add Identity to MFL(Mutual friend list).
9: else
10: do not add Identity to MFL.
11: end if
12: end for
13: end procedure
14: procedure ESTIMATING WEIGHTED SIMILARITY ()
15: input←MFL.
16: output← SIMList of Identities for a Given Identity.
17: for each User Identity and identities in MFL do
18: Compute Weighted Similarity between given Identity and identities in a MFL
using their mutual friends and equation 6.4.
19: end for
20: end procedure
21: procedure FINAL CANDIDATE-SET()
22: input← SIMList.
23: output← Final Candidate-Set for a given identity.
24: for each Identity and his SIMList do
25: if WS(IDT 2, IDSimList)>threshold then
26: add Identity to the Candidate-Set().
27: else
28: do not add Identity to the Candidate-Set().
29: end if
30: end for
31: end procedure
6.3.1.2 Estimating Similarity
A common way to estimate similarity between identities is to compute the number of
mutual friends between identities. The identities are considered similar if they have a large
number of mutual friends. Given a GT1 a friendship network of identity ID1 at T1 and GT2
a friendship network of identity ID2 at T2. The mutual friend similarity MFS(ID2, ID1)
between ID1 and ID2 can be computed by normalizing the size of MF(ID2, ID1) (as
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computed in equation 6.2) to the size of the union of the set of friends of ID1 and of ID2.
MFS(ID2, ID1) =
|MF(ID2, ID1)|
|FID2∪FID1| (6.3)
The similarity measure based on the mutual friends does not consider the strength
of the relationship between identities and their friends. The number of mutual friends
between identities increases with the size of friendship network and consequently a larger
candidate set is returned for a given identity. This would result in a high false positive on
a small similarity threshold. In general, similar identities not only have common friends
but also show similar call behavior towards them.
The calling behavior of identities towards mutual friends can provide additional infor-
mation about which two identities are more similar to each other. For instance, consider
an example of a call graph presented in Figure 6.5, where our goal is to find candidates for
an identity ID2. Identity ID2 has 6 friends, whereas identity ID1 and ID3 has three friends
each, all of them are common to the friends of ID2. The mutual network similarity of ID2
to ID1 using equation 6.3 is thus MFS(ID2, ID1) = 0.5, and network similarity of ID2 to
ID3 is MFS(ID2, ID3) = 0.5. In MFS, both ID1 and ID3 are added to the candidate set for
the identity ID2. However, we believe that identities should be considered as candidate
of a given identity not only if they have mutual friends but also if they have similar call
behavior towards mutual friends. The size of candidate set can be reduced by computing
weighted similarity measure between identities.
Definition 10 (Weighted Similarity Measure): The weighted similarity WS(ID2, ID1)
is computed as follows.
WS(ID2, ID1) =
1
OD(ID2)
∑
k∈MF
min(WIDk2,WIDk1)
max(WIDk2,WIDk1)
(6.4)
In equation 6.4, WIDk2 is the edge weight of ID2 to his k
th friend, WIDk1 is the edge
weight of ID1 to his kth friend, OD(ID2) is the out-degree of ID2 and k is the number
of mutual friends between ID1 and ID2. WS(ID2, ID1) is between 0 and 1. The more
similar the identities are in terms of common friends and behavior, the closer the weighted
similarity is to 1. On the contrary, the more dissimilar the behavior of identities towards
mutual friends, the closer the value of the weighted similarity will be to 0. Consider
again the example of the call network presented in Figure 6.5 with edge weights. The
weighted network similarity between ID2 and ID1 is greater than the similarity score
of ID2 and ID3. This is because edge weights of ID2 and ID1 towards their mutual
friends are extremely similar, whereas edge weights of ID2 and ID3 are quite different.
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Figure 6.5: An example Weighted Call Graph for a given identity ID2 from T2 and two
identities (ID1 and ID3) from T1. Without link weights ID2 is similar to ID1 and ID3 but
when link weights are considered then ID2 is more similar to ID1 than ID3 because of
similar link weights. For ease of reading, rather than showing the WGSR weight directly
on each edge, we show vector (CallRateSR,∑CDSR).
Specifically, using equation 6.4, WS(ID2, ID1) = 0.5, whereas WS(ID2, ID3) = 0.158.
With the weighted similarity measure, only ID1 is considered a candidate for an identity
ID2. If two identities have no mutual friends their similarity is zero.
6.3.1.3 The Identity-Linking Process
The identity linking process decides whether an identity in T1 should be included in the
candidate list of a given identity in T2 is as follows.
Definition 11 (Similarity Threshold): Each identity from CDR1 should be added to
the candidate list of a given identity from CDR2 if weighted similarity measure between
identities is greater than a threshold T .
CL(ID2)=
{
ID1∈CL(ID2) if WS(ID2, ID1)> T
/0 if WS(ID2, ID1)< T
A large similarity threshold would result in a small number of identities in CL because
of the requirement of maximum network and behavior similarity. This however, would
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also likely not include the identity that correctly links to the given identity. A small
threshold would likely include the identity that correctly links to the given identity, but
would include a large number of identities in the candidate set. The threshold needs
to be chosen by having trade-off between true positive (correct linking) and false positive
(incorrect linking). The candidate set can also be processed by a speech processing engine
for verification and exact matching, but at high cost. The ideal solution is that the identity
linking process produces a candidate set for the given identity and then speech processing
engine would perform speech matching process on a small candidate set, thus minimizing
the time required for the exact match.
6.3.2 Reputation Module
Reputation management is necessary to assess the trustworthy behavior of an individual
for blocking the spammers from calling, so to minimize the interaction of user with the
malicious and spamming users. The reputation of an individual is computed by aggregat-
ing the direct trust scores between individuals. Trust between individuals can be estimated
by simply considering feedback from the individuals about their call interactions or can
be estimated from call records in an automated way. In former approach, the individual
rates other individual after the end of their call transaction, however this approach require
changes in phone set and is also intrusive, thus is not feasible in actual deployment. The
later approach computes trust using information from the call detailed record. Though
these systems are non-intrusive, but are considering one feature for the trust computation
which can be easily evaded by spammers [AM13].The reputation of an individual is then
computed by aggregating the direct trust scores (feedback or trust from CDRs) .
The reputation of an individual is computed using identity of the individual. An in-
dividual can have one or more identity. If an individual have many identities and make
calls separately this would affect the reputation system as it provides incorrect view about
an individual. The solution to this issue is first link identities of an individual and then
computes reputation of an individual considering all his identities. In previous section
we presented approach for identity linking, in remaining of this section we outline an
approach used for computing trust and reputation of an individual.
In a voice network of n individuals with the linked calling identities, the service
provider computes trustworthiness of individual behavior towards others by the direct
trust scores between individuals from their call transactions. Consider a trust matrix
TrustSR, where TSR is the trust score between an individual S and the individual R. If
there is no interaction from S to R then TSR is set to 0. The trust between an individual
S and an individual R is computed by using call statistics extracted from the past call
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transactions between S and R. We use the following features for computing direct trust
between S and R: the incoming and out-going frequency and call duration between S and
R, and the out-degree of S. Specifically, given a call duration matrix, the call-rate ma-
trix and out-degree vector of all individuals, the direct trust between S and R is estimated
using equation 6.5.
TrustSR =
CDSR×CallRateSR+CDRS×CallRateRS
POS
(6.5)
The trust matrix TrustSR is generally sparse as individual usually interacts with only
few other individuals. In equation 6.5 CD is the nxn call duration matrix of n individuals,
CallRate is the nxn interaction matrix of n individuals and PO is the out-degree of n
individuals. The direct trust computed from the equation 6.5 would result in a small direct
trust scores for the individuals who have large number of short duration calls, have large
number of friends, and only receive few small duration calls from interacted individuals.
On the other hand, individuals who have long duration repetitive calls would manage to
maintain good trust towards their called individuals. From equation 6.5 we can infer that
the legitimate individuals would achieve high trust score with a large number of their
interacted individuals and spammer would have a small trust scores with a large number
of other individuals.
Algorithm 6.2 Reputation Computation
1: procedure GLOBAL REPUTATION OF ALL USERS {S}
2: input← Trust (normalized direct trust matrix, with elements TSR)
3: out put← GR (Global reputation score vector, with elements GRS)
4: precision parameter← ε
5: Initialize reputation vector GR
6: GRS = [1/POS]
7: Iterate until convergence
8: while δ < ε do
9: GR← Trust×GR
10: GR← GR/‖GR‖
11: gr←‖GR‖
12: δ ← gr−grpreviousgr
13: grprevious← gr
14: end while
15: end procedure
Once the direct trust between individuals has been computed, the next step is to com-
pute the global reputation of the individual by aggregating the direct trust score of an
individual towards all his interacted individuals. For the global reputation aggregation,
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the direct trust score of an individual must be normalized which is defined as:
TSR =
TrustSR
∑
R
TrustSR
(6.6)
The normalized TSR has values between 0 and 1, where each row sums to ∑R TSR = 1.
Consider a normalized direct trust matrix Trust from equation 6.6. Let GR be the
global reputation vector of an individual S which is computed from the iterative method
specified in algorithm 1 and presented below. The global reputation scores of all individ-
uals are then computed by performing the following iterative operation on the normalized
direct trust matrix and initial reputation vector.
GR(t+1) = Trust×GR(t) (6.7)
Initial the global reputation score is set to 1/POS i.e. if individuals have huge out-
degree they should assign small initial reputation scores. The iterative process of an
equation 6.7 continues until norm of GR that is δ= gr−grpreviousgr is less than the predefined
threshold ε .
6.3.3 Spam Detection Module
The reputation of a SPIT individual deviates much from the reputation of legitimate users
and could be used for distinguishing SPIT from the non-SPIT. In this subsection, we
show how SPIT individual can be distinguished from non-SPIT using global reputation
scores and an automatically computed threshold. A percentile based automated threshold
is computed using following method. First, the reputation scores of all users are sorted
in descending order and the threshold value is set to the 25th percentile of set. Second,
the mean of the individuals with global reputation less than the 25th percentile value is
set as a dynamic threshold for a specific time window. The procedure for classifying
individuals as SPIT or non-SPIT is presented in an algorithm 2 of Chapter 4.Individuals
can be classified as legitimate 1 or non-legitimate -1 based on a following rule:
IndividualP =
{
GRP > β × threshold ; 1
GRP < β × threshold ; -1
6.4 Experimental Data Set and Evaluation Parameters
The EIS methodology is experimental evaluated in this section. First, we verify if ID-
CONNECT module can accurately link the similar identities together, comparing with
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some other baseline identity linking solutions. Second, we examine the effect of identity
linking towards early identification of spammers.
6.4.1 Analysis of ID-CONNECT
In this section we validate ID-CONNECT module using a random data set generated
using different network models and different percentages of overlapped network. First,
we detail the process that has been followed for generating synthetic data set and identify
the evaluation parameters.
6.4.1.1 Identity Linking Data Set
There are several ways for producing synthetic graphs that can be used for generating
a call network structure similar to that of a real voice operator. In order to address all
possible network structures, we generated data for the three well known random graph
models. 1) The Erdös Réenyi model (a.k.a. ER model) [NEW05b] generates a random
graph in which edges between nodes have equal probability of existence. ER random
graph is different from real-world networks in two aspects i.e power law degree distribu-
tion and clustering coefficient. The power law degree distribution has been adopted in a
Barabási-Albert model(a.k.a. BA model) [NEW05b], which considers the phenomena of
growth and preferential attachment, yet clustering coefficient is still not adequate in a BA
model. The Watts-Strogatz (a.k.a. WS model) [NEW10] considers clustering coefficient,
power law degree distribution, shortest average path length, and also exhibits small-world
effect. Many of the voice telecommunication operators have power law degree distri-
butions (with 2 < α < 3 power law parameter), which means that a large number of
nodes have small node degree whereas a small number of nodes have very high node
degree [NEW05a], [SMS+08].
We generate random networks for 10000 users with fixed parameters for edge prob-
ability and minimum number of friends. In the ER model the edge probability between
nodes is 0.2 and the minimum number friends is greater than 10. In the BA and WS
models the average number of friends for a given node is greater than 10 with the prob-
ability of connection between nodes is 0.5. Once a call network of each node has been
generated, the next step is to assign weights on edges between nodes. Telephony users
typically show Poisson distribution [CHA2015] for their call rate; this has been used in
our simulations with average call rate of µ = 3 calls (cf. equation 6.8).
CallRateSR =
eµµe
x!
(6.8)
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Call Duration characterizes the length of communication between subscribers. Users nor-
mally have long duration calls with friends and short duration calls with their colleagues
or non-friend, but have exponential distribution on aggregate [YL07] [DDT+09]. We use
exponential distribution for the call duration with µ = 360 seconds (cf. equation 6.9).
p(CallDurationSR = x) = µe−µx (6.9)
Finally, the data is generated for two time periods. During first time period, CDRs for
10000 users is generated. For the second time period, we generate data by changing the
identity of 30% of users while the remaining 70% also appear in second time period.
The call-rate and call duration distribution for users of both time periods is same. A new
identity of the same user in T2 has some overlap in the set of mutual friends from T1 (from
1 mutual friend to complete overlap, uniformly randomly chosen) and has the same call
rate and call duration distribution parameters of his previous identity in T1. In order to
report average results we repeated each experiment 10 times.
6.4.1.2 Evaluation Parameters
We analyzed effectiveness of ID-CONNECT module using two parameters: the True
Positive Rate and the Candidate set size.
True Positive Rate (TPR): TPR is the percentage of the number of times a given
identity is correctly linked with the identity from the other time period.
Candidate Set Size (CSS): CSS is the number of candidate identities that are re-
turned for the given identity. We add identities to a candidate set of a given identity if
the similarity score of an identity from T1 and given identity from T2 is greater than a
threshold.
6.4.1.3 Other Approaches from the Literature
In next section, we compare the ID-CONNECT (labeled as IDC in evaluation graphs)
results with the following similarity measure approaches.
Out Mutual Friends: The Out Mutual Friends is number of common out friends
linked to the focused identities and is a most basic neighbor-based approach for similarity
estimation. Various approaches, such as Jaccard similarity, cosine similarities etc. have
been used for estimating mutual friend’s similarity between nodes in a graph. In this
chapter, we use Jaccard similarity measure for similarity estimation between identities
and is labeled as OMF in graphs presented in the next section.
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Out Mutual Friend’s Connections: The Out Mutual Friends Connections [ACF13]
considers the friendship links among the mutual friends of the focused identities in ad-
dition to the number of mutual friends between focused identities. In next section, Out
Mutual Friends Connection is labeled as CON.
Out-SimRank: SimRank [JW02] considers the entire graph structure to determine
the similarity between focused identities rather than by considering the neighbors of the
focused identities. In analysis, we considered out-friends of focused identities for recur-
sively computing similarity between them. We used following equation for Out-SimRank
similarity between the focused identities i.e ID2 and ID1.
S(ID2, ID1) =
C
DM
|O(ID2)|
∑
i=1
|O(ID1)|
∑
k=1
S(Oi(ID2),Ok(ID1)) (6.10)
In equation 6.10, DM = |O(ID2)||O(ID1)|, O is the out-degree of identities, C is the
constant between [0,1] and (Oi,Ok) is the out friends of friends of ID2 and ID1. In next
section, graphs for Out-SimRank are labeled as OSR.
We believe OMF and CON are the competitors to the IDC because both use direct
neighbors of the focused identities for computing similarity between focused identities.
The approaches based on mutual friends are not computational complex, however they
may have different true positives and candidate set size depending on the inclusion or no
inclusion of edge weights. On the other hand, OSR compares focused identities mutual
friends along with the entire graph structure and is computational complex compared to
approaches based on common friends.
6.4.1.4 Performance Results
In this section, we analyze the performance of ID-CONNECT for different similarity
thresholds and compare it with above mentioned approaches.
1) Threshold Variation, BA model :
We analyze the performance of the different approaches for the similarity threshold var-
ied from 0.1 to 0.9. A threshold of 0 means that the ID-CONNECT system is required
to consider every identity similar to the given identity, and thus the candidate set includes
all identities. Such a small similarity threshold would include many wrong identities. A
threshold of 1 means that a complete overlap in friendship network and a similar behav-
ior is required for considering two identities as similar. Such a high similarity threshold
would likely not include any identity in the candidate set. We highlight evaluation re-
sults in a bold for the candidate set greater than 3 and TPR greater than 80%. Figure 6.6
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(a) True Positive Rate (b) Candidate Set
Figure 6.6: Performance Results for Different Threshold and Barabási-Albert.
demonstrates that use of behavior patterns and weighted network for the similarity esti-
mation would greatly decreases the candidate-set size without affecting the TPR. From
Figure 6.6.A it is clear that TPR is almost same for all approaches for any similarity
threshold. As threshold increases, the TPR of ID-CONNECCT decreases to 20% for a
threshold of 0.9, as shown in a Figure 6.6.A. The decrease in TPR of ID-CONNECT is
due to the fact that a difference in a call rate and call duration between identities towards
their mutual friends would result in a small similarity scores between identities despite
having mutual friends. Considering weights for similarity measure also minimizes the
size of candidate set at the small thresholds without effecting TPR.
The TPR of all approaches behaves similarly up to threshold of 0.8. However, TPR
should be analyzed in connection with the size of the candidate set. The ideal approach
should have high TPR with a small candidate set. It is obvious that candidate set size
decreases with the increase in threshold as shown in Figure 6.6.B. The large number of
identities in a candidate set consumes more time and requires more resources in searching
for the correct match of the given identity with techniques such as speech processing.
From Figure 6.6.B., we observe that for most threshold values ID-CONNECT returns
only one identity for the given identity; this is the correct identity. On the other hand,
OMF has 5-9 identities in the candidate set when the threshold is smaller than 0.5 and has
candidate set size of less than 3 when the threshold approaches 1. This means that OMF
only returns the correct identity along with a small candidate set when the threshold is
high and approaching 1.
The small candidate set of ID-CONNECT is due to fact that it only considers those
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(a) True Positive Rate (b) Candidate Set
Figure 6.7: Performance Results for Erdös Réenyi.
identities as similar if identities have similar call behavior towards their common friends.
Analyzing Figures 6.6.A and 6.6.B reveals that ID-CONNECT outperform other ap-
proaches when TPR and candidate set are analyzed together. ID-CONNECT achieve
the same TPR as OMF with smaller candidate set. Particularly, ID-CONNECT reduce
candidate-set size by more than 50% for any threshold less than 0.6 and achieve similar
candidate-set size when the threshold exceeds 0.6.
2)ER and WS Models: Figures 6.7 and 6.8 presents results for the ER and WS graph
models. The candidate set size of ER model is slightly smaller than that of BA model at
small thresholds. This is because of the small clustering coefficient and non-power law
degree distribution of the ER model. ID-CONNECT achieves 100% TPR with a small
candidate set and OMF achieves similar TPR with comparatively larger candidate-set, as
shown in Figure 6.7. The increase in threshold decreases the candidate set size similarly
to the BA model.
The TPR and candidate set size for WS model are shown in a Figure 6.8. From
Figure 6.8.B it is clear that smaller thresholds yield candidate sets that are larger than
candidate sets for ER and BA models; however, at high threshold the size of candidate set
for all models is similar. The Watts-Strogatz graph model (WS) exhibits high clustering
coefficient and small world network characteristics, along with short average path lengths
to most nodes. The small world properties would probably yield comparatively larger
candidate set because of high clustering coefficient of nodes.
Analyzing TPR from 6.8.A reveals that TPR of WS is similar to those of the ER
and BA models. Comparing approaches for the TPR and candidate set show that ID-
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(a) True Positive Rate (b) Candidate Set
Figure 6.8: Performance Results for Small World Network.
CONNECT and other approaches (especially OMF) achieve 100% TPR at small thresh-
olds but as threshold increases ID-CONNECT has smaller TPR than OMF. From Figures
6.8.A and 6.8.B we can see that OMF achieves 100% TPR at threshold less than .3 with
the inclusion of more than 20 identities in the candidate set, and that ID-CONNECT
achieves the same TPR with less than 10 identities for the same threshold. The results
from Figures 6.8.A and B show that considering edge weights for identity linking in a
real network greatly reduces the candidate set size without effecting TPR.
3) Effect of Friendship Overlap: In this experiment using the BA model we varied
the number of common friends such that two identities belonging to a single physical
individual share some friends over two time periods. We assume that the identity at T2
has an overlap in friendship with the identity at T1 with different overlap percentages (i.e
80%, 50%, 30%). The call duration and call rate distributions remain the same for both
identities in the two time periods. We carried out the analysis for the BA model and for
ID-CONNECT and OMF because of their performance in the previous results. The re-
sults from figures 6.9 ,6.10 and 6.11 show that the TPR of ID-CONNECT is reasonably
high even when number of mutual friends are relatively small. The performance of ID-
CONNECT seems to be much better than that of OMF in terms of TPR and candidate
set. It is clear that the TPR of ID-CONNECT and OMF decrease with the increase in
threshold for any percentage of overlap and OMF is unable to link identities when iden-
tities share a small number of mutual friends. For this experiment, we also conclude that
ID-CONNECT and OMF would not achieve more than 70% TPR even at small thresholds
in conditions when friendship overlap is smaller than 30%.
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(a) True Positive Rate (b) Candidate Set
Figure 6.9: Performance Results for 80% Mutual Friends.
(a) True Positive (b) Candidate Set
Figure 6.10: Performance Results for 50% Mutual Friends.
(a) True Positive (b) Candidate Set
Figure 6.11: Performance Results for 30% Mutual Friends.
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4) Selection of Appropriate Threshold : The threshold specifies how much overlap
in the friendship network and call behavior is required for two compared identities to be
considered similar. A high threshold means a high number of mutual friends and a very
similar call behavior is needed; a small threshold means that a small number of mutual
friends and not a very similar call behavior is required. In the experimental results shown
in Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.6, we varied the threshold from 0.1 to 0.9. The increase in
threshold would not have any effect on TPR until 0.9 but it reduces the candidate-set size.
We need to have trade-off between candidate-set size and TPR that is a high TPR and a
small candidate-set. From results, we conclude that a threshold value in between 0.3 and
0.5 would provide optimum TPR with a small candidate set and small false positives.
5) False Positive Rate (FPR): False Positive Rate (FPR) shows the number of identi-
ties that are falsely linked. There is a tradeoff between true positive rate and false positive
rate as changing the threshold would likely to affect TPR and FPR simultaneously. The
increase in threshold would decreases the FPR and also decreases the TPR. Form the Fig-
ure 6.12, it can be seen that IDC has a small FPR (less than 1%) for the BA and ER model.
However, the FPR of WS model is very high (greater than 30%) when the threshold is less
than 0.4 but as threshold increases the FPR rate is decreased to less than 10% and further
decreases to zero as threshold reaches to 1. In WS model, user can share large number of
friends because of small world and high clustering coefficient. We can attribute this high
false positive to small world and high clustering coefficient of WS model. We particularly
adjust the threshold in such a way it should provide small false positive and high true pos-
itive. Analyzing FPR and TPR collectively, our results revealed that IDC system is able
to have acceptable TPR and FPR for the thresholds between 0.3 and 0.8 for any types of
graph network.
6.4.2 Application to Spam Detection
In this section, we analyzed the application of identity linking for identifying spammers
frequently changing their identities and compare its performance with the system per-
forming spam detection without any identity linking. In this section, we compute repu-
tation of an individual (after linking his identities) and classify individuals as spammer if
global reputation score of an individual is less than automated threshold (section 6.3.3).
6.4.2.1 Data-Set for Spam Detection
We generated a synthetic data-set for spam and non-spam users using the approach pre-
sented in [AM13] [CMP+13]. However, in this simulation setup we changed identities
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(a) False Positive Rate (b) False Positive Rate
(c) False Positive Rate
Figure 6.12: False Positive Rate for A) Barabási-Albert, B) Erdös Réenyi, and 3) Small
World Networks.
of spammers over the time for different overlaps in a friendship network. We performed
simulations for 1000 users, 250 spammers and for the five days.
We use the standard metrics to measure the performances of spam detection system.
A legitimate user that is classified as spam by the detection system is termed as a false
positive. The false positive rate is defined as the ratio of the number of false positive user
to the total number of legitimate users. A spam user that is classified as spammer by the
detection system is termed as a true positive. The true positive rate is defined as the ratio of
the number of true positive subscriber to the total number of legitimate users. An efficient
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detection system is one that achieves high true positive rate and small false positive rate.
This can also be characterized by the accuracy of the system which is the ratio of sum
of true positive and true negative to the total number of spam and non-spam users. The
TPR, FPR and accuracy are computed as TPR= TP/(TP+FN), FPR = (FP)/(TN+FP) and
ACC=(TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FN+FP). The evaluation metrics can be explained through the
confusion matrix illustrated Table 4.1 of Chapter 4.
6.4.2.2 Spam Filtering Effectiveness
Figure 6.13 presents the true positive rate for different network scenarios over the number
of days. We performed analysis for four similar networks of spammers (100%, 80%,
50% and 20% overlap in friendship network) from their different identities. The true
positive rate of non-identity linking system decreases over the time this is because the
spammer changes his identity as soon as his reputation starts falling. The detection based
on identity linking shows improvement in true positive rate as compared to non-identity
linking system. Specifically, Figure 6.13 shows that the spammers having greater overlap
in friendship network achieves high true positive rate shown in Figure 6.13.A than the
spammers having small overlap in friendship network as shown in Figure 6.13.B. This
means that in-order to bypass the system the spammer needs not to repeat the identity of
victims or repeat only small percentage of identities. The system would only achieve true
positive rate of around 60% even in five days. This small true positive is due to the fact
that linking identities together would also induce that some spammer would end up with
repetitive calling behavior with their target victims which results in high reputation scores.
IDC achieves high true positive than the non-linking system for all network scenarios.
This is because of the fact that IDC computes the reputation for individual by considering
all his identities.
The results from the Figure 6.13 reveals that true positive rate of all system except
100% similar network greatly decreases over the time. This is because of two factors:
firstly 25th percentile only detects top spammers and secondly there are many spammers
who become reputed because of repetitive calling behavior. The detection rate can be
improved blocking the identities identifies as spammers on a particular but use friendship
network of block identities for linking it to new identities from next time period.
Figure 6.14 presents the false positive rate for different network scenarios over the
number of days. We analyzed FPR for four networks (100%, 80%, 50% and 20% overlap
in friendship network). The results from Figure 6.14 reveal that all system achieves zero
false positive rates over the time. This means that no legitimate user is mistakenly blocked
by the system. We attribute this small false positive rate to the selection of classification
152 EIS: Early Identification of Spammers
(a) Same Network (b) 80% Same Network
(c) 50% Same Network (d) 20% Same Network
Figure 6.13: True Positive Rate for Different Overlaps in Victim Network.
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threshold and a reputation method that collectively use number of social and call features.
From Figure 6.14 we can also see that IDC has zero false positive for the network where
spammers have small overlap in the target victims, this is because IDC misses linking
some of the identities that belongs to the spammers, and individual spamming identities
manages reputation score greater than classification threshold.
The accuracy provides a trade-off between correct classification (that classifying spam-
mer as spammer and non-spammer as non-spammer). A high accuracy means the detec-
tion system correctly allow non-spammer and block spammer. Figure 6.15 shows accu-
racy of spam detection system for different network sizes over the number of days. Iden-
tity linking based spam detection achieves better detection accuracy than the non-identity
linking based system. Specifically identity linking based detection system achieves accu-
racy of above 85% for highly similar victims of spammer and achieves accuracy of up to
60% over the time for the small percentage of overlapped victims.
6.5 Discussion and Limitations of EIS
We presented EIS system that helps in identifying spammers frequently changing their
identities by linking similar identities that belongs to one physical individual. The service
provider can deploy EIS system as a standalone system or integrate it with call record
database or call processing system. In both implementations, the EIS system requires
access to CDRs database for the construction of call graphs of identities. The threshold
used in EIS system are adjustable and service provider can use its own thresholds for
identity linking and spamming classification based on his spam detection policies. The
placement of EIS system in a service provider has some privacy concerns but these can
be addressed using the approach presented in 4. In identity linking process, EIS can also
be used in combination with speech processing engine for validating the identities in a
candidate set for a given identity.
The proposed system has been evaluated on the synthetic data-set. Though the eval-
uation has been performed on all possible network structure but real network graphs are
different from the synthetic graphs. The system has following limitations regarding data-
set that is handling of a large amount of data, processing of sparse network structure and
classification threshold that yields small false positive and high true positive. The other is-
sue that needs to be addressed while performing analyses on real data is to find the ground
truth for the identities that belong to one individual. We believe that ID-CONNECT mod-
ule works well in number of scenarios but it can also link different spammers together
if spammers acquire target identities using same technique or acquire identities from the
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(a) Same Network (b) 80% Same Network
(c) 50% Same Network (d) 20% Same Network
Figure 6.14: False Positive Rate for Different Overlaps in Victim Network.
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(a) Same Network (b) 80% Same Network
(c) 50% Same Network (d) 20% Same Network
Figure 6.15: Accuracy for Different Overlaps in Victim Network.
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same source. Additionally, the EIS system prolonged the detection if spammer target
same victims from different identities with different call duration and call rate. Moreover,
from results for spam detection, we can see that EIS has small true positive rate when the
overlap in victim network of spammer between his identities decreases, but positive side
is that EIS has small positive rate in these conditions. We are still investigating ways to
address this issue and present a method that not only works for high overlap but also work
effectively for the small overlap.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented the design and evaluation of EIS filtering system that
decides about behavior of an individual by linking all identities that belong to the indi-
vidual. Rather than making decision for each identity, EIS system links similar identities
that belong to a one physical individual to determine whether an individual is spammer or
not. EIS system has three modules: first an ID-CONNECT module-that connects similar
identities by estimating the weighted similarity measure between identities using call and
social network features. Second, it computes reputation of an individual by using differ-
ent social network and call features, and thirdly it automatically computes classification
threshold below which individuals are considered as spammer. We have evaluated the sys-
tem on a synthetic data-set for two aspects: identity linking capability and spam detection
efficiency. Our evaluation results show that the proposed approach significantly decreases
the candidate set size while maintaining a high linking accuracy. In terms of spam de-
tection, the evaluation results show that EIS shows effective resistance against spammers
having many identities. Specifically, EIS blocks up to 60% spammers when victim over-
lap among spammer identity is high and decreases to around 20% when overlap in victim
identities is small. We believe that EIS along with content independent speech process-
ing on a candidate set would also significantly improve the identity linking process and
achieves high true positive rate.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The research presented in this thesis provides models for blocking unwanted subscribers
in a VoIP and voice networks. In this chapter, first we briefly review the contributions
made by this thesis, and secondly we briefly provide our thoughts on the future works.
7.1 Contributions
VoIP has become a cost effective mechanism for making cheap long distance and interna-
tional calls. Small and large enterprises are adopting VoIP communication because of its
integration with the Internet and cheap calling rates. These benefits of VoIP technology
have also attracted telemarketers, prank subscribers, spammers and intruders to exploit
the VoIP system for unsolicited spam calls to the subscriber of the technology. These
unwanted calls would not only degrade the productivity of humans but could also bring
some financial loss. For blocking and limiting these unwanted calls, we presented a spam
detection framework that analyzes the behavior of subscriber and incorporate collabo-
ration among service providers for the early and timely identification of spammers. The
presented framework involves modeling of behavioral patterns of a subscriber towards his
called callees, incorporates collaboration among multiple autonomous service providers
for privacy-aware collaboration and allows the linking of similar identities together for
early identification of spammers that frequently change their calling identities. Specifi-
cally, this thesis makes the following contributions:
Caller-REP: We proposed Caller-REP, a system that uses call and social network
statistics of the subscriber for the computation of subscriber’s global reputation within
the service provider network. The global reputation is then compared with the automated
threshold for determining if the subscriber is spammer or not. In particular, we provide
a system that exploits call duration of subscriber with his called callees in both direction,
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call-rate of the subscriber with his called callees in both directions and out-degree distri-
bution of the subscriber for computing direct trust of subscriber with his peer callee. The
direct trust scores of the subscriber are then used along with a power iteration algorithm
for computing global reputation of the subscriber. Finally, an automated threshold is com-
puted for determining subscriber spamming or non-spamming behavior. We analyzed the
performance of Caller-REP system using synthetic data-set that we have generated by
simulating the social behavior of spammers and non-spammers. We show that the Caller-
REP system achieves a false positive rate of less than 10% and true positive rate of almost
80% in the first two days even in the presence of a significant number of spammers. This
increases to a true positive rate of 99% and drops a false positive rate to less than 2%
on the third day. In a network with no spammers, our approach achieves a false positive
rate of less than 10%. In a network heavily saturated with more than 60% of spam sub-
scribers, our approach achieves a true positive rate of 98% and no false positives. The
results show that our approach outperforms other reputation-based detection systems in
terms of detection accuracy and detection time.
COSDS: Spammers and telemarketers target a very large number of recipients usually
dispersed across many Service Providers (SPs). Existing spam detection approaches clas-
sify a user as spammer or non-spammer based on the user’s Call Detail Records (CDRs)
at a single SP. Collaboration and Information sharing between service providers would
increase the detection accuracy but detection effectiveness depends on the amount of in-
formation shared between service providers. Having service provider’s exchange call
detail records would arguably attain the best detection accuracy but would require signif-
icant network resources. Moreover, service providers are likely to feel uncomfortable in
sharing their call records because call records contain user’s private information as well
as operational details of their network. Having service provider exchange summarized
information would reduce network usage and likely be acceptable by SP but could poten-
tially deteriorate the detection accuracy and time. To better understand the effectiveness
of collaboration for voice spam detection, we propose COSDS (Collaborative Spit De-
tection System), a collaborative reputation aggregation and spam detection system for
the VoIP network. COSDS uses a trusted Centralized Repository (CR) which computes
global reputation (GR) of end-users by aggregating their local reputation scores that are
forwarded by the collaborating SPs. The local reputation scores transferred to the CR by
the collaborating SPs are less demanding in terms of network resources and do not con-
tain call records. We evaluate our system using synthetic data that we generate through a
model of spammer and non-spammer social behavior and in a network with five collabo-
rating SPs. The results show that the COSDS approach has better detection accuracy than
the traditional stand-alone detection systems. For spammers making calls to recipients of
7.1 Contributions 159
many SPs, COSDS has True Positive (TP) rate of 80% and False Positive (FP) rate of 2%
on a first day which further increases to 100% TP rate with zero FP rate in three days.
Subject to moderate spamming rate, COSDS is able to suppress all spammers in five days
with a FP rate of less than .5%. The results also show that COSDS detection accuracy is
comparable to that of a system where collaboration is achieved through the exchange of
call records. COSDS approach is fast, requires much less communication overhead and
only requires a few iterations for reputation convergence within the SP.
EIS: Multiple identities are created to gain financial benefits by performing malicious
activities such as spamming, committing frauds and abusing the system. A single mali-
cious individual may have a large number of identities in order to make malicious activi-
ties to a large number of legitimate individuals. Linking identities of an individual would
help in protecting the legitimate users from abuses, frauds, and maintains reputation of
the service provider. Simply analyzing each identity’s historical behavior is not suffi-
cient to block spammer frequently changing identity because spammer quickly discards
the identity and start using new one. Moreover, spammers may appear as a legitimate
user on an initial analysis, for example because of small number of interactions from any
identity. The challenge is to identify the spammer by analyzing the aggregate behavior of
an individual rather than that of a single calling identity. This contribution presents EIS
(Early Identification of Spammers) system for the early identification of spammers fre-
quently changing identities. Specifically, EIS system consists of three modules and uses
social call graph among identities. 1) An ID-CONNECT module that links identities that
belongs to a one physical individual based on a social network structure and calling at-
tributes of identities; 2) a reputation module that computes reputation of an individual by
considering his aggregate behavior from his different identities; and 3) a detection module
that computes automated threshold below which individuals are classified as a spammer
or a non-spammer. We evaluate the proposed system on a synthetic data-set that has been
generated for the different graph networks and different percentage of spammers. Perfor-
mance analysis shows that EIS is effective against spammers frequently changing their
identities and is able to achieve high true positive rate when spammers have high small
overlap in target victims from their identities.
Additionally, this thesis also made following minor contributions:
Privacy Analysis of CDR’s: The call detail records normally have enough informa-
tion that can be used to infer the relationship network of target identities. The service
providers normally share anonymized data to the research organizations for extracting
meaningful information for business purposes. However, they only anonymized identi-
ties of the subscriber and the called callees leaving call duration and call time as it is in
a non-anonymized form. In chapter 5, we have shown that call duration and call time
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information can be collective used to identify the anonymized identity of the users that
further can be exploited to infer the relationship network of the these users. To overcome
this limitation, we proposed that call-time and call duration should also be anonymized
in such a way that it would not affect the accuracy of the detection system and intruders
would not be able to learn the relationship network of the target user. We experimentally
proved that anonymizing call-time and call duration would further minimize the privacy
breach through collective use of call features and would return large candidate set against
the intruder query for the target victim.
Data-Set: To-date no call detailed date set is publicly available for evaluating the
performance of detection system. Additionally, service providers are not willing to share
information about the spam attacks or call records because of privacy concerns and sensi-
tive information. Due to these issues, we synthetically generated the data-set using social
calling behavior of the spammer and non-spammer. To this extent, we have used different
graph models for generating the call graph network, used different random distributions
for generating the call-rate and call duration of user with friends and non-friends.
7.2 Future Works
Though results presented in this thesis have demonstrated the effectiveness against spam-
mers in a VoIP and voice network; however, there are several directions in which the
proposed models can be extended.
Identification of Other Call Features: In this thesis, we have used call and social
network features for computing global reputation of the subscribers within the telecom-
munication network. These features have shown great effectiveness in timely detection
of spammers. However, the presented work can be extended to utilize the call statistics
information such as call release cause codes, inter-arrival time between call requests made
by the subscriber, number of calls disconnected by the subscriber making calls and num-
ber of calls disconnected by the callee subscriber, number of failed calls, etc. We want to
integrate these call features along with the Caller-REP system in order to understand the
impact of these features on the detection performance and to minimize the false positive
rate. We would also like to investigate the ways for personalized spam detection where
the spam calls are only allowed to the specific subscribers those wish to receive these
spam and promotion calls.
Secure Multi-party Computation: In this thesis, we have relied on the use of central-
ized repository for reputation aggregation and decision about behavior of the subscriber
from collaborating service providers. However, the centralized repository can be a single
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point of failure, is not scalable, and service providers might not willing to collaborate
with the centralized repository. Instead of this collaboration, the service provider might
exchange encrypted scores with the peer collaborating service providers. We would like
to explore the idea of distributed collaboration where each service provider directly col-
laborates with his peer service provider without worrying about privacy of his customers.
This collaboration approach has two challenges: 1) privacy protection of collaborators
data, and 2) convergence and communication overhead required for reputation aggrega-
tion. To achieve these objectives, we are interested in a design of Secure Multi-party
Computation (SMC) scheme without overwhelming the network bandwidth required for
the collaboration process.
Collaboration Among Different Mobile Applications The popularity of smart phones
has attracted large number of people to replace their features phones with the smart phones
and use newly developed VoIP applications for the free voice conversation with friends
and family. There are several free VoIP calling applications are in the market for exam-
ple WhatsApp, Viber and Skype are some of the famous one. The free calling and easy
integration of these applications with the spamming tools have also attracted spammers
and scammers to target subscribers of these applications with the unwanted calls and mes-
sages. Mostly, these applications operate using mobile number of subscriber except for
Skype that uses email identity as well. A spammer can exploit subscribers of these appli-
cations in parallel or one by one. However, the effect of spamming could be minimized
with the intra-application collaboration. We would like to extend this work towards de-
sign of such spam detection application that collectively uses information from several
VoIP applications and aggregately characterize the behavior of the subscriber targeting
an application subscriber. We have already developed an android mobile application as
part of master thesis [CAR15] for detecting spammers on a standalone android mobile
device using subscriber’s call logs and collaboration among end-users. The design of
intra-application collaboration has a challenge of developing a common application pro-
gramming interface for excessing the data from different applications.
Caller ID Spoofing Caller ID spoofing is when someone change the Caller ID to
any number that he wants to display to the call recipients. Caller ID is actually meant
for providing information to callee about the person calling the callee. There are sev-
eral techniques and smart phone applications are available that can be used to spoof the
identity. It can be used to identify the telemarketers and spammers; however, spammers,
telemarketers and prank callers are spoofing identities of legitimate users to circumvent
the detection system and fraud user by pretending to be a legitimate entity. It is important
to have a system that can identify the users hiding their true identity. The challenge in
this regard is to two-folds. 1) Making decision during the call setup phase, and 2) making
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decision about identity of the caller without involving caller and the callee for a certain re-
sponse messages. The call setup messages can provide complete information about caller
location, calling identity, devices etc. and can be used to block identity spoofers.
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